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PREFACE
In the winter of 1985, the Board of Editors voted to dedicate the
combined Issues three and four of Volume 62 of the Denver University
Law Review to Dean Emeritus Daniel S. Hoffman.
. The Board of Editors invited two colleagues of Daniel Hoffman to
introduce the dedication. The Board of Editors is grateful for the efforts
of Professor James L. Winokur of the College of Law and Alex S. Keller,
President of the Colorado Bar Association, who authored the dedication
pieces which follow.
Of course the focal point of this dedication is this publication of the
Denver University Law Review. It is appropriate that the long hours and
difficult effort these combined issues of legal scholarship represent be
dedicated to Daniel Hoffman, whose own tireless effort is reflected in his
legacy-the new law center complex of the College of Law.
A brief biographical sketch is appropriate. On June 1, 1978, Daniel
S. Hoffman assumed the deanship of the University of Denver College of
Law. Like his predecessor, Robert B. Yegge, Daniel Hoffman was a
graduate of the College of Law. Prior to his return to the academic
arena, he had gained national prominence as a trial attorney and com-
piled an outstanding record of professional achievement and public
service.
Daniel Hoffman distinguished himself by serving as president of the
Colorado Bar Association, president of the Colorado Trial Lawyers As-
sociation, and as Colorado State Chairman of the American College of
Trial Lawyers during previous tenure in professional practice. He is a
former senior partner in the Denver law firm of Hoffman & McDermott.
Dan Hoffman served as Dean of the University of Denver College of Law
until June 15, 1984, when he returned to private practice. He is cur-
rently a partner at the Denver law firm of Holme, Roberts and Owen.
Board of Editors,
Denver University Law Review

TRIBUTE TO DEAN DANIEL S. HOFFMAN
JAMES L. WINOKUR*
It is a special privilege for me to participate in the Denver University
Law Review's Dedication to Dean Emeritus Daniel S. Hoffman. In addi-
tion to being my Dean for several years, Dan has been a dear friend and
personal mentor. His counsel and his example have enriched me im-
measurably, as they have profoundly enhanced this College of Law.
As I look back to meeting Dan Hoffman at the beginning of his
Deanship in 1978, I recall how immediately my expectations and
preconceptions-derived from his impressive credentials and accom-
plishments-dissolved in the face of his commanding and charismatic
presence. Dan's style and rhythm can be swiftly distracting. And yet,
part of Dan's special ability for making his ideas work is that he himself
is rarely distracted by styles and rhythms. More than once I have left a
meeting with him feeling more upbeat, but needing to carefully replay
the meeting's exchanges to fully understand and appreciate exactly how
the specific problems we addressed had been transformed. I soon real-
* Professor of Law, University of Denver. The portrait of Dan Hoffman was drawn
by Denver artist Craig Welch.
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ized that such meetings with Dan looked even better in "slow motion
replay." Dan's effectiveness was a result of careful preparation, close
attention to detail, and the ability to keep values and priorities straight
amid shifting arguments and changing facts.
I recall this perception now because my effort to assess Dan Hoff-
man's Deanship requires analogous reflection to grasp the breadth of
his influence. My first impulse is to describe Dan's leadership in terms
of his personal style-a "breath of fresh air." This style is most immedi-
ately reflected in the contrast between our dingy old downtown law
center and the beautiful new Lowell Thomas Law Building, with its sky-
lights, its spacious "Student Street" and its glorious, vibrant colors. I
remember the student-published Denver Law Forum welcoming "Dean
Dan," and the sudden emergence of the Spring Revue, the Student Bar
Association Art Show (complete with live music!), and the excitement of
the Barristers' Cup moot court intramurals. Each of these new College
of Law institutions picked up on the special style of our new Dean, and
each improved the school.
Dan's accomplishments as Dean, however, reach far beyond these
few improvements, to a host of developments on which a quality law
school must rest. Sorting carefully back through the accomplishments
of Dan's tenure as Dean, his energetic style and contagious enthusiasm
are grounded in an even more impressive context of careful planning
and building. Dan's tireless, methodical, substantive groundwork in
positioning our College of Law for a strong future stands together with
his personal flare and charisma as fundamental components of his leg-
acy. In honoring Dan, it is essential to recount the breadth and quality
of that extensive groundwork.
The most obvious aspect of Dan Hoffman's groundwork is the most
tangible-making our magnificent new Law Center a reality. From the
first opportunity to acquire our new campus, Dan (with major contribu-
tions by Professors Bill Beaney, John Carver, Al Coco, and Associate
Dean Jack Hanley) led the process by which the College of Law became
the University of Denver's prime occupant here, with new and renovated
facilities equal to or better than many of America's finest law schools.
Additionally, our new facilities and campus are designed to allow further
development that promises to change legal education in this region and
elsewhere. Dan's development of the Inns of Court concept-a law
center incorporating public interest legal institutions, practicing attor-
neys, convention facilities for legal meetings and conferences, and tech-
nologically advanced academic and library facilities-has attracted
national interest from legal educators and institutions.
Dan Hoffman's role in developing the new law school facilities
demonstrated his wide array of personal abilities. Dan repeatedly
blended his visionary Inns of Court concept with meticulous attention to
detail. Throughout the building of the Lowell Thomas Law Building
and relocation from downtown Denver, he combined a strength of per-
sonality with a grace and personal sensitivity that allowed those working
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with him, including the University Administration and Trustees, build-
ers, and financiers to comfortably support the project. When the Col-
lege of Law was threatened, first with a demand that it be fully housed in
the existing Colorado Women's College buildings, and later with a 95
percent reduction in the furnishings and equipment budget, Dan suc-
cessfully pressed for the new Lowell Thomas Law Building, substantially
equipped, which conformed closely to the original Inns of Court law
center plan.
The development of the new College of Law facility, impressive as it
is, is only part of Dan Hoffman's contributions to the College of Law as
Dean. In many respects, his intangible contributions are of even greater
import. Dan was, and to this day remains, an advocate par excellence for
the College of Law in a range of settings. Dan Hoffman impressed upon
our graduates the crucial role of Alumni responsibility in developing
and maintaining an excellent law school. Alumni support for the Col-
lege of Law is, consequently, stronger than ever. The Colorado Bar ex-
hibits an improving respect for, and involvement in, the College of Law.
Dan was also a strong advocate within the University. The College of
Law enjoys a status of academic pre-eminence among University of Den-
ver's colleges and departments. Dan kept the law school integrally in-
volved with and supportive of the University while retaining the
University Administration's assistance regarding College of Law needs.
It is no accident that the College of Law and the University were able
and willing to attract a new Dean of the stature and ambition of Yale
Law School Deputy Dean Ed Dauer in the wake of Dan Hoffman's
leadership.
Dan Hoffman's achievements as an "outside Dean"--developing
the new law center facility, and building new and improved relations
with Alumni, the practicing Bar, and the University Administration and
Trustees-are complemented by his major internal accomplishments, all
ultimately in the service of improving the quality of our students' legal
education. In 1978, when he assumed the helm of a school sometimes
thought to be academically permissive, Dan sounded a different note. In
his first orientation address to students, he emphasized his own particu-
lar and peculiar work ethic by suggesting that students having difficulty
meeting the challenge of law school should make more time for study by
sleeping only four hours per night! Those remarks signaled a new,
more disciplined era in which graduation requirements and academic
standards were raised.
Dan paid special attention to the development of legal writing and
research skills, particularly for first-year law students. Before Dan's arri-
val at the College of Law, existing writing courses were optional, and
some students graduated with no training in legal writing. Additionally,
the skills-oriented writing courses faced substantial budgetary and ad-
ministrative obstacles. Dan Hoffman, in concert with a Faculty commit-
tee, quickly addressed these problems and clarified his own commitment
to a strong legal writing program. Early in his tenure, a Legal Research
1985]
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and Writing Program was implemented for all first-year law students.
Dan recruited former Colorado Supreme Court ChiefJustice Edward E.
Pringle to administer this new, required course. In keeping with this
new emphasis, additional writing requirements have been incorporated
in other courses and several professors have elected to use take-home
essay exams or written exercises which require careful reflection upon
and analysis of complex legal problems.
The Hoffman administration (including Associate Deans John
Reese and Jim Wallace, and Registrar Irmgard Vragel) further improved
our law students' experience by implementing a series of tighter aca-
demic policies. The security of anonymity in grading is now assured.
Grading deadlines are applied more strictly. The Faculty evaluation
process is more regularly administered, with results withheld until
Faculty members have submitted grades, and the results then conve-
niently and widely disseminated. Perhaps more important than these
reforms is the development of a stronger adjunct faculty. Not only are
qualified practitioners carefully identified and recruited to make their
unique teaching abilities available to law students, but as adjunct Faculty
they are more actively evaluated and kept abreast of emerging changes
in academic policies and standards.
Dan Hoffman also led the reorganization of the Advocacy Skills Pro-
gram. The most fundamental development in Advocacy Skills occurred
at the very beginning of Dan's Deanship, when our clinical staff attorney
positions were incorporated into the tenured faculty. By changing the
status of our clinical Faculty members, assigning them classroom
courses in addition to their Student Law Office responsibilities, and re-
quiring scholarly writing of them, the University of Denver's traditional
leadership in clinical law training has been greatly enhanced. Faculty
status and faculty-level compensation have allowed the College of Law
to attract clinicians with strong credentials and serious academic ambi-
tions who have responded with innovative classroom teaching and out-
standing scholarship.
In strengthening the College's Advocacy Skills Program, Dan has
also supported the moot court, client counseling, and mock trial pro-
grams. With Dan's encouragement, in 1985 this school is a national
leader in intermural student competitions. Since 1978, teams from the
College of Law's Barristers' Cup Program for Excellence in Appellate
Advocacy, theJessup International Law Program, the Client Counseling,
and Mock Trial Programs have captured regional championships and
placed very high in national competitions.
Especially in the early years of his Deanship, Dan Hoffman worked
effectively to build a stronger, more productive faculty. Our faculty re-
cruitment efforts became more aggressive and produced a new genera-
tion of professors around whom our College of Law can be built. Thus,
the period from 1978 to 1984 under Dean Hoffman saw the addition, as
permanent Faculty, of Professors Sandra Blackstone (formerly Deputy
Director for Energy and Mineral Resources, Bureau of Land Manage-
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ment, United States Department of the Interior, and a Denver University
Law Alumna); Jerome Borison (CPA and JD, with Master of Laws from
New York University's tax program); Thomas Crandall (nationally rec-
ognized scholar in commercial law, with law teaching experience at
North Carolina, Buffalo, Gonzaga and, for 1985-86, a visitorship at the
University of Texas); William Creech (hired from the Master of Taxation
Faculty of New York University); Paul Stephen Dempsey (Director of our
Transportation Law Program, and a nationally recognized authority and
government advisor on issues of transportation and other industrial reg-
ulation); Robert Hardaway (Order of Coif graduate of New York Univer-
sity and widely-experienced Colorado litigator, now assigned to our
Advocacy Skills Program); Sheila Hyatt (former Missouri Assistant At-
torney General, recognized for important research in "Litigating the
Rights of Handicapped Children to an Appropriate Education," now as-
signed to our Advocacy Skills Program); Stephen Pepper (educated at
Stanford and Yale, and emerging as a scholar of substantial national im-
pact in Church-State constitutional issues); George W. Pring (cum laude
graduate of both Harvard and Michigan, Environmental Defense Fund
Regional Counsel, and nationally recognized as a leading pro-environ-
mental litigator); Edward E. Pringle (former Colorado Supreme Court
Chief Justice); Edward J. Roche (JD, CPA, Comment Editor of the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review and former advisor to the United States
Treasury Department's Office of Tax Legislative Counsel); G. Kellam
Scott (nationally recognized advocate and analyst of federal assistance to
minority-owned small businesses); and John Soma (widely recognized
author and speaker on emerging issues of computers and the law, for-
mer trial attorney and Chief Administrative Officer of the United States
Justice Department's Anti-trust Division).
Enhancing his efforts to strengthen our Faculty, Dan played a signif-
icant role in revamping tenure and promotion policies and recently in-
stituted substantial release-time opportunities to encourage Faculty
scholarship. Hughes Foundation grants and sabbatical leaves to facili-
tate and encourage research were also encouraged by the Hoffman
administration.
Each of Dan Hoffman's contributions has made the University of
Denver College of Law a more attractive school for Students and
Faculty. These many contributions present Dean Designate, Ed Dauer,
the Faculty, and Staff with new and realistic opportunities to move the
University of Denver College of Law forward into the ranks of excellent,
nationally respected law schools.
Many of us who worked with Dan during his six progressive years
look back on that period with appreciation for more than the new law
center facilities, the improved, rigorous curriculum, and the strong, new
faculty additions. For Dan's Deanship has-more than anything else-
reflected an extraordinary regard and respect for the dignity of each
person. As we debated the issues that confronted an improving law
school, and argued the most delicate and painful of policies and contro-
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versies, Dan steadfastly anchored our efforts with his respect for the in-
dividual that has characterized his entire career. When the inevitable
personal frictions arose during Dan's tenure, he repeatedly reminded
each of us the other's perspectives and concerns. When a colleague
confronted a personal crisis, professional or otherwise, Dan was quick to
offer encouragement, and often assistance and advice. On a Faculty and
Staff of varied personalities and styles, it is an extraordinary commen-
tary that so very many of us view Dan Hoffman as a special, personal
friend.
These perceptions of Dan Hoffman are the product of a code Dan
vividly laid out for us in his first address to the Faculty, as a Dean candi-
date in early 1978. In the strongest possible language he said that, of
his values and principles, he considered the most important to be per-
sonal loyalty and commitment. As Dean, Dan Hoffman consistently
lived out this early commitment to us and the College of Law.
Dan Hoffman's tenure was a Deanship of personal grace; a Dean-
ship of humanism; and a Deanship of healing. It has ultimately been a
Deanship of friendship. When the Faculty and Staff searched for an ap-
propriate gift to express their affection and regard for Dan's years as
Dean, the traditional placques, clocks and desk sets seemed to miss the
essential spirit of this special leader. In the end, we chose a porcelain
sculpture of four dolphins, playfully leaping from the ocean's surface.
In selecting this gift, we tried to reflect tangibly the intangibles that have
meant so much to us-the intelligence, the energy, the grace, and thefriend-
ship which we so deeply appreciate in our "Dean Dan."
DAN HOFFMAN-A UNIQUE PERSON
ALEX S. KELLER*
Readers of this volume will learn a great deal of detail about Dan
Hoffman's background and contributions to our community. He was an
outstanding President of the Colorado Bar Association and has been in-
volved with nearly every board and committee of both the Denver and
Colorado Bar Associations. He is past president of the Colorado Trial
Lawyers Association, a Fellow of the International Society of Barristers,
and a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers, including past
service as State Chairman.
While Dan is widely known for his outstanding work as Dean of the
University of Denver College of Law, my own perception of him is in the
role of a trial lawyer. He is one of the finest attorneys this state has ever
produced, and it has been a privilege to be in court with and against Dan
on several occasions. His personality, humanity, and kindness have per-
meated every court proceeding and negotiating session which I have wit-
nessed. I have been especially impressed with Dan's professionalism
and personal humility in the face of very difficult and strained
stituations.
Dan's personal commitment to civil rights has been a lifetime hall-
mark of his own personal philosophy, and he has always been dedicated
to improving the quality of life for others in every facet of our society.
Moreover, he has approached this difficult task with vigor and a youthful
attitude. The entire community, and particularly the legal community,
has benefited greatly by Dan Hoffman's service.
* President, Colorado Bar Association.
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CIVIL ACTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY:




The term "anomalous" jurisdiction' evokes amorphous notions
which even the well-schooled legal mind would not easily grasp. Yet the
term has been applied to incidents in which federal courts, without stat-
utory authority, have provided a forum to entertain independent actions
for the return of property wrongfully held by federal officers. Normally,
a Motion for the Return of Property is made pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41(e).2 When federal officers or
agencies hold property, and no indictment or information has been
filed, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply. 3 The ag-
grieved individual is left without statutory recourse, compelling the cre-
ation of a judicially-devised jurisdiction, coined "anomalous"
jurisdiction to entertain such independent actions for the return of
property.4 The anomalous character of such suits is evinced by their
characterization as a hybrid civil-criminal procedural vehicle.5 Despite
its exercise by the federal courts, the difficulty in pinning down the con-
cept to a particular jurisdictional premise could lead skeptical commen-
* Professor of Law, Western State University (San Diego Campus). B.A. University
of Pittsburgh, 1967; J.D. California Western, 1974; LL.M. Columbia University, 1975.
1. Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684, 688-89 (D. Mass. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961
(1965). The Lord opinion coined the term "anomalous" for seeking return of property
illegally held by the I.R.S. in the absence of any criminal proceedings which would have
triggered the Rule 41 (e) Motion for Return of Property. Lord appeared to limit this relief
to situations involving threatened criminal prosecutions rather than to civil or administra-
tive actions. Id. at 689.
2. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) provides:
Motion for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure may move the district court for the district in which the property was
seized for the return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful
possession of the property which was illegally seized. The judge shall receive
evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the mo-
tion is granted the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in
evidence at any hearing or trial. If a motion for return of property is made or
comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or information is
filed, it shall be treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
3. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern criminal proceedings. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 1 (scope of rules) & 2 (purpose of rules). Prior to the filing of an indictment or
information, there are no proceedings. Contra Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoo-
ver, 327 F. Supp. 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
4. Independent actions of this sort are noted in 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE 762 n.42 (2d ed. 1982).
5. FED. R. CraM. P. 41 (e) is inapplicable absent indictment, and the exercise of civil
jurisdiction typically precludes further criminal proceedings.
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tators to question its very existence. It is obvious that anomalous
jurisdiction exists merely by virtue of its repeated exercise.
Property can come into the government's hands many ways, but
generally possession results from voluntary or involuntary disclosure.
6
When the government holds property for an extremely long period of
time,7 there is a potential conflict with the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable seizures. 8 Parties have thus attempted to invoke
the anomalous jurisdiction of the court by alleging violations of the
first, 9 fourth,' 0 fifth,"' and sixth 12 amendments of the United States
Constitution.
This article will analyze the jurisdictional and practical problems
which result from the exercise of anomalous jurisdiction. It is main-
tained that the recent elimination of the amount-in-controversy require-
ment in cases involving federal questions' 3 does away with the
procedural potholes associated with its exercise. Furthermore, it is
urged that Congress enunciate a statutory basis for return of property
which is held unreasonably in situations where no indictment has been
issued. Such legislation would eliminate the drain upon judicial re-
sources caused by repeated attempts to ascertain the source and nature
of anomalous jurisdiction. '
4
6. Voluntary disclosure results from consent. See, e.g., Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d
426, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1977) (action for return of records and accounts voluntarily loaned
to I.R.S. agent, successful on ground of subsequently withdrawn consent); Richey v.
Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 1241 (5th Cir. 1975) ("anomalous" jurisdiction exists to hear and
determine allegations of invalid consent for permission given to I.R.S. agent to take busi-
ness records).
Involuntary disclosure results from searches. See, e.g., the search and seizure provi-
sions of FED. R. CaIM. P. 41.
7. See, e.g., Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 17 (7th
Cir. 1978) (hearing required, not on legality of search, but constitutionality of holding
property for 17 months without charging plaintiff with criminal offense).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
9. See Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(first and fourth amendment claims arising from F.B.I. surveillance activities).
10. See Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1977) (anomalous jurisdic-
tion found in action for return of materials voluntarily loaned by taxpayer to I.R.S., analyz-
ing consent cases in fourth amendment context).
11. See Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1281 (5th Cir. 1983) (fourth and fifth
amendment claims of plaintiff are justiciable under section 1331, the general federal ques-
tion statute); Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 1241 (5th Cir. 1975) (anomalous jurisdiction
existed in case alleging violation of Miranda rights).
12. See Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (alleged violations of
fifth and sixth amendments, but complaint dismissed due to a lack of equity jurisdiction).
13. In 1976, Congress deleted the $10,000.00 minimum-amount-in-controvery re-
quirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for subsequent actions "brought against the United States,
any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity." Act of Oct.
21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976).
In 1980, Congress deleted the minimum amount in controversy for subsequent
§ 1331 federal question suits. Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369
(1980).
14. The problem of anomalous jurisdiction warrants more commentary than it has
received. "Anomalous" jurisdiction is addressed in 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 762 n.42 (2d ed. 1982). The Motion for Return of Property is also addressed
in 8BJ. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 41.06[5] (2d ed. 1983). Other commentary
now relevant to injunctive relief against federal officers includes Comment, The Supervisory
ANOMALOUS JURISDICTION
I. SOURCE OF ANOMALOUS JURISDICTION
A. The Development of Anomalous Jurisdiction
If it can be said that a legal concept can have an ancestor, then one
might trace the roots of anomalous jurisdiction to attempts by the
Supreme Court to extend protection to federal litigants under the
Court's "supervisory power." This power was first applied to ensure the
proper administration of criminal trials in federal courts, 15 and was sub-
sequently extended to govern non-judicial acts of officials in other
branches of government. 16 Consequently, when in a pre-indictment
context, a party was not "aggrieved" within the meaning of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41 (e), 17 the lack of existing criminal proceedings
technically foreclosed the possibility of a remedy. Because judicial relief
is said to have developed as a means for protecting citizens from
procrastinating officers, anomalous jurisdiction could owe its develop-
ment to the nonstatutory supervisory power to control officers of the
court.
Still, the theoretical basis of a pre-indictment jurisdiction to return
illegally held property is difficult to ascertain and, therefore, in need of
clarification. 18 One major area of confusion is whether to apply the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.1 9 Some opinions have boldly suggested that the criminal rule
allowing a Motion for the Return of Property may be read broadly to
encompass pre-indictment relief,20 but the question remains open.
Power of Federal Courts, 76 HpAsv. L. REV. 1656, 1660-64 (1963) (Supervision Over Execu-
tive) and the law review articles cited in C. WIGrr, LAw oF FEDERAL COURTS 180 n.25 (4th
ed. 1983) (questioning former jurisdictional amount in controversy for injunctive suits
against federal officers).
15. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (supervisory power extends to
proper administration of criminal justice in federal courts).
16. See Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO. L.J. 1050,
1062 (1965) (Supervision Affecting Out of Court Behavior of Nonjudicial Officers); Com-
ment, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 -ARv. L. REV. 1656, 1660-64 (1963)
(Supervision Over Executive).
17. See supra note 2.
18. In the recent case addressing confusion in the case law, the ChiefJudge's concur-
ring opinion referred to anomalous jurisdiction as "a confused body of caselaw in need of
clarification." Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1285 (5th Cir. 1983) (Clark, CJ., concur-
ring). The majority responded that the cases cited in the ChiefJudge's opinion were con-
sistent with its disposition of the case, noting that he had not shown why the doctrine is
confusing. Id. at 1282 n.4. Cases in other districts, which analyze the confusion regarding
the propriety of such a motion, include In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453,458 (2d Cir.) (addressing
property rights in context of pre-indictment return motion), cert. dismissed, 332 U.S. 807
(1947); Donlon v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 979, 980 n.5 (D. Del. 1971) (cases not uni-
form); Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963) (tracing theoretical difficulties
with anomalous jurisdiction), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
19. See In re J.W. Schonfeld, Ltd., 460 F. Supp. 332, 334 (E.D. Va. 1978) (Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are fully applicable); Silbert v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 765,
768 (D. Md. 1967) (field of pre-indictment motions should be reviewed and clarified);
Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D. Mass. 1963) (action not in all aspects subject to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); United States v. Bell,
120 F. Supp. 670, 672 (D.D.C. 1954) (motion incidental or ancillary to pending criminal
action, and so closely associated with criminal proceeding, it should be deemed part of it).
20. In re Worksite Inspection of Quality Prod. Inc., 592 F.2d 611, 614 (1st Cir. 1979)
1985]
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One practical aspect of this area of the law is nevertheless clear:
when property is held by federal officers, aggrieved individuals must
seek its return in a federal court. Although the Supreme Court has not
decided whether state courts can enjoin federal officers, it denied certio-
rari to a Third Circuit case so holding.
2 1
Initially, the exercise of anomalous jurisdiction in civil federal ques-
tion cases presented two problems, yet only one remains. The first
problem, now non-existent, was that plaintiffs faced the procedural hur-
dle of meeting the 10,000 dollar requirement for federal question
cases. 2 2 The problem was exacerbated when a failure to allege federal
question jurisdiction transformed the action into a controversy concern-
ing federal taxes, 23 in which case the return of property violated the
Anti-Injunction Act. 24 Nevertheless, these problems were remedied by
elimination of the 10,000 dollar requirement in federal question cases.
The remaining problem is ascertaining an acceptable basis for the
exercise of this judicial power,2 5 because the federal question statute
does not independently confer subject matter jurisdiction, nor does it
provide any insight concerning how the aggrieved individual should
proceed. Plaintiffs are, therefore, filing independent actions by way of
petition, motion, or complaint. 2 6 The following section will address the
various jurisdictional premises for the exercise of anomalous
jurisdiction.
(Rule 41 (e) allows for pre-indictment motion for return of property); Smith v. Katzenbach,
351 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (en banc) (equitable result can be reached by broad
reading of Rule 41(e)); Klitzman v. Krut, 591 F. Supp. 258, 266 (D.N.J. 1984) (Rule 41(e)
contemplates pre-indictment relief); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F.
Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Rule 41(e) can be basis for jurisdiction to hear motion for
pre-indictment relief from an unconstitutional search and seizure); Lord v. Kelley, 223 F.
Supp. 684, 687 (D. Mass. 1963) (supposition that Rule 41 (e) applies only after indictment
is incorrect), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
21. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm. v. McGinnes, 278 F.2d 330, 331 (3d Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 820 (1960).
22. See supra note 13 regarding amendments to the federal question requirement.
23. See, e.g., Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 36 (5th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff did not
contend that § 1331 federal question jurisdiction is applicable, thus avoiding characteriza-
tion of controversy as one concerning federal taxes rather than case involving solely search
and seizure), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). Further, a tax audit is not preliminary to or
in connection with a judicial proceeding. United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 479-80
(1983).
The Anti-Injunction Act is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982). This Act is analyzed
infra text accompanying notes 125-32.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
25. As stated by ChiefJudge Clark of the Fifth Circuit, "[t]he exercise ofjurisdiction
was 'anomalous' because the federal courts had created their own jurisdiction without any
constitutional or statutory basis in the face of inconsistent, if not antithetical, Congres-
sional expression." Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1285 (5th Cir. 1983) (Clark, C.J.,
concurring).
26. Jurisdiction was granted, even in early pre-indictment suppression cases initiated
by motion, petition, or a bill in equity. Goodman v. Lane, 48 F.2d 32, 35 (8th Cir. 1931)
(citing authorities). Jurisdiction in modern return of property cases is similarly noted
whether initiated by petition, motion, or complaint.
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B. Jurisdictional Premises for Anomalous Jurisdiction
As stated, there is no statutory or constitutional authority for the
exercise of anomalous jurisdiction. The cases expressly 27 or impliedly
exercising it have found or suggested that its doctrinal existence is
rooted in one of five (arguably six) supporting theories: (1) the inherent
power of supervision (within which the sixth category, "reaching for-
ward," arguably exists); (2) a general equity jurisdiction; (3) vitiated
consent; (4) constitutional tort; and (5) general federal question
jurisdiction.
1. Inherent Power of Supervision
The Supreme Court has not authoritatively defined the constitu-
tional source of its supervisory power over the judicial branch of govern-
ment.2 8  The scope of such a power over executive officers is
questionable. Therefore, the inquiry is: how far can this power be
stretched? The most sweeping pronouncement came in 1963, in the
case of Lord v. Kelley:
[I]t seems to this Court that the Supreme Court has extended
or will extend the anomalous jurisdiction as to reach unlawful
searches and seizures by a federal agent connected with the en-
forcement of law ....
To this Court, the indications are that the Supreme Court
intends that where a federal criminal prosecution is probable, a
federal trial court shall have non-statutory jurisdiction to enjoin
federal enforcement officers from holding or using property
they unlawfully seized.
2 9
The message of this oft-cited case has been applied to agents of the
I.R.S., 30 O.S.H.A., 3 1 Customs Service, 3 2 E.P.A.,33 F.B.I., 34 Bureau of
Narcotics, 35 a private attorney,
36 the Postal Service, 37 and the D.E.A.
38
27. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 724 F.2d 1157, 1159-60 (5th Cir. 1984); Linn v.
Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1983); Pieper v. United States, 604 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir.
1979); Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977); Meier v. Keller, 521 F.2d 548 (9th
Cir. 1975); Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1975); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497
F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1974); In re Campola, 543 F. Supp. 115, 116 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Resmondo
v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 19, 20 (S.D. Fla. 1981); In reJ. W. Schonfeld, Ltd., 460 F.
Supp. 332 (E.D. Va. 1978); Dolan v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 979 (D. Del. 1971); Lord
v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
28. See generally United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ohio 1966) (motion
successful in context of threatened civil enforcement proceeding); Hill, The Bill of Rights
and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 193-213 (1969) (Supreme Court has actu-
ally avoided consideration of the constitutional basis for the judicial supervisory power).
29. Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684, 688-89 (D. Mass. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961
(1965) (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1983).
31. See, e.g., Marshall v. Central Mine Equip. Co., 608 F.2d 719, 721 (8th Cir. 1979).
32. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 466 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1979).
33. See Pieper v. United States, 604 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir. 1979) (reversing trial
court determination that E.P.A. employee not officer of the court).
34. See Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
35. See Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (citing Rea v. United
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The supervisory power has been applied in a civil context also;39
therefore, this basis for the exercise of anomalous jurisdiction would
seemingly apply whether an action be deemed civil or criminal in nature.
Application of the supervisory power in civil matters, however, may be
stretching the judicial canvas too far beyond Justice Frankfurter's pru-
dential concern in McNabb:
[W]e confine ourselves to our limited function as the court of
ultimate review of the standards formulated and applied by fed-
eral courts in the trial of criminal cases. We are not concerned
with law enforcement practices except in so far as courts them-
selves become instruments of law enforcement.
40
Extending the supervisory power to executive agents, who are not
officers of the court, could conflict with the doctrine of separation of
powers.41 In addition, a civil damage remedy may arise directly under
the fourth amendment;4 2 therefore, injunctive relief protecting the same
constitutional guarantees need not arise under the comparatively amor-
phous supervisory power. Sanctioning a nonstatutory remedy in this
context goes beyond the judicial housekeeping function of the supervi-
sory power. 43 Combined with the proposition that "the effect of the
Fourth Amendment in civil cases is not totally settled,"'44 to enjoin fed-
States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (enjoining federal narcotics agent from testifying in state
proceeding)).
36. See Meier v. Keller, 521 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1975) (attempt to enjoin private
attorney from cooperating with government under anomalous jurisdiction).
37. See Hitzman v. Krut, 591 F. Supp. 258, 266 (D.N.J. 1984).
38. See DeMassia v. Nunez, 747 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984).
39. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946). In exercising the super-
visory power, the Supreme Court determined that blanket exclusion of a certain socio-
economic group from jury services tarnishes administration of civil justice in federal
courts. See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (private books, invoices, and
papers constitutionally inadmissible in criminal proceedings, also determined inadmissible
in related civil proceedings); United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180, 184 (N.D. Ohio
1966) (court determined illegally seized property not related to the crime must be
returned).
40. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
41. See Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 203
(1969); Morris, The End ofan Experiment in Federalism-A Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WASH. L.
REv. 407,427 (1961); Comment, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARv. L. REv.
1656, 1661 (1963).
42. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (cognizable money damage claim for violation of fourth amendment arises directly
under the Constitution itself). After Bivens, the Federal Tort Claims Act was amended to
provide statutory relief against the United States for the constitutional torts of its federal
officers. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982). Congress is currently considering limiting the
individual liability of federal officers, who are typically judgment-proof, by amending the
Act to preclude tort claims against them. See Bell, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Tort
Claims At, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 1 (1979).
43. See supra text accompanying note 40. Further, one might infer a Supreme Court
position that the supervisory power of the federal courts does not embrace the ability to
regulate I.R.S. agents. Eastus v. Bradshaw, 94 F.2d 788, 789 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 576 (1938).
44. Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 403 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
The effect, in terms of a damage remedy, became clearer in Bivens, see supra note 42,
while the effect of an injunctive remedy remained hazy. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FED-
ERA. CouRTs 180 n.25 (4th ed. 1983) (collected law review articles discussing this issue).
In searches conducted by administrative agencies the supervisory power of the courts
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eral officers from retaining illegally held property is better rooted in
some ground other than the inherent power of supervision.
45
It might be contended that the doctrine of reaching forward4 6 is an
independent ground for the exercise of anomalous jurisdiction, yet it is
unlikely such a contention would succeed in light of the doctrine's char-
acterization as an exercise of a court's equitable powers, 47 and as an
exercise of the supervisory powers.48 The cases discussing this theory4 9
have accordingly failed to link it to any single jurisdictional basis. One
thing does, however, remain clear: the reaching forward concept is not
a distinct basis for the exercise of anomalous jurisdiction. Rather, it is
better recognized as a means of portraying the factual circumstance trig-
gering the exercise.
2. General Equity Jurisdiction
As early as Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court alluded to the
right of an injured party to claim protection of the laws. 50 Where no
"law" exists, the equity side of modern federal courts5 ' is alert to grant
may be even less effective than in criminal searches. This is because "[p]robable cause in
the criminal law sense is not required." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320
(1978); accord United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (no requirement of probable
cause for search where taxpayer fraud is suspected unless it is shown enforcement of ad-
ministrative order would be an abuse of judicial discretion).
45. See, e.g. Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 33 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 927 (1975). The Hunsucker court exemplifies the uncertainty and split of authority
regarding the supervisory powers of the courts. The court observes that the earlier cases
suggest a court's power is limited solely to officers of the court, but such power does not
extend to non-officers such as I.R.S. agents. The court then states that the more recent
trend suggests a court's powers do extend to non-officers such as I.R.S. agents. The court,
however, says it will pretermit the issue of the court's power and simply "assume" it has
supervisory powers over I.R.S. agents. Contra In re Wilton Assoc., Ltd., 49 F.R.D. 170, 172
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court, after recognizing that one is not "aggrieved" under Rule
41(e) absent indictment, states that "[o]ur jurisdiction, therefore, must rest upon the gen-
eral supervisory power of federal courts over federal law enforcement officials. ... (em-
phasis added).
46. This particular theory was best stated in Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1, 3 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 762 (1933): "Though no indictment be pending, the court may
reach forward to control the improper preparation of evidence which is to be used in a
case coming before it, and can always by summary procedure restrain oppressive or unlaw-
ful conduct by its officers." Foley was relying on the Supreme Court decision in Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 354-55 (1930) (where complaint for return
of property alleged unconstitutional seizure, U.S. Attorney and prohibition agents subject
to power of the court).
47. See, e.g., Pieper v. United States, 604 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir. 1979).
48. See, e.g., Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
49. See Pieper v. United States, 604 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Rapp, 539 F.2d 1156, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1976); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 32 n.3
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 815-
16 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Foley v. United States, 643 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1933).
50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (the "very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
wherever he receives an injury").
51. The merger of law and equity courts was established by the 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In other words, there is only one form of action, regardless of whether
relief is at law or in equity.
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relief for federally protected rights.5 2 In that anomalous jurisdiction is
an extension of federal authority to protect individual rights when statu-
tory law is lacking, the doctrine could find a viable theoretical basis in
the general equity jurisdiction of the court.
The Supreme Court has, accordingly, condoned the application of a
federal court's equitable powers to tailor a remedy for the individual
suffering executive abuses involving constitutional questions. 53 Specifi-
cally, the Court has suggested that "[o]nce a constitutional violation is
found, a federal court is required to tailor 'the scope of the remedy' to fit
'the nature and extent of the violation.' "54 This power generates a wide
latitude of discretion, because an equitable remedy is only narrowly re-
viewable under the abuse of discretion standard. 5
5
Federal courts have applied this general equity jurisdiction to in-
junctions concerning the return of property5 6 and, in so doing, have
defined the scope of its application. A court's equitable powers, like all
court powers, should not unduly interfere with the executive function.5 7
The Supreme Court has consequently cautioned against equitable in-
junctions that affect criminal proceedings. Therefore, the propriety of a
motion for the return of property brought as an independent action is
sometimes conditioned on its connection to a pendent criminal proceed-
ing. Thus, "[oinly if the motion is for the return of property and is in no
way tied to a criminal prosecution in esse against the movant can the pro-
ceedings be regarded as independent."'5 8 This avoids the problem of an
equitable extension by a court that may interfere with a criminal prose-
52. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (the Supreme Court, in dicta, recognizes
federal courts may issue injunctions to protect constitutional rights).
53. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392, 394 (1971) (violation of the fourth amendment may give rise to money damages).
54. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1976) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 744 (1974)).
55. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1973).
56. Pieper v. United. States, 604 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir. 1979); Mr. Lucky Messen-
ger Serv., Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 16-17 (7th Cir. 1978); Meier v. Keller, 521
F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Donlon v. United States,
331 F. Supp. 979, 980 (D. Del. 1971); Chakejian v. Trout, 295 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Lord v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D. Mass. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961
(1965).
57. Compare the cases collected in the law review articles in note 41 supra.
58. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1962) (decision on motion for
return of property is independent, and thus final for purposes of appeal, only if not tied to
cniminal prosecution). Further, a mere audit is not considered to be preliminary to, or in
connection with, a judicial proceeding. See aLso United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 479-
80 (1983) (I.R.S. may not obtain grand jury materials to aid in the investigation of civil tax
liability).
A related problem is whether subsequent events should be considered as a means of
determining if there is a prosecution in existence for purposes of appeal. See In re Search
Warrant, 750 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that subsequent events should be
considered, citing authorities from other circuits).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, additionally, has stated: "[sleveral circuits have
given this test a strict reading and have required that any criminal action against the mo-
vant be beyond the investigatory stage and into an accusatory stage by the filing of
charges. Other circuits have been less restrictive and have deemed a criminal action to be
in esse before arrest or indictment." DeMassa v. Nunez, 747 F.2d 1283, 1286.87 (9th Cir.
1984) (citations omitted). See infra note 98 for a discussion of the term "in esse."
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cution. If an indictment does issue, the appropriate remedy for return
of property is the motion provided under Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 41(e). Rule 41(e) also functions to codify the exclusionary rule
since inadmissibility is part of the remedy.
59
The caveat of caution and restraint accompanies every potential ex-
ercise of anomalous jurisdiction, regardless of which underlying theory
is applied.60 This caveat is improperly ignored where Rule 41 (e) is read
broadly to apply in the absence of an indictment. The courts have read-
ily expanded Rule 41(e) to support the notion that equity jurisdiction
exists to cover pre-indictment motions not covered by the rule. 6 ' Yet
another concern voiced in the supporting Advisory Committee Note
suggests that a broad reading of Rule 41(e) to incorporate pre-indict-
ment relief is desirable as fostering expediency in criminal proceedings:
the "purpose [of Rule 41 (e)] is to prevent multiplication of proceedings
and to bring the matter before the court in the first instance."'6 2 Fourth
amendment violations are effectively adjudicated on the merits prior to
criminal proceedings when the rule is so interpreted. Nevertheless, ju-
dicial expansion of Rule 41(e)63 evokes the equally valid criticism that
application of the rule to encompass pre-indictment relief amounts to
judicial legislation, since the rule expressly applies to criminal matters.
3. Revoked Consent
Constitutional problems are not always triggered by macabre cir-
cumstances or fatally defective warrants. Occasionally, such problems
arise in the context of conventional I.R.S. investigations when the subse-
quently aggrieved individual initially cooperates with federal officers.
Internal Revenue Service investigations often commence with routine
tax interviews with, or audits of, the taxpayer. Problems may occur
when the taxpayer initially consents to production of documents and
that consent is subsequently revoked by the court or individual because
it was obtained in a coercive manner. Cases involving either voluntary
or coerced consent 6 4 present a scenario distinct from exercises of anom-
59. See supra note 2.
60. See Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1281 (5th Cir. 1983); Pieper v. United
States, 604 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir. 1979); Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc. v. United
States, 587 F.2d 15, 17 (7th Cir. 1978); Meier v. Keller, 521 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1975); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 34 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238,
242 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
61. Meier v. Keller, 521 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 983 (1975);
Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 34 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927
(1975); Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Pieper v. United States,
460 F. Supp. 94, 96 n.1 (D. Minn. 1978), affid, 604 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1979).
62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) Advisory Committee Note.
63. See Pieper v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 94, 96 n. 1 (D. Minn. 1978), aftd, 604 F.2d
1131 (8th cir. 1979); see also Meier v. Keller, 521 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 1975); Hunsucker
v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 34 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Smith v.
Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
64. Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977); Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239,
(5th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Chakejian v. Trout,
295 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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alous jurisdiction that are attributed to the court's supervisory power or
general equity jurisdiction. This distinction is supported in part by the
pronouncement that the judicial supervisory power does not extend to
I.R.S. agents.
6 5
Where voluntary consent is the sole justification for government
possession of property, there is no illegal seizure, but the retention may
become illegal if that consent is withdrawn. In this fourth amendment
context, the Supreme Court has promulgated the standard of assent
without coercion, viewed by the totality of the circumstances. 66 A
waiver of fourth amendment rights is not governed by the strict stan-
dards applied to other waivers. 6 7 A less exacting standard for fourth
amendment waivers, however, does not mean that such waivers are un-
qualified. An action seeking return of documents voluntarily loaned to
the I.R.S. is illustrative. In Mason v. Pulliam, the government argued that
initial consent forever waived fourth amendment rights, particularily
since a subsequent demand for the return of property (records and ac-
counts) would frustrate a clearly legitimate investigation without advanc-
ing constitutional concerns. 6 8 The court, in affirming the return order,
noted that federal officers could not go beyond the scope of the consent
originally given. Under this interpretation, revocation of the waiver re-
instated the taxpayer's fourth amendment rights.
69
Pre-indictment return of property actions alleging other constitu-
tional violations have proven more difficult for taxpayer plaintiffs. For
instance, where consent has been attacked on grounds of self-incrimina-
tion,70 the decisions evince a judicial trend against interference with a
criminal prosecution. Some of the rationale applied in the preclusion of
pre-indictment relief in this context include decisions that Miranda warn-
ings7 ' are not necessary in noncustodial I.R.S. investigations, 7 2 and that
adequate civil 73 or criminal7 4 remedies eliminate the need to order re-
turn of property.
65. Eastus v. Bradshaw, 94 F.2d 788, 789 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
66. Schneckloth v. Bustemorte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (state must demonstrate
consent was voluntarily given; such a determination is a question of fact to be determined
from all the circumstances).
67. Id.
68. 557 F.2d 426, 428 (5th Cir. 1977).
69. Id. at 428 (citing United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971) (de-
fendant in criminal prosecution, initially consenting to search, called off the search,
thereby limiting scope of consent) and United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (after discovery of damaging evidence, consenting defendant revoked consent,
thereby immediately limiting scope of search)).
70. Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Chakejian v. Trout, 295 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
71. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
72. Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 812-14 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Chakejian v. Trout,
295 F. Supp. 97, 102 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
73. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1982) regarding procedure for judicial review of a
tax summary. This permits civil actions under the I.R.C. without the necessity of resorting
to independent injunctive relief. The adequacy of this remedy at law was upheld in Reis-
man v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) and Justice v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.
Ky. 1967) (per curiam).
74. As discussed throughout the text, the criminal remedy is FED. R. CriM. P. 41(e).
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Allegations of the unconstitutional deprivation of the right to coun-
sel have been equally unsuccessful. These sixth amendment claims have
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel where documents are not pro-
vided prior to grand jury testimony75 or where there is an investigative
interview designed to establish criminal liability.7 6 In every instance,




In 1971, the Supreme Court, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, held that a suit for damages may arise di-
rectly under the Constitution itself.78 This established a non-statutory
remedy against federal officers for violations of the fourth amendment.
Subsequently, the Federal Tort Claims Act (F.T.C.A.) was amended to
codify this remedy for suits against the United States. 79 The fourth
amendment ameliorates jurisdictional problems by extending the non-
statutory supervisory power to federal executive officers. 80 Yet the
F.T.C.A. does not permit injunctive relief,8 1 even though such relief
may present a remedy for constitutionally-barred misconduct by individ-
ual officers.
82
The Bivens basis for anomalous jurisdiction has been suggested, but
remains undecided. 8 3 If Congress does not provide for injunctive relief
in forthcoming amendments to the F.T.C.A., 8 4 and general federal
75. See supra note 72 for sixth amendment cases.
76. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 466 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D. Minn. 1979) (witness may
have attorney present outside room where grand jury investigation is being conducted); In
re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957) (no constitutional right to be assisted by counsel in
giving testimony at an investigatory proceeding). FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) is also applicable.
It provides that only a government attorney, not a defendant's attorney is allowed in a
grand jury room during an investigation.
77. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 466 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D.Minn. 1979); Chakejian v.
Trout, 295 F. Supp. 97, 99 (E.D.Pa. 1969). See also Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 813
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
78. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (claim arises directly under fourth amendment). The subse-
quent cases establishing a similar tort remedy are Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)
(claim arising directly under fifth amendment) and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)
(claim arising directly under the eighth amendment).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982) (includes 1974 amendment withdrawing sovereign im-
munity of government when torts are committed within scope of employment).
80. See supra notes 28-48 and accompanying text.
81. See Moon v. Takiasaki, 501 F.2d 389, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But seeJaffee v. United
States, 592 F.2d 712, 718-19 (3d Cir. 1979); Kelley v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 356, 362
(E.D.Pa. 1981). Both Kelley andJaffee limit injunctive relief permitted under F.T.C.A. for
constitutional violations.
82. See Bell, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Torts Claims Act, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1-
17 (1979) (amendments would remove individual liability of federal officers and federal
employees) [hereinafter "Proposed Amendments"].
83. Bivens, in conjunction with the federal question jurisdiction of § 1331, was argued
with a multitude of theories in Pieper v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 94, 96 (D.Minn. 1978),
afid on other grounds, 604 F.2d 1131 (8th Cir. 1979). Bivens jurisdiction was also suggested,
but deemed inapposite, in Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1286 (5th Cir. 1983) (Clark,
CJ., concurring).
84. See Proposed Amendments, supra note 82; see also infra text accompanying notes
152-55 regarding expansion of proposals to include injunctive relief.
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question jurisdiction does not independently support anomalous juris-
diction,8 5 the need for its exercise will remain intact. The propriety of
an extension of Bivens, from an implied damage remedy8 6 to an implied
injunctive remedy, is hampered by the observation that the connection
between the two remedies is too tenuous to invoke its application. In
addition, using the fourth amendment to justify a court's injunctive pow-
ers involving executive agencies might conflict with the separation of
powers doctrine.
Because a suit for the return of property is in reality a suit against
the United States,8 7 additional problems arise. The United States can-
not be sued without its consent,8 8 and congressional consent to such
suits should be narrowly construed,8 9 although the Supreme Court has
denied sovereign immunity to government agents who act in an uncon-
stitutional manner. 90 In recognition of the absence of any statute con-
ferring general jurisdiction over federal officers and agencies, 91 the
apparent lack of a provision for injunctive relief under the F.T.C.A.,
9 2
and the inapplicability of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
pre-indictment injunctive relief,93 the judiciary should resort to a less
hostile basis for its exercise of anomalous jurisdiction.
5. General Federal Question Jurisdiction
Section 1331 of the Judicial Code for federal courts provides that
the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions aris-
ing under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."'9 4 Fed-
eral judicial decisions create the federal common law in contrast to the
statutory law enacted by Congress. For purposes of section 1331, fed-
eral common law is arguably included among the laws of the United
85. See infra section I(B)(5).
86. Bivens' codification, by 1974 amendments to the F.T.C.A., essentially provides a
damage remedy implied from violations of the fourth amendment. Its purpose is still via-
ble for other constitutional torts. The subsequent utilization of the Bivens implied damage
remedy rationale in the cases is cited in note 78 supra.
87. When a federal officer exceeds powers granted by the sovereign, actions beyond
those limitations are individual rather than sovereign. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949). There is, however, qualified immunity for "good faith"
violations, which might preclude monetary relief. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
Since federal officers are generally judgment proof or unable to act without authority, the
real target is or ought to be the government. See Proposed Amendments, supra note 82 at
7-10. See generally Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI.
L. REV. 435 (1962).
88. Supreme Court case authority for this consent requirement ranges from 1834 to
the present. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (dicta); United
States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1834) (dicta).
89. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1940) (dicta); Schillinger v.
United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894).
90. Cf. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-23 (1963) (dicta) (suit brought to enjoin
United States officials dismissed for want of jurisdiction, because suit was in reality one
against the United States, and the United States' consent was lacking).
91. 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MxLLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3655, at 172 (1976) (citing McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971)).
92. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (emphasis added).
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States. The Supreme Court failed to resolve this contention in 1959
when presented with the opportunity to incorporate federal common
law into the word "laws." '95 However, in 1972, the Court held that sec-
tion 1331 jurisdiction existed over claims involving the federal common
law of interstate pollution.96 To date, this opinion stands alone as the
only case to suggest such a broad reading of the word "laws," and its
effect was subsequently nullified by Congress.9 7 Therefore, if anoma-
lous jurisdiction is a part of the federal common law, its exercise cannot
be regarded as attributable to the general federal question statute, sec-
tion 1331.
The federal courts have nevertheless announced a federal common
law to provide for the return of property when there are no criminal
proceedings pending.98 These courts have drawn upon Supreme Court
directives to fashion relief when federal rights are involved. 9 9 Yet the
very existence of anomalous jurisdiction has been questioned by these
courts,1 00 thereby suggesting that its exercise presents a federal ques-
tion cognizable under section 1331. This possibility, however, conflicts
with judicial constructs resolving doubts against the existence of juris-
diction, 10 1 or the concern that the application of federal common law is
confined to only a few circumstances.
1 0 2
Another related approach to finding a niche for anomalous jurisdic-
tion within the general federal question statute was facilitated by elimi-
nation of the amount in controversy requirement. This approach
requires an interpretation of section 1331 as incorporating the federal
common law, a proposition of questionable validity. 10 3 Some have sug-
gested that the elimination of the amount in controversy requirement
has entirely eradicated the need for independent recognition of anoma-
95. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959).
96. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972).
97. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Mich., 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (subsequent
stage of 1972 Illinois v. Milwaukee interstate pollution case, wherein the Court held its
earlier common law remedy was pre-empted by 1972 federal pollution legislation).
98. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text. Also note the distinction between
when a criminal proceeding is pending and when it is "in esse" for the purpose of a motion
or complaint for the return of property. The term "in esse" was used in the aforemen-
tioned context in DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1962) and applies in
situations in which there is an outstanding complaint, a release following arrest or arraign-
ment, information, or indictment. Some courts require that for a criminal proceeding to
be in esse, the proceedings must have gone beyond the investigatory stage and be in the
accusatory stage which is signified by the filing of charges. In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
716 F.2d 493, 496 (8th Cir. 1983); Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569, 571
(6th Cir. 1982); Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 16 (7th Cir.
1978). This jurisdictional split regarding the term "in esse" is described in DeMassa v.
Nunez, 747 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (9th Cir. 1984).
99. "It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights
are concerned." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
100. See, e.g., Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1983). In his concurrence,
ChiefJudge Clark stated that "anomalous" jurisdiction-once a necessary evil-has become
a superfluous anachronism . . . a dead letter." Id. at 1285.
101. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).
102. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Mich., 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981); Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
103. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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lous jurisdiction. 10 4 No matter what it is labeled, as long as property
continues to be wrongfully held by federal officers in the absence of an
indictment, the judiciary will find a remedy, the semantics of which will
remain the domain of the commentators.
II. A PROPOSED TEST TO DETERMINE WHEN THE EXERCISE OF
ANOMALOUS JURISDICTION IS APPROPRIATE
Whether anomalous jurisdiction has an identifiable source or basis
in the law of federal jurisdiction is a question obviously susceptible to
much debate and confusion, to which the preceding portions of this arti-
cle attest. That question is then left to the authors of judicial opinions.
What remains to be determined is: What are the appropriate circum-
stances for its exercise? A number of concerns have surfaced.' 0 5 The
following proposition assumes that because of its anomalous nature,
anomalous jurisdiction is best characterized as an exercise of the equita-
ble powers of a court. A three-tiered test comprising primarily equitable
criteria is therefore offered because it incorporates the apparent con-
cerns of courts which have engaged in the exercise of anomalous juris-
diction. The test requires (1) disregard of the plaintiff's constitutional
rights, (2) irreparable injury, and (3) unavailability of alternative
remedies.
A. Disregard of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights
Reliance upon any particular constitutional provision has not been
critical. 10 6 Violations of the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments
have been alleged in anomalous jurisdiction cases seeking the return of
property illegally held by federal officers. 10 7 The unreasonable search
and seizure provision of the fourth amendment is the one most fre-
quently relied upon.
10 8
104. See supra note 100.
105. Inter alia, the concerns are: whether the primary purpose of the suit is to recover
property or to restrain a tax collection, Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1282 (5th Cir.
1983); balancing the plaintiff's temporary loss of the property against government's inter-
est in protecting the secrecy of an investigation, Shea v. Gabriel 520 F.2d 879, 882 (1 st Cir.
1975); the plaintiffs need for the property, Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 1243 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1975); effect of private judgment on public interest in administration ofjustice, Smith
v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1965); procrastination of official holding
property, United States v. Bell, 120 F. Supp. 670, 673 (D.D.C. 1953). Compare the factors
discussed in Hunsucker v. Phinney 497 F.2d 29, 34-35 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
927 (1975) with the three-tiered test proposed herein: (1) disregard of plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights; (2) whether plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm; and (3) whether another
adequate remedy is available.
106. See supra notes 9-12 for a brief summary of cases alleging constitutionally pro-
tected rights and supra note 14 for a review of constitutional provisions addressed in sev-
eral commentaries.
107. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
108. Property may be illegally held when plaintiffs initial consent is subsequently with-
drawn. Fourth amendment violations may occur when consent is withdrawn so that the
continued holding of the property is illegal. See supra Section I(B)(3). In some cases,
illegally held property will not be returned if the property was used to further criminal
activity or constituted the fruit of such an endeavor. See In re Wiltron Assoc., Ltd., 49
F.R.D. 170, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (quoting authorities).
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It is important to recognize the distinction between a pleading
which seeks the return of property and one concerned with the suppression
of the use of that property in a criminal proceeding. When both sup-
pression and return are sought, the courts have generally required a
showing of a callous disregard of the plaintiffs constitutional rights. 10 9
When only the return of property is sought, however, it is not estab-
lished whether the complaint must allege a "clear"" 1 0 or a "callous" I '
disregard of the plaintiff's rights. A violation may be clear, but not nec-
essarily callous. The safest practice is to allege both possibilities."1
2
Adherence to this suppression-versus-return distinction avoids an
additional problem: a premature decision on the merits of a criminal
prosecution. Some courts might find it necessary to ascertain whether a
constitutional violation has occurred before ordering the return of prop-
erty. The constitutional question is more appropriately decided after an
indictment has been issued and when the return of property would be
governed by Rule 41(e). This view incorporates a concern for judicial
expediency by avoiding potentially redundant, time consuming, and
costly litigation. In addition, this approach would enhance compliance
with an individual's constitutional rights by lessening the burden im-
posed upon him by the court. Therefore, relief in anomalous jurisdic-
tion cases should more appropriately depend upon satisfaction of the
more equitable considerations of lack of an adequate alternative remedy
and a showing of irreparable injury.
B. Irreparable Injury
This aspect of the test should be considered in conjunction with the
availability of alternative adequate remedies (section II(G)) in that the
underlying purpose of anomalous jurisdiction is to relieve a plaintiff's
intolerable hardship resulting from an unlawful deprivation of
property. 1
13
The two considerations addressed in the cases are the plaintiff's
need for the property,114 and the alleged stigma caused by a wrongful
109. See Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 34 (5th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927
(1975); Silbert v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 765, 767-68 (D.Md. 1967). Cf. United States
v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers, 254 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 938 (1958) (re-
quiring a clear and definite showing that constitutional rights have been violated). But cf.
Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 17 (7th Cir. 1978) (callous
disregard standard to be applied only when suppression is sought).
110. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 466 F. Supp. 863, 866 (D.Minn. 1979); Donlon v.
United States, 331 F. Supp. 979, 980 (D.Del. 1971).
111. Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1281 (5th Cir. 1983); Hunsucker v. Phinney,
497 F.2d 29, 34-35 n.10 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
112. See, e.g., Pieper v. United States, 605 F.2d 1131, 1133 (8th Cir. 1979) (jurisdiction
requires "clear showing of a search and seizure in callous disregard of the fourth
amendment").
113. See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.10 (1976) (discussion of standards for grant-
ing or denying injunctive relief).
114. See Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 18 (7th Cir.
1978) (plaintiff needed funds seized to satisfy tax liability); Mason v. Pulliam, 402 F. Supp.
978, 981 (N.D.Ga. 1975), aff'd, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977) (irreparable injury would
result if criminal indictment issues from wrongfully seized materials).
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possession which accordingly results in a wrongful indictment."15 Be-
cause the right to have property returned is not synonymous with the
right to have illegally-seized evidence suppressed, injunctions seeking
the return of property should focus on the plaintiffs need for the prop-
erty, as the stigma suffered by the plaintiff is more appropriately associ-
ated with exclusion of wrongfully retained evidence. Therefore, the
irreparable injury factor for determining the exercise of anomalous ju-
risdiction should be a balancing test to determine whether the plaintiffs
prospects for irreparable injury outweigh the state's need for the prop-
erty as part of a criminal investigation. This would reduce undue inter-
ference with the criminal justice system while preserving the individual's
right to the property.
C. Unavailability of an Alternative Remedy
Traditionally, equitable relief is barred by the availability of an ade-
quate remedy at law. Yet in the context of a criminal proceeding, the
rhetoric of equity concerning "an adequate remedy at law" is tradition-
ally inapplicable. Rather, the prospect of equitable relief in this context
should be conditioned on the availability of sufficient alternative reme-
dies. This approach would avoid the semantic difficulties of reconciling
criminal proceedings involving property with the traditional terminol-
ogy of equity.
The availability of a jurisdictional alternative remedy is no longer a
requirement to the invocation of equity jurisdiction.' 1 6 For instance,
pre-indictment relief is inappropriate to enjoin enforcement of a tax
summons, 17 and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence cannot prema-
turely bar prosecution for tax evasion because exclusion itself is an ade-
quate remedy. 18
The adequacy and availability of remedies for fourth amendment
violations must be viewed restrictively to effectuate the purposes of the
exclusionary rule," ' 9 but the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule
is not as tangible when there is no criminal prosecution pending from
which evidence may be excluded. Despite the reduced importance of
the exclusionary rule in circumstances where no criminal proceedings
exist, the courts should still require a clear showing that no alternative
remedies are available.
Accordingly, some of the anomalous jurisdiction cases undertake an
115. Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 1243 n.l0 (5th Cir. 1975) (stigma not removed by
a judgment of acquittal in criminal proceedings); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 34
(5th Cir. 1974), (examination of wrongfully seized materials leading to issuance of wrong-
ful indictment would inflict irreparable stigma), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). But see In
re Compola, 543 F. Supp. 115, 117 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (stigma by itself not irreparable
injury).
116. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.5 (1976).
117. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446-50 (1964).
118. Cf. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966) (implicit assumption that ex-
clusion of evidence does not bar prosecution altogether).
119. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
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analysis of the various remedies that might be available, 120 premised on
the caution and restraint exercised by the courts in this area. 12 1 The
most significant remedies, which provide alternatives to the non-statu-
tory civil suit for return of property, are administrative actions in tax
cases, declaratory relief, mandamus, and other statutory bases for the
return of property held by the government.
122
Administrative remedies in tax cases include the return of property
as ancillary relief in a suit for a refund or a summons enforcement pro-
ceeding. 123 A refund suit may be an inadequate remedy where the
plaintiff seeks recompense for alleged abuses, rather than the return of
improperly assessed taxes. Such suits, however, must be read in con-
junction with the congressional prohibition against injunctions which ef-
fectively restrain assessment or collection of federal taxes.1 24 One
purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act is to minimize civil pre-enforcement
interference, while affording the individual the opportunity to deter-
mine his right to the disputed tax in a suit for a refund. 125
It is nevertheless possible to avoid the Act's prohibition against
such injunctions where equity jurisdiction exists and the government
could not possibly prevail. 126 The plaintiff must clearly establish the in-
adequacy of legal remedies.
127
Sharp division in the application of the Anti-Injunction Act surfaced
in the recent case of Linn v. Chivatero.128 A taxpayer and his attorney
sued the I.R.S. District Director, seeking injunctions prohibiting the use,
120. See Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1983) (alternative, inadequate rem-
edies discussed were a suit for tax refund or suppression of the evidence in non-existent
criminal proceeding); United States v. Rapp, 539 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1976) (replevin or a
claim under the Tucker Act for deprivation of property without due process of law); In re
J.W. Schonfeld, Ltd., 460 F. Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.Va. 1978) (suppression and return in a
suit for refund, or in a criminal proceeding the taxpayer may request return); United
States v. Bell, 120 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1954) (administrative relief, trespass against the
officer, or assertion of property rights in the district's action in libel proceeding for
forfeiture).
121. See supra note 60 and accompanying text regarding caution and restraint analysis.
122. See supra note 120. Other procedural devices include intervention. Chakejian v.
Trout, 295 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (intervention by taxpayer into enforcement pro-
ceedings against third party); In re Wilton Assoc., Ltd., 49 F.R.D. 170, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(interpleader).
123. Jurisdiction over taxpayer suits for refunds of federal taxes is provided in 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982). Jurisdiction over I.R.S. summons enforcement suits, triggered
by taxpayer noncompliance, is provided in 26 U.S.C. § 7402(b) (1982).
124. The Anti-Injunction Act provides that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court. 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a) (1982).
125. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974).
126. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (the plaintiff
must show that "under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States
cannot establish its claim . . ."). The Supreme Court previously held that special and
extraordinary circumstances could make the Anti-Injunction Act inapplicable. Miller v.
Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932). Enocks limited the Miler potential
for merely applying equity practice as it existed prior to passage of the Act, thus forming
the basis for the more strict interpretation of the Act in Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S.
725 (1974).
127. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 6 (1962).
128. 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1983).
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and ordering the return, of documents accidentally produced in re-
sponse to an I.R.S. summons. 129 The key issue was the applicability of
the Anti-Injunction Act in suits where anomalous jurisdiction is
presented. The trial court, although dismissing for lack of jurisdic-
tion,1 30 presumed the existence of both federal question jurisdiction
and anomalous jurisdiction. '3 ' The appellate majority "refuse[d] to ad-
dress the continued validity of anomalous jurisdiction . . .despite a
confused body of caselaw in need of clarification."'13 2 The court held
that the Anti-Injunction Act did not barjurisdiction. It characterized the
taxpayer's requested injunctive relief as a controversy arising under the
fourth amendment search and seizure provision.13 3 The elimination of
the amount in controversy requirement in federal question cases
avoided the problem of transforming the injunctive suit for the return of
property into a controversy concerning federal taxes which would be in
violation of the Anti-Injunction Act.' 3 4 The concurring opinion ob-
served that the distinction made by the majority between a search and
seizure issue and a tax issue, to determine whether jurisdiction existed,
was inconsistent with the purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.1
3 5
Linn, therefore, establishes a significant hurdle by inhibiting the ex-
ercise of anomalous jurisdiction in tax cases governed by the Anti-In-
junction Act. The case must certainly be characterized as one involving
the return of property rather than one possibly involving a search and
seizure issue.
The Declaratory Relief Act could conceivably present an alternative
remedy, but an order for the return of property is simply not a declara-
toryjudgment. In addition, although the plaintiff might perceive a suffi-
cient controversy, the courts have not viewed the circumstance
triggering anomalous jurisdiction as a controversy within the meaning of
the Act. '
3 6
One proposed remedy is mandamus. 137 Since proceedings under
the mandamus statute are prohibitively intricate,13 8 the remedy has
been characterized as both potentially available' 3 9 and clearly unavaila-
129. Id. at 1279.
130. The trial court's dismissal was reversed and remanded for a determination of the
propriety of the government's retention of the accidentally produced documents. Id. at
1285.
131. Id. at 1281.
132. Id. at 1285 (Clark, CJ., concurring).
133. Id. at 1281.
134. Id. at 1282-84. See also Hunsucker v. Phinney 497 F.2d 29, 36 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
135. Linn v. Chivatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1286 (Clark, CJ., concurring).
136. In re Shoenfeld, Ltd., 460 F. Supp. 332, 338-39 (E.D.Va. 1978) (injunctive relief
seeking return of taxpayer's property not within Declaratory Relief Act).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982); French, The Frontiers of the Federal Mandamus Statute, 21
Vsu.. L. REv. 637 (1976).
138. Estate of Watson v. Blumenthal, 586 F.2d 925, 934 (2d Cir. 1978).
139. Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 36 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927
(1975); Mason v. Pulliam, 402 F. Supp. 978, 980 (N.D.Ga. 1975), af'd, 557 F.2d 426 (5th
Cir. 1977).
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ble.140 Since the purpose of mandamus is to review ministerial (as op-
posed to discretionary) acts, 14 1 the remedy is clearly unavailable.
Another alternative to non-statutory anomalous jurisdiction is a
statutory suit for the return of property under section 1356 of the Judi-
cial Code. 14 2 Yet in Hunsucker v. Phinney,143 the court declined to con-
strue section 1356 in such a manner as to enable it to order the return of
the taxpayer's property. 144 Other courts have failed to find section 1356
jurisdiction, 14 5 and the American Law Institute has proposed its re-
peal.' 46 Finally, state courts are an inappropriate forum under the stat-
ute, 14 7 precluding its application in any manner by a state court.
It would appear from the foregoing that alternative remedies rarely
exist, suggesting that in most situations equity lies in favor of the truly
aggrieved plaintiff. Yet, to expand federal jurisdiction without authority
is a questionable path for the courts to follow. But how else can the
wronged individual secure his rights to property? The following conclu-
sion addresses this problem.
CONCLUSION
Federal subject matter jurisdiction in suits against federal officers
cannot exist in the absence of a statutory waiver of immunity.148 Addi-
tionally, there is no general statutory jurisdiction for suits against fed-
eral agencies and officers.' 49 At one time the courts were sharply
divided over the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act provi-
sion that a "person suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."'150 But in 1977, in
Califano v. Sanders, 151 the Supreme Court resolved the controversy, hold-
ing that the Administrative Procedure Act did not independently confer
140. Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238, 242-43 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (mandamus unavailable absent specific statute defining officer's duties).
141. See, e.g., Kirkland Masonry, Inc. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 532, 533-34 (5th Cir.
1980); Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1073 (1979); Associated Businesses of Franklin, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
522 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (S.D.Ohio 1981).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1356 (1982). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), provides for
suits against the sovereign for any seizure under any law of the United States on land or
upon waters not within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Yet anomalous jurisdiction
plaintiffs seek injunctive rather than monetary relief. Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29,
36 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
143. 497 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. dernied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
144. 497 F.2d at 35.
145. See Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817) (analyzing predecessor of
§ 1356);Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1957).
146. A.L.I., Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts § 1311
(1969).
147. Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 9-11 (1817).
148. See supra notes 88 and 89.
149. See supra note 91.
150. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) (emphasis added). The division of authority is covered in
14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 3655 n.10
(1985).
151. 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977).
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jurisdiction on a court. Once again, the individual seeking the exercise
of anomalous jurisdiction was left without an alternative.
This author advances two proposals. The lower federal courts
should rely exclusively upon the general federal question statute, in spite
of underlying jurisdictional problems. 152 This may ultimately force the
issue of whether the federal common law of anomalous jurisdiction in-
volves a "law" within the meaning of section 1331 of the Judicial
Code.
153
The preferred proposal is for Congress to include an injunctive re-
lief alternative in the proposed amendments to the Federal Tort Claims
Act.15 This would provide an express equitable remedy which would
facilitate the policies underlying the current damage statute.
Nevertheless, the latter proposal has at least two drawbacks. First,
it would encourage civil claims for the return of property prior to the
completion of criminal investigations. Second, its effect would approach
the creation of undesirable statutory jurisdiction over suits against fed-
eral agencies and officers, because claims against the latter must allege
either specific statutory authorization, or that the suit is against the fed-
eral government.'
55
An amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act would have to be
interpreted or drafted in such a way as to strike a balance between the
government's interest in expediency in the criminal justice system and
the individual's interest in his rights to property. Providing statutory
relief would eliminate both the current uncertainty accompanying a non-
statutory extension of federal jurisdiction, as well as the drain imposed
upon judicial resources in attempting to ascertain a basis for this power.
There still exists the less optimistic possibility that congressional inac-
tion and judicial confusion will prohibit the now uncertain remedy con-
tained in the exercise of anomalous jurisdiction.
152. See supra section I(B)(5).
153. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text for current problems with the
F.T.C.A.
155. See Boelens v. Redman Howes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing
cases from various circuits); see also McQpary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971).
THE FEDERAL DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION RIGHTS OF NON-INDIAN CIVIL
LITIGANTS IN TRIBAL COURTS AFTER SANTA
CLARA PUEBLO V. MARTINEZ
GREGORY SCHULTZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
Indian tribal courts can and do exercise jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans in reservation related civil matters. ' Tribal courts and governments,
however, unlike the state and federal governments, are not subject to
federal constitutional restraints. 2 As a result, until 1968 non-Indians
and Indians alike suffered in tribal courts and before tribal councils what
would have amounted to, in state and federal courts, denials of due pro-
cess and equal protection of the laws. 3 Wishing to change this situation,
Congress in 1968 passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, which provides,
among other things, that "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall ... (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property
without due process of law."'4 The Act on its face furnishes no remedy
by which to enforce the rights granted therein, other than habeas corpus
relief.5 Nevertheless, until the Supreme Court decided Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez,6 most federal courts hearing claims under the Act
found an implied right of action and granted injunctive or declaratory
relief accordingly.
7
In Santa Clara, however, which concerned an equal protection chal-
lenge by an Indian against her tribe and its governor, the Supreme
Court held that the tribe's sovereign immunity from suit barred suits
against the tribe under the Act, except those pursuant to the habeas
writ.8 The Court also held that the Act did not impliedly authorize a
private cause of action for declaratory or injunctive relief against tribal
officials. 9 The decision, therefore, resulted in an Act which provides
rights but no remedy, other than the habeas writ or an action under the
* J.D., 1984, Northwestern School of Law. The author is an Associate with Brown
& Bain, Phoenix, Arizona.
1. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See generaly Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and
the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAH. L. REv. 206.
2. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-58 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376 (1896).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1982).
5. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
6. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
7. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
8. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 58-59 (1978).
9. Id at 72.
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Act in the tribal court itself, to preserve such rights. The habeas writ
protects only against takings of liberty, not property, without due pro-
cess, and so is of no use in civil litigation. Nor, as cases decided under
the Act indicate, 10 do the tribal courts always enforce the rights granted
by the Act against themselves or against those tribal councils which elect
tribal judges. As a result, since Santa Clara, non-Indians and Indians
involved in civil litigation in the tribal courts have had no effective relief,
federal or tribal, from deprivation of due process or equal protection of
the laws.
This situation is undesirable for non-Indians and Indians involved
in civil litigation in the tribal courts, and ultimately for the tribes them-
selves. Non-Indians have hesitated to invest capital on the reservations,
or to do business with Indians in general without an ultimate safeguard
of state or federal relief. They are reluctant to face the possible depriva-
tion of their property without due process by the tribal courts or coun-
cils. I The fact that the tribal courts themselves are now supposed to
preserve the rights granted under the Act, but cannot be held by federal
courts to do so, means no guarantee of due process or equal protection
exists. 12 The result of this fear of tribal courts by non-Indians is a denial
to the tribes of private investment capital and, consequently, perpetu-
ates the tribes' economic dependence on federal outlays. 13 Such depen-
dence conflicts with the federal objective, recognized by the Santa Clara
Court, of fostering tribal autonomy and self-government. 14
Various solutions to the problem present themselves. First, the
Santa Clara opinion could be read narrowly, as denying a federal remedy
other than habeas corpus only to Indians, not to non-Indians, and only
in situations involving intratribal disputes. This solution, however, in-
congruously entails interpreting an act which was predominantly in-
tended to provide Indians with constitutional-type rights against their
governments' 5 as providing only non-Indians with federal remedies to
10. See, e.g., Shortbull v. Looking Elk, 677 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 907 (1982); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981); RJ. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous.
Auth., 509 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mont. 1981), rev'd, 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 3476 (1985).
11. See Schwechten, Epilogue: In Spite of the Lau--A Social Comment on the Impact of Ken-
nerly and Crow Tribe, 33 MoNT. L. REV. 317 (1972); Comment, Jurisdiction and the Indian
Credit Problem: Considerations for a Solution, 33 MoNT. L. REV. 307 (1972).
12. See supra note 10.
13. See AMERICAN INDIAN PoLicy REVIEW CoMM'N, FINAL REPORT 307 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as AIPRC]. The American Indian Policy Review Commission was established
pursuant to Pub. L. No. 93-580, 88 Stat. 1910 (1975) (as amended by Pub. L. 94-80, 89
Stat. 415, 416 (1975)) and was a bipartisan body charged with reviewing the historical and
legal basis of the Indian relationship with the federal government, and with reporting its
recommendations to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, who were
in turn to refer the report to standing committees to consider the enactment of recom-
mended legislation.
14. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62-65. See also Message from President Nixon to Con-
gress, H.R. Doc. No. 363,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, 116 CONG. REC. 23258 (1970) (the goal
of national Indian policy is "to strengthen the Indian's sense of autonomy without threat-
ening his sense of community.").
15. See S. REP. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967).
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enforce the same rights. The more logical reading of Santa Clara is that
the opinion is applicable to both Indians and non-Indians. In this case,
the solution to the problem of remedy for Indians and non-Indians
should be a congressional amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act,
permitting appeal by both Lxadians and non-Indians to a federal district
court from a tribal court if the appellant can demonstrate a prima fade
denial of the rights enumerated in the Act. The appellant should also
have to demonstrate, in his petition for appellate review, an exhaustion
of tribal appeals.
16
The Act, if amended as proposed, would intrude only minimally on
the federal policy, recognized by the Santa Clara Court, of protecting
tribal sovereignty and self-government. 17 The amended Act would also
be consistent with the predominant legislative intent which was to pro-
vide some constitutional-type rights to all who find themselves before
tribal courts or councils.' 8 The proposed appellate solution is more
consistent with the modern status of federal Indian law, including the
Indian Civil Rights Act itself, than is the Santa Clara Court's decision that
tribal sovereignty and autonomy bar injunctive and declaratory relief
under the Act.
The focus of this article is the plight of non-Indians in tribal courts.
Accordingly, Section II describes the erosion of tribal sovereignty in
matters involving non-Indians, showing that the sovereignty doctrine no
longer serves as a legal impediment to review of tribal court opinions by
federal appellate courts. The great degree of federal control over the
Indian reservation is also examined. Section III presents a description
of those features of tribal court litigation which would amount to denials
of due process in state and federal courts. The tribal courts' inability to
prevent equal protection violations by tribal councils is also examined,
followed by a consideration of the extent to which the tribal courts are
dependent upon federal funding and dominated by federal regulation.
Section IV examines the Act itself, its legislative history, the Santa Clara
opinion, and the negative responses to Santa Clara by federal courts. A
proposal is offered in Section V to amend the Act to permit federal ap-
pellate review of tribal court decisions which involve prima facie viola-
tions of the rights provided by the Act. Finally, the paper closes with a
brief examination of the economic benefits which would accrue to the
tribes if the amended Act causes an increased willingness on the part of
non-Indian investors to invest capital on the reservations.
16. The American Indian Policy Review Commission also suggested such appellate
review in its FINAL REPORT, AIPRC, supra note 13, at 19.
17. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62-65.
18. E.g., Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the American Indian, S. 961-68 and S.J. Res.
40, Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1965). See also supra note 15.
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II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF INDIAN TRIBES
A. Tribal Sovereignty
The legal status of Indian tribes is unique in the American legal
system. It is best described as "dependent sovereignty." The sover-
eignty is inherent because the tribes were once completely independent
nations, separate from and pre-dating our own government,1 9 and they
gave up their complete sovereignty only by conquest and treaties. The
tribes are now unique political aggregations, retaining certain attributes
of their inherent sovereignty which pertain to their members and their
territory. 20 The first significant federal Indian decision was Worcester v.
Georgia, in which Mr. Chief Justice Marshall described the Indian nation
as
a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with bounda-
ries ... in which the laws [of the states] can have no force, but
... in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.
The whole intercourse between the United States and this na-
tion, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government
of the United States.
2 '
Today the retained inherent sovereignty of tribes includes the power to
establish governments and courts, and to pass laws to govern the con-
duct of their members.
22
The inherent sovereignty of the tribes, however, is subject to the
sovereignty of the United States. The tribes exist within the geographi-
cal limitations of the United States, and it has been established that In-
dian title to the lands on which they live is "only a right of occupancy...
extinguishable only by the United States."' 23 Congress has plenary au-
thority to make laws concerning the Indian tribes.2 4 This power derives
from Congress' constitutional responsibility for regulating commerce
with the tribes and for treatymaking.
2 5
Tribal sovereignty as it exists today, thus, the product of an inher-
ent sovereign's incorporation within the territory of a greater sovereign,
the United States. This incorporation has entailed a loss, by treaty and
federal statute, of some aspects of the sovereignty which the tribes previ-
19. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959).
20. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
21. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832).
22. See, e.g., Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
23. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974). See also
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
24. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978).
25. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973). See U.S.'
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; art. 11, § 2, cl. 2. The power over the tribes has also been held to
derive from the necessity of giving protection to a dependent people. See, e.g., Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 n.4 (1959). Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall, calling the tribes
"domestic dependent nations," likened the relation of the United States to the tribes to
that of a ward to his guardian. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
This wardship theory, at least as a source of federal power over the Indian, has lost favor.
But cf. AIPRC, supra note 13, at 4-6.
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ously enjoyed.2 6 Tribal sovereignty is of a limited character, subject to
complete defeasance by Congress, but to be retained until Congress so
acts.
The tribes now possess only those aspects of sovereignty not with-
drawn by treaty or statute, or "by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status."'2 7 Such implicit divestiture by virtue of the
tribes' dependent status occurs where the exercise of tribal sovereignty
is inconsistent with overriding federal interests.2 8 Divestiture of sover-
eignty is therefore the result in those cases involving the relations be-
tween an Indian tribe and non-members of the tribe, usually non-
Indians. 29 The exercise, therefore, of tribal power beyond that of self-
government and the control of internal relations is inconsistent with the
tribes' dependent status.
3 0
It follows from the limited nature of tribal sovereignty that if Con-
gress decided that there was a federal interest in endowing non-Indians
with constitutional-type rights in the tribal courts, then tribal sover-
eignty should be no bar to the federal enforcement of such rights. Rela-
tions between non-Indians and the tribes do not concern strictly internal
tribal matters. As such, the implicit divestiture of tribal sovereignty that
results when the tribes interact with non-Indians would allow the federal
courts to intrude on tribal government at least to the extent of permit-
ting a federal appeal from certain tribal court decisions.
B. Federal Control of Tribal Government
In addition to limited sovereignty, another unique feature of the
present legal status of the tribes is the extent of federal control of tribal
governments. Because of retained inherent tribal sovereignty, tribal
self-government is not an exercise of delegated federal power; that is,
tribal governments are not federal agencies.3 1 The exercise of tribal
26. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
27. Id
28. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 151 (1980) (observing that federal law "has not worked a divestiture of
Indian taxing power").
29. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
30. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). See also Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 n.4 (1959);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886). The implicit divestiture of tribal sov-
ereignty by reason of the tribes' dependent status sometimes occurs when the Court is
concerned for the states' legitimate interest in regulating the affairs of non-Indians. Mc-
Clanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973). The test for when the
states' interest divests tribal sovereignty is laid down in Williams, 358 U.S. at 219-20:
Over the years this Court has modified [the Worcester principle] in cases where
essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would
not bejeopardized.... Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the ques-
tion has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.
In short, a state can assert jurisdiction over non-Indians on a reservation, at the expense of
tribal sovereignty, only if it can do so without weakening tribal self-government.
31. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326-28. See also AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM,
INDIAN SELF DETERMINATION AND THE ROLE OF TRIBAL COURTS, at 20 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as "AILTP"].
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self-government3 2 does remain subject to ultimate federal control, but
federal regulations do not create the Indians' power to govern them-
selves.3 3 "That Congress has in certain ways regulated the manner and
extent of the tribal power of self-government does not mean that Con-
gress is the source of that power."'3 4 In accordance with the notion that
tribal courts and governments are not, as a matter of law, federal agen-
cies or instrumentalities, the Supreme Court has held that they are not
subject to the Constitution.
3 5
The current federal policy objective of fostering tribal self-govern-
ment is not inconsistent with the legal doctrine that the source of power
behind tribal self-government is tribal, not federal, sovereignty.3 6 As a
matter of legal history, however, federal attempts to foster tribal govern-
ment have always taken the form of deep intrusions into tribal life and
organization.3 7 This intrusion continues today, as federal regulations
dictate the form and even the existence of some tribal governments.
3 8
Federal Indian policy has vacillated between the extremes of assimi-
lating the Indians into white society and preserving tribal autonomy and
self-government. The former policy has been dominant historically.
Following the range wars, which ended in the 1870s and subjected most
tribes to military rule, Congress passed the Indian General Allotment
(Dawes) Act.3 9 The Act attempted to "civilize" the Indian population by
dissolving tribal relations. 40 This was to be accomplished by the de-
struction of tribal governments, then still in the form of the authority of
chiefs and elders. 4 1 The Act provided for farm-sized allotments to each
tribal Indian, and was designed to transfer ownership of reservation
land to individual Indians in fee after a period of ownership in trust and
thereby to extend state jurisdiction to the Indians and their lands. Tri-
bal land beyond that needed for the allotments was opened to non-Indi-
32. There are some 287 tribal governments within the United States. AIPRC, supra
note 13, at 5 (1977). As of 1977, a total of 289 tribes and bands lived on 268 "federally
recognized" reservations or otherwise defined "trust areas" in 26 states. Id at 90.
33. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328. As examples of the federal regulation of tribal govern-
ments the Wheeler Court lists, first, the Code of Indian Tribal Offenses and the Courts of
Indian Offenses, both products of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, noting:
Such Courts of Indian Offenses, or "CFR Courts," still exist on approximately 30
reservations "in which traditional agencies for the enforcement of tribal law and
custom have broken down [and] no adequate substitute has been provided." 25
C.F.R. § 11. l(b) (1977). We need not decide today whether such a court is an
arm of the Federal Government ....
Id at 327 n.26. As further examples of federal regulation, the Court mentioned the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982), and the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982). Id. at 327.
34. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328.
35. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-84 (1896).
36. See Message from President Nixon to Congress, supra note 14; AIPRC, supra note
13, at 154 (1977). For an example of a recent United States Supreme Court decision
relying heavily on this policy for a rationale, see Santa Clara, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
37. See Canby, supra note 1, at 206-11.
38. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
39. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 381 (1982).
40. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559 n.9 (1981).
41. Id
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ans.42 Concurrent to the allotment process, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
promulgated administrative rules and devices, such as the Courts of In-
dian Offenses, designed to efface the tribal way of life.
43
The assimilationist approach eventually resulted in non-Indian ac-
quisition of most of the Indian land. As a result, Congress in 1936
adopted the Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act,4 4 which re-
mains the predominant federal legislative device for fostering tribal self-
government. This Act ended the allotment practice, provided for the
organization of tribal governments under written constitutions, and was
generally intended to preserve Indian government and the Indian land
base.4 5 Indian tribes, today, however, regard the Act as an obstacle to
their assertion of self-government because of the power the Act bestows
upon the Secretary of the Interior to veto tribal governmental actions.
4 6
The Indian Reorganization Act, under which the majority of tribes
today have formed their governments, 4 7 has, in effect, permitted the
Secretary of the Interior to mold tribal governments in the form he has
desired. The Act provides that the tribes can organize and adopt "an
appropriate constitution and bylaws" which become effective after a tri-
bal election "called by the Secretary of the Interior under such rules and
regulations as he may prescribe."4 8 However, the constitution, bylaws
and amendments are subject to the approval of the Secretary.4 9 The
tribe's choice of a lawyer, under the Act, is also subject to secretarial
approval. 50 More significantly, much of the present authority of the Sec-
retary to pass upon the validity of tribal laws stems from the particular
constitutions which the tribes adopted under the Act. These constitu-
tions are modeled after a constitution drafted by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs after the passage of the Act, and provide that enactments of the
tribe are not effective until such laws have been approved by the Secre-
tary. 5 ' This review process has hindered tribes in their efforts to assert
their inherent sovereignty within the reservation "through the simple
expedient of a Secretarial veto of tribal ordinances which he conceives
as being beyond the power of a tribe."152 Aside from reviewing tribal
42. Canby, supra note 1, at 210.
43. AIPRC, supra note 13, at 148. However, note that a 1935 opinion of the Secretary
of the Interior concerning the authority of the Secretary to issue rules and regulations
applicable in the Courts of Indian Offenses begins with the admission that there is no
federal statute which vests the Secretary with authority to "govern the conduct of Indians
on the reservation or to promote law and order thereon in anyway at all." Solicitor's
Opinion of Feb. 28, 1935 (unpublished), entitled "Secretary's Power to Regulate Conduct
of Indians," quoted in AIPRC, at 149-50.
44. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1982).
45. See, Canby, supra note 1, at 210. Section 461 of the Act ended the allotment pro-
cess, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1982), and § 462 extended the federal trusteeship of those lands
which had not been allotted.
46. AIPRC, supra note 13, at 188.
47. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 n.6 (1978).
48. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982).
49. Id
50. Id.
51. AIPRC, supra note 13, at 188.
52. Id. For example, the efforts of the Colville Tribe to impose a water use code
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ordinances, the Secretary has also on occasion revoked outright the con-
stitutions of tribes that had not organized under the Act.
53
Thus, despite a stated federal policy of respecting tribal sovereignty
and fostering tribal self-government, tribal governments and tribal law
have often taken the form desired by the Secretary of the Interior and
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to which the Secretary can delegate his
power and duties. Indeed, the American Indian Policy Review Commis-
sion, in 1977, came to the conclusion that the Bureau of Indian Affairs
has acted directly to undermine tribal self-government.54 A final contra-
diction of the present federal policy of respecting tribal sovereignty and
of minimizing intrusions into tribal self-government is that tribal gov-
ernment, including the tribal courts, is predominantly federally-
funded.5 5
In sum, although tribal governments and courts are the product of
tribal sovereignty and have been held not to be subject to the Constitu-
tion,5 6 they are molded and controlled by the Secretary of the Interior
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs and are financially supported by federal
outlays. One may therefore ask, especially in view of the truly limited
nature of tribal sovereignty discussed above, whether anyone, particu-
larly non-Indians, should ever suffer denial of due process and equal
protection of the laws by these defacto federal instrumentalities. If the
response is no, and if the tribes, as a matter of Supreme Court decisions,
are destined to remain free of the strictures of the Constitution, then a
practical solution to the conflict between the status of tribal government
in law and in fact would be to hold tribal governments and courts to the
statutorily-bestowed constitutional-type restrictions of the Indian Civil
Rights Act as a means of an effective federal remedy.
III. TRIBAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
This section describes denials of due process and equal protection
by tribal courts and councils. The Supreme Court has held that tribal
courts themselves should enforce the constitutional-type rights granted
by the Indian Civil Rights Act. 57 The tribal courts, however, sometimes
within the boundaries of their reservation were thwarted by the refusal of the Secretary to
approve their proposed code. The Commission has recommended that section 476 of the
Act be amended to permit Secretarial review only of tribal ordinances which conflict with
the federal trust responsibility over tribal natural resource assets. Id at 15.
53. Id at 189. For his authority to revoke the Secretary has invoked 25 U.S.C. § 2
(1982), which vests in the Secretary "the management of all Indian Affairs and of all mat-
ters arising out of Indian relations." Id The Secretary can delegate his powers and duties
to the branches and divisions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 25 U.S.C. § I(a) (1982).
54. AIPRC, supra note 13, at 189. The Commission has compiled an extensive catalog
of instances of such undermining of tribal government. The catalog consists chiefly of
examples of failure to aid the tribes in their attempts at self-government.
55. Id. at 222-23. See also AILTP, supra note 31, at 58.
56. See Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 56; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978);
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). The tribes are probably subject to the thirteenth
amendment, which limits the private action of owning slaves. See In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327
(D. Alaska 1886).
57. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 65.
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can neither remedy equal protection violations by the councils, which
control the judges' jobs,5 8 nor remedy their own due process violations,
as revealed by the claims against such courts brought subsequent to the
Santa Clara decision.
59
Indian tribes are not required to establish distinct, equal branches
of government to provide for a separation of powers. Rather, tribal
courts are considered subordinate to the tribal council on about one-
half of the reservations. 60 As a result, the councils try to influence court
decisions when they desire a particular outcome.61 Tribal council con-
trol of tribal courts, on most reservations, includes the power to select
judges and to decide the length of their tenure in office. 62 Terms in
office are short, and the judge who desires reappointment faces frequent
pressure to placate the appointing council. 63 Impeachments and recalls
of judges are frequent, and when the recall can be effected by a simple
majority vote of the council, the judge is particularly susceptible to re-
moval if he makes an unpopular decision. 64
Tribal court judges are almost always Indians and non-lawyers. Few
Indian judges have had any legal education other than that received in
attendance at National American Indian Court Judges Association semi-
nars. These seminars provide training only in criminal law. 6 5 Although
the judges' lack of legal education obviously makes non-Indian litigants
anxious about mistaken rulings of laws, this lack of formal legal training
is irrelevant to resolving intratribal disputes in the Indians' traditional,
more informal manner. Members of the tribe have few procedural due
process expectations and are often content to submit to the authority of
an elder, such as a judge, out of court. 66 Litigants, including non-Indi-
ans, in tribal courts find themselves under pressure from the bench to
settle, rather than to stand firm on legal positions. 6 7 Even while the
matter is pending before the court, Indian judges often try to settle dis-
58. See infra notes 60-64. See also note 162 and accompanying text, discussing Dry
Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980) (non-
Indian plaintiffs denied access to tribal court, to make an equal protection claim against
the tribal council, by the council itself), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
59. See generally AILTP, supra note 31, at 24-29. See also supra note 10 and accompany-
ing text.
60. AILTP, supra note 31, at 86.
61. Id. at 39.
62. Canby, supra note 1, at 216. See, e.g., SAN CARLOS APACHE TRIBE, ARIz., REV. LAW
AND ORDER CODE 1.6 (1956).
63. AILTP, supra note 3 1, at 94.
64. id at 40-41.
65. Id at 53. Federal regulations require only that a tribal judge be a member of the
tribe served by the court, never have been convicted of a felony, and not have been con-
victed of a misdemeanor within the preceding year.
66. Traditional tribal justice tended to be more informal and consensual than adjudi-
cative and emphasized restitution rather than punishment. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 332
n.34. The AIPRC described traditional tribal justice as follows:
Indian tribes and societies generally did not consider private property as central
to a government's relationship to citizens: communal property concepts are far
more prevalent in tribal societies than are individual property concepts. Because
of this, theft within tribes was "virtually unknown."
AIPRC, supra note 13, at 161.
67. Canby, supra note 1, at 217. "Tribal judges are more likely to encourage full
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 & 4
putes outside of the courtroom. 68 The judge is usually acquainted with
the Indian parties and, as a result, ex parte contacts and attempts to influ-
ence the judge are pervasive, 69 often made by the litigants' families
while trying to explain the circumstances of the particular case. 70 Non-
Indians who are strangers on the reservation can be at a disadvantage.
A non-Indian party feels the effects of the judge's lack of legal train-
ing more than Indian parties do in intratribal disputes because tribal
judges apply federal regulations or state law in litigation involving non-
Indians. Most tribal codes are modelled after the Code of Indian Tribal
Offenses, which was published by the Bureau of Indian Affairs after the
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act. 7 1 Although a few tribes have
expanded upon the Code7 2 and those tribes organized under the Act
can adopt their own code, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, few have done so.73 Thus, in some cases involving non-Indi-
ans, tribal judges administer an antiquated federal code. 74 Further-
more, some tribal council decisions are not incorporated into the code
being used by the tribe, with the result that the decisions are unknown
by the judge who must interpret them in future cases.
7 5
In much civil litigation with non-Indian parties, tribal courts apply
the law of the state in which the reservation is situated, a body of law
with which the courts are even less familiar than federal regulations.
Tribal use of state law is authorized by the Code of Indian Tribal Of-
fenses itself, which requires the tribal courts to apply: (1) federal regula-
tions, and ordinances or customs of the tribe not prohibited by federal
law; and (2) in matters not covered by federal law, the law of the state
"in which the matter in dispute may lie." 76 Thus, in tort and contract
cases, for which there are no applicable federal regulations or tribal cus-
toms, state law is applied. 7 7 For example, most tribes apply state traffic
laws to reservation motorists, many of whom are often non-Indians just
passing through Indian country. 78 The non-Indian in tribal court,
agreement among the parties through open-court negotiations then to decide that one
party should win and the other lose." Id. at 218.
68. AILTP, supra note 31, at 67.
69. Id. at 69.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., PAPAGO TRIBE, ARIZ. LAW AND ORDER CODE (1937); WHITE MOUNTAIN
APACHE TRIBE, ARIZ. LAW AND ORDER CODE (1938). See generally, Canby, supra note 1, at
216; AILTP, supra note 31, at 38. The Code of Indian Tribal Offenses was adopted at 22
Fed. Reg. 10,515 (1957) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 11).
72. AILTP, supra note 31, at 38.
73. "The Navajo Code... resembles state law more than federal regulations. NAVAJO
TRIBAL CODE (1969). The Hopi Tribe adopted a new tribal code in 1972. The Salt River-
Pima Maricopa Indian Community, the Gila River-Maricopa Indian Community, the White
Mountain Apache Tribe ... all have code revision projects under way." Canby, supra note
1, at 216.
74. AILTP, supra note 31, at 97.
75. Id. "Sometimes the first the court hears of a change in existing law is when a
defendant calls it to the court's attention." Id at 38.
76. 25 C.F.R. § 11.23 (1984).
77. Canby, supra note 1, at 216.
78. AILTP, supra note 31, at 85. The next most frequently applied state laws on reser-
vations are probate laws. Id
TRIBAL COURTS
therefore, will be reasonably able to anticipate the body of substantive
law that the tribal court will apply in his case.
He may, however, have little idea what to expect procedurally.
Tribes use elements of federal, state, and National American Indian
Court Judges Association (NAICJA) rules of civil procedure, 79 and use
them irregularly. 80 Hearings and motions are not commonly used in
tribal courts.8 1 Few reservations have rules of evidence in their codes,
and most rely on a mixture of federal, state, and NAICJA rules.8 2 These
rules, too, are followed loosely: hearsay is admissible, and expert wit-
nesses, are rarely used.83 Few tribal courts permit jury trials in civil
cases, 84 and in those that do, jurors are selected only from the tribal
rolls and the selection is not subject to challenge.
8 5
A final point about trial procedure in tribal courts is the scarcity,
and in some instances, the exclusion from the court, of licensed at-
tornies. 86 The tribal equivalent of an attorney is the "lay advocate," a
non-lawyer who may or may not have had litigation experience. 8 7 Lay
advocates generally represent Indian defendants while licensed attor-
neys represent most non-Indians in tribal courts. Because most of the
licensed attorneys themselves are non-Indians, 88 there is a significant
risk of alienating or intimidating the tribal judge. This is particularly
true when the tribe itself is involved in the case and represented by a
tribal attorney who has ex parte access to the judge. 89
If a tribal court litigant suffers even a blatant deprivation of due
process, or if a tribal court fails to remedy an equal protection violation
by the tribal council, and the litigant therefore desires to appeal, he may
be further and fatally hindered by the lack of a transcript of the trial
court proceedings and the absence of an appellate court. Few tribal
courts are "courts of record," utilizing a clerk and a seal and regularly
recording their proceedings and decisions.90 When records of proceed-
ings are kept, the quality is often poor, and they are not transcribed until
after counsel decides to appeal. 9 ' Even more troubling is that no tribal
trial courts render written decisions, and that only a few do even at the
appellate level.
92
79. AILTP, supra note 31, at 44.
80. Id. at 68.
81. Id at 62.
82. Id. at 68.
83. Id.
84. I d at 72.
85. Id. at 73. See also Recent Developments, 46 WASH. L. REV. 541, 545 (1971); Clinton,
CiminalJurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a jurisdiction Maze, 18 ARIz. L. REV.
503, 561 (1976).
86. Canby, supra note 1, at 218.
87. Id
88. AILTP, supra note 31, at 64.
89. Id at 55. "On one reservation the tribal attorney/prosecutor also gives the judge
legal advice and obtains a 90% conviction rate in court."
90. Id. at 30.
91. Id at 68. Some tribes now use a tape recorder or a shorthand clerk to record
proceedings. Id
92. Id at 69.
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Tribal appellate systems vary greatly. On many reservations there
is simply no appellate system. 93 Where tribes utilize CFR Courts, an
administrative appeal may be taken to the Department of the Interior.
94
Many appellate systems do not function because of a lack of funding or
because tribal members, unfamiliar with the idea of appeal as a right, do
not understand the courts to be an available remedy. 9 5 Of the Indian
appellate courts that do operate regularly, such as those of the Navajo
and the Oglala Sioux, the courts typically allow for review only on the
trial court record, which often is incomplete, although on occasion they
will hear oral argument and accept newly discovered evidence.
9 6
In sum, the litigant, whether Indian or non-Indian, who ventures
into tribal court on a civil matter faces a strong possibility of a denial of
due process. Furthermore, as indicated by challenges to tribal council
decisions filed under the Indian Civil Rights Act, tribal courts sometimes
fail to remedy equal protection violations by the councils.9 7 Accord-
ingly, federal courts administering the Indian Civil Rights Act9 8 before
Santa Clara99 held that under the Act the tribal courts, while they did not
have to adhere to every procedural due process requirement to which
the states are subject under the fourteenth amendment, did have to fur-
nish certain basic elements of due process, such as providing adequate
notice and fair and impartial hearings.1 0 0 In similar fashion the federal
courts under the Act held the tribal councils to a standard of equal pro-
tection tempered by tribal values and resources.10 1
Another indication of the quality of justice in tribal courts comes
from the state courts' treatment of tribal judgments. Only two states,
and those only to a limited degree, recognize tribal court judgments.
10 2
93. AIPRC, supra note 13, at 164.
94. Id. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.6 (1984); see also id. §§ 11.6C-.6CA.
95. AILTP, supra note 31, at 75. See also Recent Developments, 46 WASH. L. REV. 541, 546
(1971).
96. AILTP, supra note 31, at 75.
97. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973).
The tribal courts have also failed after Santa Clara to restrain the tribal councils. See supra
text accompanying note 58.
98. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
99. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
100. See, e.g., Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir.
1974); cf National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 560 F. Supp. 213 (D. Mont.),
rev'd, 736 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2447 (1985). The right to a fair and
impartial hearing is sustained when there is blatant bias on the part of the judge. See, e.g.,
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). A serious bias against non-Indians discovered in
tribal courts was that Indian judges consider non-Indians a source of revenue for the
courts, and so fine them heavily. AILTP, supra note 31, at 79.
101. See, e.g., Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506
F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974).
102. Those states are New Mexico and Arizona. AILTP, supra note 31, at 80. In Jim v.
CIT Financial Services Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975), which concerned an
attempted repossession of an auto on the Navajo reservation by a non-Indian creditor, the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that the Navajo Nation was a territory for the purposes
of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), the enabling statute for the full faith and credit clause, and
that therefore, on remand, the district court was to determine whether Navajo law was to
apply to the sales contract. The case thus concerned choice of law more than recognition
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If Indian courts could consistently be held to fundamental constitutional
standards, even those provided by the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 3 and
they maintained records of their proceedings, states would have little
rational basis for refusing to recognize tribal court judgments. 1° 4 In
turn, recognition of tribal judgments by state courts would effectively
prevent parties from fleeing or removing property from the reservation
to escape execution of tribal court judgments. This would foster the
authority of tribal courts, 10 5 and so satisfy the Santa Clara 106 policy man-
date of strengthening tribal autonomy. Instead, Santa Clara, by denying
a federal remedy other than the habeas writ under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 10 7 and thereby severely limiting the effectiveness of the Act
as a means of forcing tribes to meet some constitutional standard of due
process and equal protection, left to the tribes the problem of attaining
state court recognition. The tribes have been unable to do so. The
Court's decision, therefore, works against the objective of fostering tri-
bal governmental autonomy which is ironic, because the Court found
that objective to be determinative in its reading of the congressional in-
tent behind the Act.
10 8
IV. THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTs ACT AND SANTA CLARA
PUEBLO V. MARTINEZ
A. Purpose and History of the Act
In April, 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 9 to
remedy tribal abuses of judicial and legislative power in denying consti-
tutional-type rights to persons subject to tribal jurisdiction. 010 The Act
imposes constitutional-type restrictions on the functioning of tribal gov-
ofjudgments. Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that a Navajo will admitted
to probate in a tribal court should be given the same force and effect as a will originally
probated in an Arizona state court. In re Lynch's Estate, 92 Ariz. 354, 377 P.2d 199
(1962). See also Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855) (Cherokee Nation's letters
of appointment for testamentary purposes entitled to full faith and credit).
103. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1982).
104. AILTP, supra note 31, at 31.
105. Id. at 30.
106. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Commentators have called for amending 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to
specifically include Indian tribes among those governments to whom full faith and credit
should be given. Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes,
7 N.M. L. REV. 133, 145 (1977). See AIPRC, supra note 13, at 19.
107. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1982).
108. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62.
109. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1982).
110. See generally S. REP. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967); Hearings on the Constitu-
tional Rights of the American Indian, S. 961-68 and S.J. Res. 40, Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965); Hearings on the
Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 234-45 (1962); 87th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 285-86 (1963); 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 511-12 (1963); 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 4, at 815 (1964); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONsTrrrUONA. RIGHTS OF SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., CoNsTrrrUTONA. RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN
INDIAN (Comm. Print 1965); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE
COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN
INDIAN (Comm. Print 1964).
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ernment, including the courts. " ' I The most important provision of the
Act for the purpose of this article states that "[n]o Indian tribe in exer-
cising powers of self-government shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of
liberty or property without due process of law."
' "12
The legislative history of the Act reveals that it deliberately extends
equal protection and due process rights to any person, including non-
Indians, within the jurisdiction of the tribe. United States Senator Ervin,
the Act's sponsor, originally proposed that the full constitutional protec-
tion of the Bill of Rights be granted to anyone, Indian or non-Indian,
who came before a tribal court.' 1 The Department of the Interior re-
sponded with an alternative version of the bill which provided only cer-
tain constitutional-type rights, to be enumerated by statute, and only to
members of the tribes." 4 The Department asserted that granting the
complete protection of the Bill of Rights to anyone who came before a
tribal court would disrupt tribal life, especially if non-Indians used the
equal protection right to claim the benefits of tribal membership.' 15 In
drafting the final version of the Act, Senator Ervin incorporated the In-
terior Department's approach of granting only select constitutional-type
rights. The final version, nevertheless, continued to guarantee equal
protection and due process to any person within the tribe's jurisdiction,
111. The Act provides:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue war-
rants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assist-
ance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual
punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months
or a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws
or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment
the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982).
112. Id § 1302(8).
113. Hearings on S. 961-968 and S.J Res. 40 before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
114. Id at 318.
115. Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIs.
557, 591 (1972).
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including non-Indians as well as Indians. 116 Some time after the pas-
sage of the Act, the Pueblo tribe, in Senate hearings, expressed concern
about the way the courts were applying the Act, and in particular, how
non-Indians living in the Pueblo communities had utilized the equal
protection right to gain the full benefits of tribal membership." 17 In re-
sponse, Senator Ervin introduced an amendment to the Act which re-
stricted the meaning of "any person" in the Act to "American Indian,"
thereby denying non-Indians on reservations the guarantee of equal
protection of tribal laws.'18 Ervin himself offered no support for the
amendment, which he felt went against the spirit of his bill, and it died
under advisement in the Senate. 1 9
B. Applications of the Act Before Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
The Act on its face provides no injunctive or declaratory remedy by
which to enforce the rights it enumerates. Section 1303, however, does
furnish habeas corpus relief.120 Even though the Act provides no ex-
plicit remedy other than the habeas writ, until Santa Clara Pueblo v. Marti-
nez,121 most federal courts found an implied right of action under the
Act and granted injunctive or declaratory relief accordingly.'
22
Concern, however, about the federal policies of fostering tribal self-
government and cultural autonomy divided federal courts on the ques-
tion of what standard of constitutional protection is provided by the
constitutional-type rights of the Act. Some courts, denying the impor-
tance of Indian values, held the tribes and their courts to the constitu-
tional standards of the federal courts themselves.' 2 3 Another held that
the Act did not necessarily incorporate the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, holding instead that the actions of tribal governments
must be measured "in light of tribal practice" and that "essential fair-
ness in the tribal context, not procedural punctiliousness, is the stan-
dard against which the disputed actions must be measured.'
24
Variations from the standards of federal law were sanctioned in ques-
116. Id. at 602. See also Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
SUMMARY REPORT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, 49th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1966).
117. Hearings on S. 211 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1969).
118. Burnett, supra note 115, at 614.
119. Id. at 615.
120. "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person in a
court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian
Tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
121. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
122. See, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 933 (10th Cir.
1975); Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1234 (4th Cir.
1974);Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200, 203 n.5 (9th Cir. 1973);
Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 455 F.2d 698, 700 (8th Cir. 1972).
123. E.g., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding Indians to the
federal "one-man, one-vote" doctrine); accord, White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311
(8th Cir. 1973); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D.C. Ariz. 1969).
124. McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir. 1974).
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 & 4
tions involving election district apportionment t2 5 and eligibility to vote
in tribal elections.
126
In an attempt to further the congressional goal of preserving tribal
culture by permitting the tribal government to resolve tribal disputes
and make tribal policy, before they would grant relief under the Act,
most federal courts prior to Santa Clara insisted upon a showing by the
plaintiff that he had exhausted all tribal remedies.12 7 Premised on the
idea that Indian governments themselves should be given every possible
opportunity to meet the mandates of the Indian Civil Rights Act, the
exhaustion practice in essence turned federal district courts into appel-
late courts for the tribal courts.
C. The Supreme Court's Reading of the Act in Santa Clara
Santa Clara was a suit brought in federal court by a female tribe
member and her daughter against her tribe and its governor. Martinez
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of a tribal
ordinance which denies membership in the tribe to children of female
members who marry outside the tribe, while extending membership to
children of male tribe members who marry outside the tribe. Martinez
and her daughter claimed that the rule discriminates on the basis of sex
and ancestry, in violation of the equal protection provision of the Indian
Civil Rights Act. 128 The issue in the case was whether, under the Act, a
federal court could pass on the validity of such a tribal ordinance when
the Act itself does not expressly authorize civil actions for declaratory or
injunctive relief in the enforcement of its substantive provisions.
The Court first noted that the inherent sovereignty of the tribes and
their power to make law on intratribal affairs was subject to congres-
sional authority "to limit, modify, or eliminate the powers of local self-
government which the tribes otherwise possess,"' 12 9 and that the Indian
Civil Rights Act is an exercise of such authority. 130 The Court then ob-
served that Indian tribes possess the common law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers. 1 ' Accordingly, the Court
held that, because a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but
must be express, and because the Act does not expressly subject tribes
to the jurisdiction of federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or de-
claratory relief, such suits against tribes under the Act are barred by the
tribe's sovereign immunity.'
3 2
125. Daly, 483 F.2d at 700.
126. Wounded Head v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975).
127. See, e.g., St. Mark's v. Chippewa-Cree Tribe, 545 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1976); Howl-
ett v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Driving Hawk, 534 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1976) (exhaustion required only if plaintiff
cannot receive a fair hearing from the tribal council); Janis v. Wilson, 521 F.2d 724 (8th
Cir. 1975) (same).
128. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1982). See supra note 111.
129. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 56 (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)).
130. Id at 57.
131. Id at 58.
132. Id. at 58-59.
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A more difficult issue was whether tribal officers, not protected by
the tribe's immunity, could be subject to a cause of action implicit in the
terms of the Act. Holding that they could not, the Court first asserted
that providing a federal forum for issues arising under section 1302
would interfere with tribal autonomy, undermining the authority of tri-
bal courts and thereby infringing upon the right of Indians to govern
themselves.13 3 The Court then turned to the factors identified in Cort v.
Ash, 13 4 to determine whether a cause of action is implicit in the Act, if
not expressly provided.
The Court first acknowledged that a central purpose of the Act was
to secure constitutional-type rights for individual Indians, and that the
respondents were members of the class intended to benefit from the
Act. 13 5 The Court decided, however, that inferring a private cause of
action was not necessary to fulfill the purposes of the Act and that both
the statutory scheme and legislative history suggest that the failure to
establish a federal remedy other than habeas corpus was deliberate on
the part of Congress.
136
The Court then identified two competing purposes of the Act:
strengthening the legal position of individual tribal members (the Court
made no mention of non-Indians) against the tribe, and promoting a
federal policy of furthering Indian self-government by avoiding undue
interference with it. 13 7 The Court found a commitment to furthering
tribal self-government in Congress' selective incorporation of constitu-
tional safeguards into the final version of the Act, indicating a concern
for "the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal govern-
ments."' 3 8 Creating a federal cause of action to enforce the rights set
forth in the Act, while perhaps "useful ... in securing compliance [with
the Act], plainly would be at odds with the Congressional goal of pro-
tecting tribal self-government."
' l 9
Furthermore, the Court held, it was not necessary to imply a federal
remedy, in addition to habeas corpus relief, to give effect to Congress'
objective of extending constitutional norms to the tribes because tribal
forums are available. The Court noted that tribal courts have long been
recognized as "appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of dis-
putes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indi-
ans and non-Indians."
140
The legislative history of the Act also supported the Court's deci-
133. Id at 59.
134. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The four factors involve first, whether the plaintiff is within
the class of persons to be protected by the statute; second, whether there is an indication
of legislative intent either creating or denying a remedy; third, whether it would be consis-
tent with the underlying legislative purpose to imply a remedy; and fourth, whether the
claim is one traditionally relegated to state or tribal law. Id at 78.
135. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 61.
136. Id
137. Id at 62.
138. Id
139. Id at 64.
140. Id at 65.
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sion not to find a private right of action in the Act. By rejecting the
version of the Act which provided for de novo federal review of tribal
court criminal convictions, and instead settling on the habeas remedy,
Congress opted for a less intrusive review mechanism. 14 1 For similar
reasons, said the Court, Congress rejected those versions of the Act
which would have required review by the Attorney General or the Secre-
tary of the Interior of alleged civil violations of the Act.142 In short,
congressional rejection of proposals that would have authorized causes
of action other than petitions for habeas corpus persuaded the Court
that Congress intended to create only the limited review provided ex-
pressly by the habeas corpus remedy.
143
As a final matter, the Court noted the cultural difference between
federal jurisprudence and tribal tradition, and surmised that Congress
may have limited the federal remedies because "Congress may also have
considered that resolution of statutory issues under § 1302, and particu-
larly those issues likely to arise in a civil context, will frequently depend
on questions of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may be
in a better position to evaluate than federal courts." 14 4 The Court, thus,
decided that a federal remedy to enforce the statutory prohibitions of
the Act, at least in a civil context, might interfere with a tribe's ability to
maintain its political and cultural integrity. 145 For all of the above rea-
sons, the Supreme Court held that the Indian Civil Rights Act does not
impliedly authorize actions in federal court for declaratory or injunctive
relief against either the tribe or its officers.
Justice White dissented. He stated that the only declared purpose
of the Act is "to insure that the American Indian is afforded the broad
constitutional rights secured to other Americans."' 46 Implicit in this
purpose, he asserted, was an authorization to bring civil actions in fed-
eral court against tribal officials for declaratory and injunctive relief to
enforce the provisions of the Act.
14 7
D. Federal Decisions Subsequent to Santa Clara
Despite its broad holding, the facts of Santa Clara, construed nar-
rowly, raise the question of whether the case can be distinguished when
non-Indian parties are involved, since in such litigation the matters dis-
puted are not intratribal and rarely concern tribal custom. Perhaps, in
light of the limited nature of tribal sovereignty when non-Indians are
concerned, 148 Santa Clara can be read to permit federal injunctive and
declaratory relief for non-Indians under the Act. The obvious problem
141. Id at 67.
142. Id at 68.
143. Id at 70.
144. Id at 71.
145. Id at 72.
146. Id at 72 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 841, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 6
(1967)).
147. Id at 74 (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969)).
148. See supra notes 20 through 30 and accompanying text.
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with such a reading is that it goes against the Act's legislative intent of
providing the rights of the Act to Indian and non-Indian alike in the
tribal courts. This has not stopped some federal courts, however, from
distinguishing Santa Clara in such a limiting fashion.
Since Santa Clara, federal courts have been in dispute about the ap-
plication of the decision to non-Indians. The general tenor of some
recent decisions has been disbelief that the Supreme Court, by denying
an effective federal remedy under the Act, intended to allow non-Indian
American citizens to suffer denials of the constitutional-type rights of
the Act in their civil dealings with the tribes. The present situation is
ironic. The Indian Civil Rights Act, intended primarily to provide con-
stitutional-type rights to individual Indians, but subsequently inter-
preted by the Supreme Court to provide no federal injunctive or
declaratory remedies to enforce such statutory rights, is now read by
some courts to grant such remedies to non-Indians, but not Indians.
All post-Santa Clara decisions concerning the rights of individual In-
dians under the Indian Civil Rights Act have denied the Indians a fed-
eral remedy. The Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, are in
agreement on the question. In Shortbull v. Looking Elk, 14 9 an Indian who
was a tribal member but whose name was kept from the tribe's voting list
sued tribal officers under section 1985 of Title 42 of the United States
Code, and under the Indian Civil Rights Act, alleging that tribal officials
had deprived him of his right, as determined by a tribal court and a
council resolution, to have his name put on the ballot. The court held
that the plaintiff had no cause of action under section 1985, and that
even though he had a claim under the Indian Civil Rights Act, the Act
provided no federal remedy. However, the court expressed its frustra-
tion with the Santa Clara decision, noting that Shortbull's lack of federal
remedy defeats the purpose of the Indian Civil Rights Act, which is to
protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal
governments. The court also questioned whether rendering meaning-
less the rights afforded by the Act was justified on the grounds of main-
taining tribal autonomy.' 50
The same complaint is echoed in those post-Santa Clara cases con-
cerning the rights of non-Indians under the Act. The most frequently
cited post-Santa Clara decision denying non-Indians a federal remedy
under the Indian Civil Rights Act is Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe.15 ' In Trans-Canada, the plaintiff non-Indian, a
149. 677 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982).
150. Id. at 650. See also Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community, 642 F.2d 276 (9th Cir.
1981) (no federal remedy under the Act available to individual Indian alleging that tribe
had deprived him of tribal office in violation of tribal statutes); Bruette v. Knope, 554 F.
Supp. 301 (E.D. Wisc. 1983) (In civil rights complaint by individual Indians against reser-
vation police officers, sovereign immunity extends to officers acting in their official capac-
ity and so bars suit against them under the Act.); Toineeta v. Andrus, 503 F. Supp. 605
(W.D.N.C. 1980) (In dispute over possessory right to tribal land, plaintiff Indian cannot
bypass Santa Clara by suing individual tribal officers in place of the tribe and bringing the
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985(3)).
151. 634 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1980).
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developer of fee land within reservation boundaries, refused to comply
with a tribal business licensing ordinance. The tribal court enjoined the
developer's construction activities in order to compel compliance with
the ordinance. The plaintiff, in turn, sued the tribe in federal court,
seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the ordinance and alleg-
ing jurisdiction under, and violations of, the Indian Civil Rights Act. In
particular, he claimed due process and equal protection rights of tribal
law. The court cited Santa Clara in holding that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. The court reasoned that because the Act did not provide
the plaintiff with a remedy other than habeas corpus, the Act did not, in
this case, furnish the court with federal jurisdiction.
152
The United States District Court of Montana expressed dissatisfac-
tion with this Ninth Circuit holding, but grudgingly followed it in R.J.
Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority. 153 In R.J. Williams, the
plaintiff non-Indian construction company entered into a contract with
the defendant tribal housing authority. A dispute arose, and the tribal
court, without notice or a hearing, ordered the attachment of the plain-
tiff's property on the reservation. Furthermore, by tribal statute, the tri-
bal court did not have the jurisdiction which it exercised over the
plaintiff. The district court held that the tribal court-ordered seizure of
the property violated the plaintiffs right to due process under the In-
dian Civil Rights Act. 154 The district court granted the plaintiff injunc-
tive relief and damages for conversion against the tribal housing
authority which had a waiver-of-immunity clause in its charter of incor-
poration. The injunction restrained the authority from selling what had
been attached and from pursuing any further action in tribal court.
The district court also held, however, that it could not grant the
plaintiff relief in the form of damages against the tribe itself because the
Indian Civil Rights Act did not provide the court with jurisdiction over
the tribal court or its officers.' 5 5 The court, in frustration, said that
[t]his case illustrates the absurd results that the broad rule of
[Santa Clara] can cause. The... tribal code states that the tribal
courts shall have no jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Tribal
Court nonetheless exercised jurisdiction over plaintiffs who are
non-Indians. The Tribal Court next ordered plaintiffs' prop-
erty attached, allegedly in clear violation of plaintiffs' due pro-
cess rights. Plaintiffs, however, have no remedy in federal court
to enforce their statutory right to due process. 1
56
The court then considered distinguishing the tribal sovereignty con-
cerns of Santa Clara by noting that in the instant case the plaintiff was a
non-Indian, that the dispute was one of contract law, and not tribal law,
and that the plaintiff had no forum. 157 It acknowledged the Tenth Cir-
152. Id. at 476.
153. 509 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mont. 1981), rev'd, 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 3476 (1985).
154. Id at 939.
155. Id at 938-39.
156. Id at 939.
157. Id at 939-40.
TRIBAL COURTS
cuit decision in Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes,' 5 8
which had utilized similar distinctions to avoid the Santa Clara ruling.
Nonetheless, the court felt that it had to defer to its own circuit's Trans-
Canada decision, and denied the plaintiffs any further remedy.
15 9
Other courts have not felt so restrained by the Santa Clara interpre-
tation of the Act and have provided federal remedies to non-Indians
under the Act, or at least implied that such remedies are available to
non-Indians. In United States v. Clifford,160 an action for declaratory re-
lief, the convicted non-Indian plaintiff moved to suppress evidence
seized at his arrest by tribal police on the reservation. The Eighth Cir-
cuit held that, even though there was no search and seizure violation in
the given case, the plaintiff had a claim under the Indian Civil Rights
Act. 16 1 The court used the Act to hold tribal officers to constitutional
standards of evidence-gathering. The case implies that a violation by
tribal officers of certain of a non-Indian's rights under the Act could
entitle the non-Indian to a new trial in federal court if the plaintiff had
been convicted in tribal court.
In more evident conflict with Santa Clara is the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion in Dy Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes.' 6 2 The Dry
Creek decision, in direct contradiction of the Ninth Circuit's Trans-Canada
ruling, distinguished Santa Clara on both factual and policy grounds. In
Dry Creek, the plaintiffs were a non-Indian corporation and its owners,
located on fee land within reservation boundaries. The tribal council
ordered the blocking of the plaintiffs' access road. The plaintiffs sought
a remedy in tribal court but were denied access to it, because of personal
hostility from certain council members. They then sought injunctive re-
lief in federal court, alleging that their personal and property rights
under the Indian Civil Rights Act had been violated. The district court
deferred to Santa Clara and denied jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, distinguishing Santa Clara on the basis
that Dry Creek did not involve a stricdy intratribal matter, that non-Indi-
ans were involved, and that no tribal forum was available. The court
held that the plaintiffs had to be afforded a remedy and, thus, remanded
the case to the district court. 163
The Dry Creek approach admittedly provides an effective federal
158. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 19 8 0 ), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981). See infra note 162
and accompanying text.
159. The limited success that the plaintiffs enjoyed with respect to the claims against
the Indian housing authority was short lived. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed on the
grounds that the district court had improperly decided whether the housing authority was
under tribal court jurisdiction, when the question should have been decided by the tribal
court itself. 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Snow v. Quinault Indian Nation, 709
F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1983) (Indian tribe immune from suit in federal court by non-
Indian plaintift),cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
160. 664 F.2d 1090 (8th Cir. 1981).
161. It at 1091 n.3. The court found the claim justified under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2).
See also United States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869 (8th Cir. 1981).
162. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
163. Dry Creek, 623 F.2d at 685. See also Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe, 673 F.2d
315, 319 (10th Cir. 1982) (non-Indian construction company's contract damage claim
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remedy for non-Indians under the Act, at least in the situation where a
tribal government denies the non-Indian equal protection by denying
him access to the tribal forum. The decision is also facially consistent
with Santa Clara, which did not consider the treatment of non-Indians
under the Act, and did not reach the question of whether tribal sover-
eignty merits less respect when non-Indians raise a claim under the Act
which the tribal court refuses to hear.' 64
The numerous cases filed under the Act by Indians before Santa
Clara, however, indicate that Indians also suffer the same type of due
process and equal protection violations in tribal courts as non-Indi-
ans. 16 5 Indeed, an important motive behind the passage of the Act was
to remedy such violations.1 6 6 While the rights of non-Indians in tribal
courts is of primary concern, the similar plight of Indian litigants, as
expressed at the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act itself, cannot be
ignored. Accordingly, Santa Clara should not be read in such a way as to
grant non-Indians, but not Indians, the rights provided by the Act. An
obvious solution to the problem would be for Congress to override
Santa Clara by amending the Act to explicitly provide those federal reme-
dies which the Supreme Court found lacking. A more realistic alterna-
tive, however, since it would not be in direct conflict with Santa Clara and
would effectuate the purposes of the Act, is the appellate solution pro-
posed in the next section.
V. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL
Tribal courts frequently have jurisdiction over non-Indians involved
in civil litigation arising on the reservation.1 67 In the tribal courts non-
Indian and Indian litigants can suffer denials of due process of law.
These litigants suffer such denials even when measured by constitu-
tional standards tempered by an awareness of the tribal context, as done
by numerous pre-Santa Clara cases decided under the Act. 16 8 Litigants
are also often denied equal protection of the laws by tribal councils, as
against tribe did "not rise to the level of constitutional deprivation to be redressed under
the ICRA," implying that a more serious deprivation would so state a claim).
164. The Tenth Circuit has recently emphasized that where a non-Indian plaintiff has
not first attempted to pursue a remedy in a tribal forum, the Dry Creek rule does not apply.
White v. Pueblo of SanJuan, 728 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1984). Seealso EleventhAnnual Tenth
Circuit Survey: 1983-1984, 62 DEN. U.L. REV. 59, 76-77 (1985).
165. See generally AILTP, supra note 31, at 24-29.
166. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
167. Federal courts have criminal jurisdiction over the reservations. See Clinton, Crimi-
nal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARiz. L. REV.
503, 557 n.281 (1976). The General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982), confers on
federal courts jurisdiction over Indians who victimize non-Indians in violations of federal
enclave law. The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982), grants to federal courts
jurisdiction over Indians who commit enumerated crimes on the reservation, regardless of
the race of the victim, and regardless of whether the Indian has already been punished
under tribal law. The final major federal intrusion into tribal criminal jurisdiction over
member Indians is the Indian Civil Rights Act itself, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1982), which
limits the sentencing power of tribal courts, and is enforceable by § 1303, the right to the
writ of habeas corpus.
168. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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measured by a similar tempered standard, and cannot depend on tribal
courts to remedy such violations. 16 9
To rectify this situation, in 1968 Congress passed the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 170 which guarantees constitutional-type rights, including
due process and equal protection, to all Indians and non-Indians who
come before tribal courts. The Supreme Court, however, in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 17 1 held that Congress intended no federal remedy
other than habeas corpus for violations of the rights enumerated in the
Act. This weakened the Act as a means of imposing constitutional-type
restrictions on tribal courts. Identifying two purposes behind the Act,
protecting the legal interests of individuals as against tribal govern-
ments, and furthering tribal government by avoiding federal interfer-
ence, the Court in essence decided that Congress had intended to
promote the former interest only to the extent that it did not impinge
upon the latter.17
2
In reaction to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act, the
Tenth Circuit in Dry Creek173 read the Santa Clara decision literally and
held that the non-Indian plaintiffs who were denied access to the tribal
forum had a federal cause of action under the Act. 174 However, Dry
Creek does not provide a satisfactory solution to violations of constitu-
tional-type rights suffered by non-Indians in tribal courts. First, the de-
cision grants a federal remedy under the Act only in the situation where
the tribe has denied a non-Indian access to the tribal forum. Second,
even limiting the federal remedy for non-Indians under the Act to such a
situation necessarily misreads the congressional intent behind the Act.
Congress by no means intended to provide only non-Indians, but not
Indians, the rights enumerated in the Act. 17 5 Dry Creek is consistent with
the Supreme Court's mandate to respect tribal sovereignty in intratribal
disputes, but is inconsistent with the intent of the Act. The ideal solu-
tion to the problem of the deprivation of tribal litigants' rights should
reconcile these apparently conflicting values of tribal sovereignty in in-
tratribal matters, and the individual rights of both Indians and non-
Indians.
The following solution is therefore proposed. The Indian Civil
Rights Act should be amended to permit appeal to federal district
courts, in both civil and criminal matters, by anyone subject to the juris-
diction of a tribal court who makes a primafacie showing of a deprivation
by the tribal court of any right bestowed by the Act. In order to foster
tribal self-government, this federal appeal should be available only after
169. See supra notes 10, 58-59 and 97; see also Olney Runs After v. Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, 437 F. Supp. 1035 (D.S.D. 1977); White v. Tribal Council, Red Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians, 383 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1974).
170. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
171. 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
172. Id at 64.
173. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
174. Id at 685.
175. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
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exhaustion of tribal remedies.' 76 The rights of due process and equal
protection, as furnished by the Act, should be interpreted on federal
appeal as interpreted by federal courts previous to Santa Clara, and not
according to the strict procedural requirements of federal case law, but
rather by a lower standard of fundamental fairness which takes into ac-
count the needs and customs of the tribes.
177
This federal appellate solution would protect the rights of the Act
by means similar to taking an appeal on a constitutional question from a
federal Article I court. It would be consistent with the predominant leg-
islative purpose behind the Act of providing constitutional-type protec-
tions to anyone who comes before a tribal court. 178 It is, furthermore,
only minimally inconsistent with the other congressional objective of the
Act, as emphasized by the Supreme Court in Santa Clara, of fostering
respect for tribal sovereignty and self-government. 179 The require-
ments of an exhaustion of tribal remedies and interpretation of the
equal protection and due process rights with an eye to tribal needs and
capabilities should lessen the intrusion on tribal sovereignty in even
strictly intratribal disputes. Also, federal enforcement of the constitu-
tional-type requirements of the Act should promote the recognition of
tribal judgments by the states, which in turn should foster the authority
of tribal government by preventing the flight from reservations, which
presently occurs, to escape execution of tribal judgments. 180
Nor is the proposed federal appellate solution inconsistent with
other contemporary aspects of federal Indian law and policy, as depicted
previously in this article. The current state of tribal sovereignty is that it
is subject to the greater sovereignty of the United States. 181 By virtue of
their dependent status the tribes have lost whatever aspects of their sov-
ereignty are inconsistent with federal interests, which has historically
meant that the tribes have lost most of their sovereignty where relations
between Indians and non-Indians were concerned. Tribal sovereignty is
not limited to protecting their self-government and controlling strictly
intratribal matters. 1
8 2
In accord with this limited tribal sovereignty, federal criminal juris-
diction has been extended to serious crimes committed between Indians
on the reservation,1 8 3 and, more important, to deny tribal criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians on the reservation.1 8 4 This latter intrusion
176. See AIPRC, supra note 13, at 19, for an identical proposal.
177. The proposal in essence entails a return to the attitude of those federal courts that
interpreted the Indian Civil Rights Act before Santa Clara: the actions of tribal courts
should be measured in light of tribal practice and "essential fairness in the tribal context,"
is the standard against which tribal actions should be measured. See supra notes 101, 124-
28 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
179. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 62.
180. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
182. Id.
183. See supra note 167.
184. Id
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into tribal sovereignty resulted from the overriding federal interest in
protecting non-Indians from "unwarranted" deprivations of their lib-
erty.' 8 5 It is a short step from this rationale, and consistent with the
truly limited state of tribal sovereignty, to assert the federal interest in
protecting non-Indians from "unwarranted" deprivations of their prop-
erty. If, out of respect for whatever is left of tribal sovereignty, tribal
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians cannot be denied, then federal inter-
ests would be best protected by permitting a federal appeal to vindicate
the rights granted by the Indian Civil Rights Act.
Admittedly, permitting a federal district court, in a case involving
strictly intratribal litigation, to find that a tribal court violated an Indian
party's rights under the Act, and then to remand the matter to the tribal
court, would represent an intrusion on that intratribal aspect of tribal
sovereignty which federal courts have traditionally respected. Under the
amended Act, such an intrusion on the mechanics of tribal government
would be unavoidable, but its impact would be limited. A federal appeal
would not harm those concerns underlying the policy of preserving tri-
bal sovereignty, such as the protection of tribal culture.186 The appeal
right cannot increase the influence of the states on the reservation, nor
significantly affect tribal culture, since tribal courts themselves are not
an Indian cultural product but a non-Indian imposition on the tribes.
Traditional dispute resolution, with which most Indians remain content,
and which operates mainly outside of court, should continue
unimpaired. Only those Indians who are dissatisfied with the traditional
informality, and want the rights which the Act gives them, will challenge
the traditional method.
The proposed federal appellate solution is therefore also consistent
with the limited nature of tribal sovereignty currently reflected in tribal
governments and courts. While, as a matter of case law, inherent tribal
sovereignty may be an underpinning of tribal government and
courts,' 87 as a matter of fact the exercise of tribal power is subject to
such a great degree of federal influence that tribal governments and
courts are effectively federal instrumentalities. 18 8 Most tribal govern-
ments formed under the Indian Reorganization Act remain subject in
numerous ways to the control of the Secretary of the Interior,189 and are
heavily dependent upon federal funding, as are most tribal courts. The
truly limited sovereignty manifest in tribal governments and courts
should not bar the proposed compromise solution of protecting tribal
court litigants by imposition of the constitutional-type rights of the In-
dian Civil Rights Act,'90 and enforcing those rights by an effective fed-
185. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978).
186. See Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 71-72 (injunctive and declaratory relief under the Act is
undesirable because of the threat to a tribe's ability to "maintain itself as a culturally...
distinct entity.").
187. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 31-56 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
190. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982).
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eral remedy.
A final reason to amend the Indian Civil Rights Act is that it would
be in the best economic interest of the tribes themselves to ensure non-
Indians the constitutional-type rights of the Act. The horrifying poverty
and underdevelopment of the reservations are undeniable.19 The stark
contrast in the economic conditions of reservations and adjoining com-
munities startles even the casual observer. The immediate cause of the
economic plight of the tribes is the dearth of private capital invested on
the reservations. 19 2 The lack of private development of the reservation
stems primarily from the lack of an awareness of its possibility on the
part of the tribes themselves because of their present and historical reli-
ance on federal "welfare" outlays. 193 This dependency, in turn, is a
product of the strict federal supervision of the development of tribal
natural resources stemming from the federal trust responsibility for the
tribes. '
94
To ensure tribal autonomy through economic self-sufficiency, the
tribes must begin to make their own investment decisions about their
own resources. 19 5 Two profound changes must occur to bring about
this state of affairs. First, the federal trust responsibility must be se-
verely curtailed, to force upon the tribes the responsibility for the invest-
ment of their undeniably bountiful resources. 19 6 Then, assuming a
situation in which the tribes do have access to their own resources which
could serve as collateral for an infusion of private, non-Indian capital,
the tribes must then lure such investment by providing a legal environ-
ment with far fewer risks than now face non-Indian businessmen in their
dealings with Indians. The tribes at present have little incentive to fur-
nish non-Indian investors with a legal process subject to constitutional
restrictions because the Secretary of the Interior, not the tribes, makes
the ultimate investment decisions concerning tribal resources. 19 7 The
tribes feel unaccountable, and so the spirit of entrepreneurship which
characterizes American economic life is missing among Indians. As a
result of this lack of entrepreneurial spirit, non-Indians, as well as Indi-
191. See generally AIPRC, supra note 13, at 91, 355. The Commission noted that the
small amount of revenue earned on the reservations by Indians inevitably leaks out to the
surrounding nonreservation communities.
192. Id. at 7-8, 307, 358-59.
193. Id at 305-07.
194. id at 7-8, 16, 359. The Commission noted that all tribal income originates from
the sale or lease of trust resources, judgment funds, and interest from investments and
Treasury deposits. All such revenues are considered tribal trust funds.
195. Id at 307.
196. Id at 16. The Commission recommends that whenever the Secretary disapproves
of a tribal initiative in the use of tribal resources, he should have to file a written statement
with the tribe notifying it of the reason for his disapproval and afford the tribe an opportu-
nity for a hearing. For a brief description of the extent of tribal natural resources, see id. at
305.
197. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1982) (authorizes leases of tribal lands for business and
other purposes subject to approval of the Secretary); 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (1982) (authorizes
mining leases of tribal lands subject to Secretarial approval); 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1982) (au-
thorizes oil and gas leases on tribal lands, subject to Secretarial approval); 25 U.S.C. § 407
(1982) (authorizes timber leases, under regulations of the Secretary).
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ans, are subjected to due process violations in tribal courts, and even
occasional intentional denials of equal protection of tribal law by tribal
councils. 9
8
An obvious means of assuaging the concerns of non-Indian busi-
nessmen about falling within tribal court jurisdiction is to amend the
Indian Civil Rights Act to provide the "backstop" of a federal appeal to
protect the constitutional-type rights of due process and equal protec-
tion bestowed by the Act. The reluctance of non-Indian creditors to ex-
tend credit to Indians when they face the possibility of having to rely on
tribal courts to enforce their contracts is well-documented. After the
Williams v. Lee'9 and Kennerly v. District Court20° decisions denied non-
Indian creditors the use of the state courts in which to collect their
debts, the reservations suffered a marked decline in extension of credit
by banks, mortgage companies, car dealers, and other merchants.20' In-
terest rates rose markedly because of the fear of being unable to recover
losses in tribal courts due to Indian defaults on payments.
202
It is apparent that only by guaranteeing to non-Indian businessmen
that they will suffer no worse treatment in tribal than in non-Indian
courts can the tribes gain access to necessary investment capital. The
prospect of an ultimate federal appeal in the case of deprivation of their
property without due process of law should provide the needed reassur-
ance to non-Indian investors.
198. See generally supra notes 57 to 107 and accompanying text.
199. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
200. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
201. See Mudd, Jurisdiction and the Indian Credit Problem: Considerations for a Solution, 33
MONT. L. REV. 307, 310-11 (1972); Schwechten, Epiloquein Spite of the Law: A Social Comment
on the Impact of Kennerly and Crow Tribe, 33 MoNr. L. REV. 317 (1972); see also Schaab,
Indian Industrial Development and the Courts, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 303 (1968) (Congress and
federal courts should consider the impact that the policy of tribal sovereignty has on busi-
ness relations of Indians).
202. See AILTP, supra note 31, at 85.
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DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC. V. BYRD: THE UNRAVELING OF
THE INTERTWINING DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
The seeds of the "intertwining doctrine"I are found in the Supreme
Court's 1953 decision of Wilko v. Swan.2 Wilko held that the Securities
Act of 19333 rendered unenforceable agreements to arbitrate future4
federal securities law claims arising out of disputes between investors
and broker-dealers, despite conflicting provisions in the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.5 While the holding in Wilko clearly directed that "a federal
court has the sole right to decide the ultimate issues essential to a fed-
eral securities law claim,"' 6 it gave no indication of the viability of an
arbitration provision on pendent 7 state securities or common law claims.
Frequently, the pertinent facts underlying these pendent state and com-
mon law claims are "inextricably intertwined" with the federal securities
law question. The Supreme Court recently examined the propriety of
the intertwining doctrine, which allowed a federal court to try both the
arbitrable state or common law claims and the non-arbitrable federal
securities law claims together, despite the existence of a valid arbitration
1. Also known as the "permeation doctrine" (Lee v. Ply*Gem Industries, Inc., 593
F.2d 1266, 1274 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979)). This doctrine may be de-
fined as "a judicially-created exception to the application of the Arbitration Act which
instructs that when arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims are sufficiently intertwined factu-
ally and legally, a court should deny arbitration of the arbitrable claims and try all the
claims together in federal court." Liskey v. Oppenheimer, 717 F.2d 314, 317 (6th Cir.
1983) (citations omitted).
2. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
3. Securities Act of 1933, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
4. Agreements to settle or arbitrate claims arising from violations which have already
occurred are not void under sections 14 and 29(a). See, Murtagh v. University Captial
Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810, 816 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974); Coenen v.
R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 406 U.S. 949
(1972); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1013 (1971); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir.
1968). See generally Gruenbaum, Avoiding The Protection Of The Federal Securities Laws: The
Anti-Waiver Provisions, 20 SANTA CLAA L. REv. 49, 55 (1980); Note, Enforceability of Arbitra-
tion Agreements In Fraud Actions Under the Securities Act, 62 YALE L.J. 985, 994-96 (1953).
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
6. Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643-44 (7th Cir. 1981).
7. Pendent jurisdiction is defined in BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1021 (5th ed. 1979)
as: "Original jurisdiction resting under federal claim extends to any nonfederal claim
against same defendant if the federal question is substantial and the federal and
nonfederal claims constitute a single cause of action." For a more complete discussion of
the doctrine, see, e.g., Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and PendentJurisdic-
tion, 33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 759 (1972); Minahan, Pendent and AncillaryJurisdiction of United States
Federal District Courts, 10 CREIGHrON L. REv. 279 (1976); Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal
Courts: A Reviised Rationalefor PendentJurisdiction, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 245 (1980); Note, UMW
v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARv. L. REV. 657 (1968); Note, Federal Pendent Party
Jurisdiction and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs - Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L.
REV. 194 (1976); see also Maasar, A Pendent and Ancillay Jurisdiction Primer: The Scope and
Limits of SupplementalJurisdiction, 17 U.C.D. L. REV. 103 (1983).
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agreement.8 In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,9 the Court determined
that the pendent state claims must be severed from the federal securities
claims and submitted to arbitration. This article will trace the evolution
of the conflict regarding the intertwining doctrine, analyze and discuss
the arguments presented to the Supreme Court in Byrd, and highlight
the questions left unresolved by this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Although arbitration probably "predates our traditional judicial sys-
tem, and, in some respects, is the philosophical and procedural father of
civil litigation,"' 1 it was viewed with hostility by the English common
law courts as an infringement on their jurisdiction. " The House Report
accompanying the Arbitration Act recognized this problem stating:
The need for the law arises from . . . the jealousy of the
English courts for their own jurisdiction. . . . This jealousy
survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle became firmly
embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it
by the Americn courts. The courts have felt that the precedent
was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative en-
actment .... 12
The Arbitration Act plainly evinces a congressional preference for
arbitration as a means of dispute resolution and this preference is codi-
fied in the unambiguous language of section 2 of the Act, which man-
dates that contractual arbitration agreements "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable," unless the contract itself is invalid.' 3 Ar-
8. The intertwining doctrine had been recognized by the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits. See Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 1238 (1985); Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (11 th
Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981). The Sixth, Sev-
enth, and Eighth Circuit Courts have rejected the intertwining doctrine. See Surman v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984); Liskey v. Oppen-
heimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983); Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661
F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
9. Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
1238 (1985).
10. Lippman, Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Settlement: Some Selected Perspectives, 24
ME. L. REv. 215, 216 (1972). Arbitration is defined by Lippman as "the submission of a
dispute, controversy or claim to a person or persons, usually unofficial, who have been
selected in a manner provided by agreement or law." Id. at 215 (citations omitted). S.
EAGER, THE AxarrRAlON CoNTRAcr AND PROCEEDINGS § 1 (1971) defines arbitration as "a
proceeding whereby, pursuant to the agreement of parties, disputes or controversies be-
tween them, without regard to the justifiable nature thereof, are submitted by them for
determination by an individual or individuals rather than by a court or judge acting in a
judicial capacity." The Arbitration Act contains no definition of arbitration.
11. See M. DoME, COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION § 301 (1968). See generally S. EAGER,
supra note 10; F. ELKOURI & E. EItOURI, How ARBrRATION WORKS 2-4 (3d ed. 1973);
Sturges, Arbitration-What Is It? 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1031 (1960).
12. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 1-2 (1924).
13. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (emphasis added) Section 2 of the Arbitration Act directs:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
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bitration is perceived as an efficient method of avoiding the unnecces-
sary expense and delay of litigation,14 as illustrated by section 3 of the
Act, 15 which directs that, after initially determining that the request for
arbitration is governed by the agreement, the court action shall be
stayed pending resolution of the dispute by arbitration. In addition, the
court may order the arbitration to proceed in accordance with the agree-
ment, appointing an arbitrator itself, if the parties cannot agree on
one.
1 6
The procedure for enforcement of arbitration agreements is very
simple, reducing technicality and formality to a minimum. The arbitra-
tion proceeding is commenced by service of notice of an application for
stay (of judicial proceedings), or an order, comparable to a summons;
five days' notice is required. Thereafter, except in cases where the exist-
ence and applicability of the arbitration agreement are in dispute, the
question of whether arbitration should be ordered is decided summarily
by motion, with affidavits and exhibits submitted to avoid the necessity
of a court appearance by the parties or their witnesses. Upon determi-
nation by the court that the arbitration agreement is valid and applicable
to the disputed issues, the court enters an order directing that arbitra-
tion on the merits of the controversy proceed.
After the arbitrator renders his or her decision, either party may
apply to the court specified in the petition for an order confirming the
award; if no court was specified, application would be made to the fed-
eral court in the district where the award was rendered. This award
must be granted as a matter of course, unless the award is later judicially
vacated, modified or corrected. 17 The grounds for vacating, modifying
or correcting an award are limited, and the motion must be made within
three months. If the award was obtained by corruption, fraud or undue
influence; if there was evidence of partiality or corruption by the arbitra-
tor; if the arbitrator was guilty of misbehavior or misconduct; or if the
arbitrator exceeded his powers or failed to make a mutual, final or defi-
nite award; then and then only may the court vacate the award.'
8 If
there was an evident miscalculation or mistake in description contained
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing con-
troversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrev-
ocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
14. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1. 3 (1924).
15. Section 3 of the Arbitration Act requires:
If any suit be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the
court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall
on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitra-
tion has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the
applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
16. Arbitration Act §§ 4-5, 9 U.S.C. §§ 4-5 (1982). See generally Cohen & Dayton, The
New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1965).
17. Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13 (1982).
18. Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
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in the award, or if the award was made upon a matter not submitted, or
if it was deficient in form, without affecting the merits, then and only
then may it be modified or corrected to effect the intent of the award
and to promote justice. 19 Upon vacating an award, the court may direct
a rehearing, if the time within which the award was to be made has not
expired.
20
Although it would appear that the Arbitration Act applies in all situ-
ations where a valid arbitration agreement exists, various "public pol-
icy" exceptions 2 1 have been recognized since the statute was originally
enacted. 2 2 Disputes involving the Securities Act of 193328 and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 193424 constitute just such an exception.
B. Case Law: Attempts to Integrate the Arbitration and the Securites Acts
The Supreme Court first addressed the conflict between the policies
and mandates of the Federal Arbitration Act and the Securities Acts in
Wilko v. Swan.25 The Court considered whether a pre-dispute agree-
ment to arbitrate is a "condition, stipulation, or provision binding any
person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision"
of the Securities Act, which section 14 of the Securities Act of 193326
declares void. Wilko sued his brokerage firm under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933,27 alleging that his stock purchases were induced
19. Arbitration Act § 11, 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1982). For circumstances in which arbitral
finality may be challenged, see, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Gas
Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); Torrington v. Metal Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.
1966); Moss, The Fate of Arbitration in the Supreme Court: An Examination, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
369, 384; Note, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 120, 146 (1977);
Note, Judicial Deference To Arbitral Determination: Continuing Problems of Power and Finality, 23
UCLA L. REv. 936 (1976).
20. Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
21. See Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements To Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy
Denfence, 2 CARDozo L. REv. 481 (1981); see also S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v.
Utah International, 576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (claims alleging violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968
(1982), not arbitrable on public policy grounds).
22. President Calvin Collidge signed the Arbitration Act of February 12, 1925, ch.
213, § 1, 43 Star. 883, effective January 1, 1926. Title 9 was codified and enacted into
positive law by the Act ofJuly 30, 1947, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 669. Sections 1 through 5 of
the Act of 1925 are identical to the 1947 statute, except that the latter adopted the catch
lines which precede each section in Title 9 of the United States Code.
23. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1982). Cf Byrd, 105 S.
Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring), where Justice White notes that section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 actions, being implied rights of action, do not necessarily fall under the protection
of the 1934 Act.
25. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
26. Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provi-
sion of this title or of the rules and regulations of the commission shall be void."
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d
(1982) imposes civil liability on any person who offers or sells a security in violation of
section 5 of the Act (prohibitions relating to use of interstate commerce and the mails
unless a registration statement has been filed or is in effect) or by means of a prospectus or
oral communication which includes an untrue statement of, or omits to state a material
fact. A purchaser who knows of the untruth or omission in the prospectus or oral commu-
nication at the time he purchases is expressly precluded from recovering. The seller has
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by misrepresentations and omissions made by the brokerage firm. With-
out answering the complaint, 2 8 the defendant brokerage firm moved to
stay the trial of the action and to arbitrate the claims, relying on the
margin agreement the customer had signed. The district court held that
the agreement to arbitrate deprived Wilko of the advantageous court
remedies2 9 afforded by the Securities Act, and denied the stay. 30 The
Second Circuit reversed the trial court, s but on appeal the Supreme
Court ratified the trial court's reasoning.3 2 It analyzed the contrasting
standards under both the Arbitration Act and the Securities Act of 1933
and found that securities law violations require "subjective findings of
the purpose and knowledge" 33 or intent of an alleged violator, while the
Arbitration Act "contains no provision for judicial determination"
3 4 of
these important subjective matters. The Court concluded that Congress
must have intended that the non-waiver provision of section 14 of the
Securities Act of 1933 take precedence over the conflicting directives of
the burden of proving lack of scienter, and the amount recoverable by an aggrieved
pruchaser is expressly limited.
28. The filing of an answer by the defendant broker-dealer is deemed a waiver of the
arbitration agreement. See Hansen v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 408 So. 2d 658 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see also Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d
1023 (11 th Cir. 1982) (waiver of arbitration not lightly inferred; inferences that right to
arbitrate waived due to slight delay or apparently futile nonpursuit of arbitration will not
be made).
29. Among the "advantageous court remedies" afforded by the Securities Act of 1933
is the fact that:
Section 12(2) created a special right to recover for misrepresentation which dif-
fers substantially from the common-law action in that the seller is made to assume
the burden of proving the lack of scienter. The Act's special right is enforceable
in any court of competent jurisdiction - federal or state - and removal from a state
court is prohibited. If suit be brought in a federal court, the purchaser has a wide
choice of venue, the privilege of nationwide service of process and the jurisdic-
tional $3,000 [now $10,000] requirement of diversity cases is inapplicable.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 431 (footnotes omitted). The provisions of the Securities Acts
dealing with jurisdiction and service of process are section 22 of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)(1982), and section 27 of the Secuities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1982). There is no jurisdictional requirement as to the amount in controversy to
invoke jurisdiction under either Act.
30. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir.),
rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). An interesting point is raised by the author of Note, supra note
4, at 990-91 n. 24:
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals in Wilko appears to have consid-
ered the possiblity that a claim for fraud under the Securities Act might not be a
dispute arising under the contract. The arbitration clause is not literally the 'all
future disputes' type but covers '[a]ny controversy arising between us under this
contract' which purports to cover 'all . . . relations and dealings' between the
parties. Hence, it might have been argued that fraud was not contemplated. If
the court had so found, it could not have stayed the litigation. (citations omitted).
31. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
32. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
33. 346 U.S. at 435.
34. Id. at 437. This rationale has been criticized by one commentator, who notes that
"the possibility that an arbitrator will misapply the law is present in every arbitration pro-
ceeding.. . [but] [s]o long as both the arbitrators and the underlying law are working to
achieve justice between the parties, the risk of error is not, and should not be, particularly
disturbing. Arbitration has been recognized as an acceptable mechanism for the resolu-
tion of disputes despite the risks of errors of law, and no persuasive reason has been ad-
vanced for treating differently the possibility of legal error in securities law cases." Sterk,
supra note 21, at 516 (citations omitted).
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the Arbitration Act,3 5 effectively nullifying the contractual agreement to
arbitrate.
The next examination of the controversy over the arbitration of se-
curities claims by the Supreme Court was Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 3 6 In
this case, the issue was presented in the context of an international com-
mercial transaction involving the sale of three business entities through
the purchase of securities, and involved alleged violations of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 of the Regulations
of the Securities and Exchange Commission.3 7 Balancing the possible
harm to international trade against the protective intent of the securities
laws, the Court determined that the arbitration agreement should be en-
forced and the dispute arbitrated.3 8 The Court distinguished Wilko, not-
ing that the fact that the agreement was international was a "crucial
difference" 3 9 and restricted its holding to arbitration agreements in situ-
ations with significant international contacts. 40
Subsequently, the issue of whether non-international claims arising
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are subject to the Wilko doctrine was
answered in the affirmative. 4 1 The Third,4 2 Fifth43 and Seventh 4 4 Cir-
cuits held that despite the judicial creation of a Rule lOb-5 cause of ac-
35. 346 U.S. at 438. One commentator has stated that, since nearly 10 years had
elapsed between the passage of the Arbitration Act in 1925 and the Securities Acts in 1933
and 1934, the provisions of the Securities Acts should be strictly applied when they con-
flict with the Arbitration Act; Congress was aware of the Arbitration Act and could have
made mention of it in the Securities Acts, but chose not to. See Gruenbaum, supra note 4,
at 59; see also Stansbury & Klein, The Arbitration ofInvestor-Broker Disputes, 35 ARB. J. 31, 34-
35 (1980). (Congress accepted the Wilko doctrine, and made specific reference to it when
it amended the Securities Exchange Act in 1975.).
36. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
37. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1982), section 10(b), and Rule lOb-5
of the Regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 10(b) prohibits
the use of any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. Rule lOb-5 makes unlawful the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange in connection with the purchase or sale of any security to defraud or
make any untrue statement of a material fact, or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made (considering the circumstances under which they were
made) not misleading.
38. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-17.
39. Id. at 515.
40. Id. at 519.
41. Cf. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244-45 (White, J. concurring). Because both section 10(b)
and Rule l0b-5 causes of action are implied, Justice White first notes that the literal lan-
guage of section 29 of the 1934 Act, which prohibits any stipulation, condition or provi-
sion requiring waiver of "compliance with any provision of this chapter" does not apply to
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions. In further discussions, he then states that the "spe-
cial right" to a judicial determination protected by the Wilko doctrine "is not necessarily
appropriate where the cause of action is judicially implied and not so different from the
common law action." The applicability of the Wilko exception to section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 actions was not at issue in Byrd, however, and the majority specifically declined to
resolve this question.
42. Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
43. Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824
(1977).
44. Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835 (7th
Cir. 1977).
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tion, policy considerations mandating protection of the individual
investor justified this seeming extension of the Wilko exception.
4 5
The controversy concerning the viability of the intertwining doc-
trine itself in securities cases began in 1965 with Stockwell v. Reynolds &
Co.4 6 The plaintiffs alleged violations of section 10(b), Rule lOb-5 and
alleged fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, claiming they
would have sold their stock sooner, and at a higher price but for the
fraudulent representations of the defendants. Finding that the plaintiffs'
complaint did state a cause of action, 4 7 the court held that the plaintiffs'
common law counts were subject to arbitration according to the arbitra-
tion provision of the Customer Agreements. 48 The court stayed arbitra-
tion pending a final determination of the federal claims, observing that
the relief sought in the common law counts was based on the same
transactions as the feceral securities counts. 49 The court stated that:
[t]here would appear to be little purpose in having both the
court proceeding and the arbitration going on at the same time,
and doubtless the ultimate determination by the court of [the
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims] would have a definite
bearing on the outcome of the arbitration proceeding.
50
No authority was cited for this proposition.
Shapiro v. Jaslow5 ' is another early case involving both federal secur-
ities and common law claims.5 2 The plaintiffs originally agreed to arbi-
trate the entire claim; this dispute arose when the plaintiffs decided
instead to litigate the matter. The defendant brokerage firm answered
that the plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate all controversies, including
those based on common law wrongs, and moved to stay the litigation
pending arbitration. 53 Recognizing its power to compel arbitration of
45. Cf Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (WhiteJ, concurring) (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1974)) (A "colorable argument" can be made that Wilko v.
Swan should not apply to arbitration ofjudicially implied causes of action under the 1934
Act.).
46. 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
47. Id. at 219.
48. Id. at 220.
49. The first and fourth counts charged the defendants - Reynolds & Co., the broker-
age firm and Carpenter, a partner in the brokerage firm and a director in the corporation
whose stock formed the basis of this action - with violations of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5. The second and third counts charge common law fraud and common law negligence;
the fifth count charges Carpenter with breach of his fiduciary duty as a director. Id. at 217.
50. Id. at 220.
51. 320 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
52. The court notes only that the cause of action against the brokerage firm alleged
that it had failed to act "in accordance with the laws of the United States of America and
the rules of the New York Stock Exchange." Id. at 599.
53. The plaintiffs' claims included one count against the brokerage firm and two
against another defendant (Jaslow), whose capacity in this dispute is unclear. When it filed
its answer, essentially asserting the arbitration clause as an affirmative defense, the defend-
ant brokerage firm also counter-claimed against the plaintiffs and the other defendant,
based on an alleged deficiency in one of the firm's accounts, demanding arbitration. Plain-
tiffs cross-moved to stay the arbitration of the counterclaim. The brokerage firm moved
for leave to file an amended counter-claim against the plaintiffs, deleting them from its
motion to compel arbitration. Finally, defendant Jaslow cross-claimed against the broker-
age firm.
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state securities and common law claims, the court stated that "...
under the circumstances here such procedure is impractical, if not im-
possible, since we cannot separate out the common law from the federal
law issues. [The brokerage firm] cannot render meaningless our exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the Federal Secuities Act claim by compelling arbi-
tration of an ancillary pendent dispute."'5 4 Again, no support was cited
for this statement.
The leading case advocating the application of the intertwining doc-
trine is Miley v. Oppenheimer & Company, Inc.55 While conceding that
plaintiff's section 10(b) claim was not arbitrable, the brokerage firm as-
serted on appeal that the pendent state claims for breach of fiduciary
duty and violations of the state deceptive trade practices statute should
have been severed from the federal securities claim and submitted to
arbitration, and the litigation stayed pending completion of the arbitra-
tion.56 The appeals court in effect balanced the potential that state se-
curities claims which are based upon allegations similar to those
supporting federal securities claims would never be arbitrated, with
Wilko's directive that federal courts must determine the "ultimate facts"
underlying a federal securities claim and denied arbitration of the state
claims to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction over the federal securities
claim. 57 The court stated that "arbitration should not be ordered where
'[a]n arbitrator making a decision on the common law claims would [be]
compelled to review the same facts needed to establish the plaintiff's
securities law claim.' ",58 In dictum, the court postulated that a much
stronger argument could be made for arbitration of pendent state claims
if the arbitration was stayed pending resolution of the litigation, instead
of staying the litigation and allowing the arbitration to go forward, as
the defendants here had suggested.
59
Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc.60 is the principal case illustrating
the perceived weaknesses and inappropriateness of the intertwining
doctrine. Relying on the sanctity of the contract containing the arbitra-
tion clause and a literal interpretation of the Arbitration Act, the Sev-
enth Circuit rejected the investor's attempt to avoid arbitration of the
common law tort and contract claims pendent to his federal securities
claim under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The Miley court's argument
that preservation of exclusive federal jurisdiction justified the applica-
tion of the intertwining doctrine in Miley was rejected as unconvincing.
The Seventh Circuit Court believed the better solution in cases with fac-
tually and legally related arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims was to stay
the arbitration proceeding pending resolution of the litigation.
6 1 It
54. Id. at 600.
55. 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
56. Id. at 334.
57. Id. at 335-36.
58. Id. at 335 (quoting Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976)).
59. 637 F.2d at 336 and n.15. Oppenheimer had moved to dismiss the federal claim
or, alternatively, to stay the federal trial until completion of the arbitration.
60. 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
61. Id. at 643-44.
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noted that under the Miley approach, "the intertwining doctrine would
always threaten to become the exception that swallowed the rule, al-
lowing the presence of a non-arbitrable claim to force a trial on other-
wise arbitrable claims." '6 2 The court also rejected the plaintiffs
argument that arbitration would cause inefficiency because of duplicated
efforts in bifurcated proceedings.63 Dickinson's last justification for liti-
gating only the federal securities claims was that this comports with the
language contained in the contract between the parties-the arbitration
clause in the Customer Agreement. The standard arbitration clause re-
quires arbitration of "all controversies '"64 which may arise between the
parties. However, if the "actual, unambiguous language" 65 of this
clause was strictly construed, as this court seemingly requires, the fed-
eral securities claims would also have to be arbitrated, a result contrary
to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Wilko.
And so the stage was set for Byrd, who filed his suit against Dean
Witter in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California, a district which had not previously ruled on the intertwining
doctrine. Byrd alleged violations of sections 10(b), 15 and 20 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 193466 and four other claims based on viola-
tions of state law. The federal court exercised jurisdiction over the state
claims based on diversity of citizenship 67 and pendent jurisdiction. 68
Dean Witter moved to sever and arbitrate the pendent state claims and
stay the arbitration, pending adjudication of the Securities Act of 1934
claims based on the arbitration provision in the Customer Agreement
6 9
and the Miley court's suggested solution to the threat purportedly posed
otherwise to the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction. 70 The district
court denied the motion in its entirety and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
order on an interlocutory appeal. 7 1 The Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts' denial of the motion to compel arbitration and ordered the
severance and arbitration of the state claims to proceed contemporane-
ously with the litigation of the federal securities claims. 72 The remain-
der of this article will discuss the issues raised by the Byrd decision. The
next section outlines some difficulties which the Supreme Court's most
recent attempt at reconciling the Securities Acts and the Arbitration Act
has failed to answer.
62. Id. at 645-46.
63. Id. See supra note 15 for the text of § 3.
64. In the past, the investor routinely signed a Customer Agreement stating that
"[any controversy between us or arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach
thereof, shall be settled by arbitration." For a discussion of recent changes in this stan-
dard agreement mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c2-2 (1984), see also infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
65. 661 F.2d at 642-43.




70. Id. at 1241.
71. 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
72. 105 S. Ct. at 1244.
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II. PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY ARBITRATION OF PENDENT STATE AND
COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. State Law Repercussions
Quite frequently, the aggrieved investor alleging federal securities
law violations will also assert common law fraud claims7 3 and state law
claims for breach of fiduciary duty74 and breach of contract and dam-
ages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 7 5 Potentially these
state law claims allow for recovery of punitive damages 76 which are not
available for federal securities law violations. 77 The doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction permitted the federal courts recognizing the intertwining
doctrine7 8 to decide matters not specifically enumerated in any statutory
grant of federal jurisdiction, such as state securities and common law
claims, including punitive damages. 79 As a result of the Byrd decision,
the presence of an enforceable arbitration clause effectively precludes
punitive damage awards. Judgments in federal securities claims are lim-
ited to awards of actual damages, and the arbitration of all other inves-
tor disputes is based on a contract, i.e., the Customer Agreement, which
typically covers "any controversy arising between us under this con-
tract." Therefore, unless awards of punitive damages are specifically au-
thorized by the Customer Agreement there would seem to be no basis
for their award to an aggrieved investor.80 It goes without saying that
73. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1021 (6th Cir.
1979); DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. 55, 56 (S.D. Fla. 1976); Greitzer v. United States
National Bank, 326 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
74. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d at 1021; Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d 367, 370-72 (7th Cir. 1978); Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Ham-
mill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 23 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
75. See Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982). But
see Greitzer v. United States National Bank, 326 F. Supp. at 764-65 (proper claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress not pleaded, as no "outrageous conduct" was
alleged).
76. The potential for recovery of punitive damages on litigated state law claims is
cited as the "primary reason for pleading state causes of action along with federal securi-
ties claims" by the author in Krause, Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of Predispute
Arbitration Agreements For Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 693, 709 (1980). Another rea-
son suggested by Krause is the increased liability of a principal for the acts of his or her
agents under state law in some jurisdictions. (The state common law theory of respondeat
superior vs. the federal "controlling person" standard.) Id. at 696-97 nn. 19-20.
77. The damages section of the Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(e), 12(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(e), 771(2) (1982) do not provide for recovery of punitive damages. Punitive dam-
ages are not recoverable under the Exchange Act of 1934 by virtue of § 28(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1982) which provides that no one shall recover "a total amount in excess of his
actual damages."
78. See supra note 8.
79. See, e.g., Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 703 F.2d 1152 (10th
Cir. 1981) (Plaintiffs alleged violations of § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 of the '34 Act, § 22(a) of
the '33 Act, a state statute prohibiting wrongful transfer of securities, common law fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. Origi-
nal judgment of $3,000,000 punitive damages reduced on appeal to $1,000,000.), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 92 (1983).
80. Cf Silverberg v. Schwartz, 75 App. Div. 2d 817, 427 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1980), where a
court reversed an arbitrator's award of punitive damages pursuant to the terms of a part-
nership agreement, holding that punitive damages is a sanction reserved to state and judi-
ciary, and cannot be conferred on an arbitrator by agreement.
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the inclusion of such a remedy in the Customer Agreement is not likely.
More importantly, the validity of each state's securities laws be-
comes questionable, in situations where the investor has signed a Cus-
tomer Agreement with an arbitration clause, and sues his or her broker
alleging violations of state (but no federal) securities laws.
In Kroog v. Mait,8 1 for example, Kroog originally filed her case in
state court, alleging violations of the Wisconsin Uniform Securities Law
and several common law causes of action.8 2 The defendants transferred
the action to federal district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction,
answered the complaint, and moved to stay the proceedings and compel
arbitration, pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the Customer
Agreement. The trial court denied the motion to arbitrate holding that
the anti-waiver provision in the Wisconsin securities laws 83 required liti-
gation of the claims that alleged violations of Wisconsin securities law, a
holding directly analogous to the United States Supreme Court's Wilko
decision.8 4 The trial court viewed the issue as being a conflict between
the Federal Arbitration Act provisions and the entire Wisconsin securi-
ties regulatory scheme. 8 5 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the trial
court's analysis of the conflicting state and federal statutes. It defined
the conflict as between two procedural mandates, the federal law com-
pelling and the state law prohibiting arbitration, rather than as a clash
between federal arbitration procedures and Wisconsin substantive se-
curities regulation. The court found that the federal arbitration scheme
preempted application of the state statute under the Supremacy
Clause. 86 In this situation, the state securities laws provided no protec-
tion to the aggrieved investor.8 7 In other words, Kroog v. Mail appar-
81. 712 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1001 (1984).
82. Kroog's first cause of action alleged that defendant Mait bought and sold securi-
ties in Wisconsin in violation of the State's registration requirements. Her second claim
alleged that the brokerage contract between the parties was void and subject to rescission
because Mait himself was not properly registered. The remaining three causes of action
alleged defendants' liability under the common law theories of mismanagement, unsuita-
ble purchases, excessive trading, and breach of fiduciary duty. 712 F.2d at 1149.
83. Wis. STAT. § 551 59(8) (1972) ("Any condition, stipulation or provision binding
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter
or any rule or order hereunder is void.").
84. 712 F.2d at 1151.
85. Id.
86. Id. See also Klien Sleep Products, Inc. v. Hillside Bedding Co., 563 F. Supp. 904
(SJD.N.Y. 1982) (non-waiver provision in New York Franchise Sales Act): Barron v. Tastee
Freez International, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 1213 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (non-waiver provision under
Wisconsin Uniform Securities Law). Compare Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("The effect of [Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act] is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitra-
tion agreement within the coverage of the Act.") (emphasis added) with Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 865 (1984) (O'Connor, J. and Rehnquist,J. dissenting) (The "his-
tory [of the Federal Arbitration Act] establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress
viewed the FAA as a procedural statute .. ."). See also Southland Corp. v. Keating at 862
(Stevens,J. concurring) (Although the FAA, as enacted, was intended to be a "statute...
essentially procedural in nature,. . . intervening developments in the law" compel agree-
ment with the majority, i.e., that the statute results in a substantive body of law.).
87. 712 F.2d at 1149. Cf Kiehne v. Purdy, 309 N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1981) (In an action
alleging fraud, breach of contract and violations of the Minnesota Blue Sky law, the Minne-
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ently stands for the proposition that the Federal Arbitration Act
overrides any conflicting anti-waiver provision contained in state securi-
ties laws. In cases that may be removed to a federal court, the presence
of a valid arbitration agreement effectively deprives an investor of the
protection of his or her state's securities regulations; state law claims
must be arbitrated in these circumstances.
In an analogous factual situation, the California Supreme Court
ruled in Southland Corp. v. Keating"s that the California Franchise Invest-
ment Law, which contains a anti-waiver provision similar to those con-
tained in the Federal Securities Acts8 9 and many state securities laws9 °
required judicial consideration of claims based on the Franchise Law.
The court concluded that the California statute did not contravene the
Federal Arbitration Act. 9 1 This decision was overturned by the United
States Supreme Court, 92 which held that the California court's interpre-
tation "directly conflicts with section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
and violates the Supremacy Clause."' 93 The state statute reviewed in
Southland Corp. v. Keating is so similar to the non-waiver provisions in
many state and the Federal Securities Acts that there seems little doubt
that the Southland holding would be directly applicable, although the dis-
sent preserved the procedural/substantive distinction9 4 originally raised
by the trial court in Kroog v. Mait.9 5 The trend begun by Kroog,9 6 and
ratified indirectly in Southland,97 and directly in Byrd98 is now undenia-
ble. The recently decided case of Sager v. District Court99 is illustrative.
The Colorado Supreme Court "reluctantly" overruled its previous hold-
ing, based on Wilko, 00 that common law claims intertwined with alleged
state securities law violations need not be arbitrated. Although the Col-
orado Securities Act1 0 1 contains a provision that is nearly identical to
the anti-waiver provision in the Federal Securities Acts, the Colorado
court acknowledged that:
Wilko is not applicable since it dealt with Congress' power to
override one federal statute with another. Here we are dealing
with the state's power to enact a statute which overrides a fed-
sota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the arbitration agreement was
void under state law.).
88. 31 Cal. 3d 584, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 645 P.2d 1192 (1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 852
(1984).
89. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see infra note 101 and accompanying text.
91. 31 Cal. 3d at 604, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72, 645 P.2d at 1203-04.
92. 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
93. Id. at 858.
94. Id. at 864-70, (O'Connor, J. and Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
95. 712 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1001 (1984).
96. 712 F.2d 1148, 1153-54.
97. 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
98. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
99. 698 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1985).
100. Id. at 255.
101. Colo. Securities Act of 1981, CoLO. REv. STAT. § 11-51-125(10) (1973) provides:
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision of this article or any rule or order under this artide is
void."
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eral statute .... The Arbitration Act is part of the federal sub-
stantive law, and, thus, under the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
Const. art. VI, Cl. 2, any conflicting state statute is void.
10 2
When a valid arbitration clause exists, it now appears inescapable
that the state's securities laws are a dead letter.
B. An Adhesion Contract
One of the defenses commonly raised by plaintiff/investors at-
tempting to resist arbitration is that the arbitration clause is not valid
because it is contained in a standardized form not subject to negotia-
tions or change. Byrd presented this argument, but not until the case
reached the Supreme Court, which "declined to address it in the first
instance . . .express[ing] no view on the merits of the argument."'
0 3
Wilko fared little better; although one of the two reasons 104 given for not
enforcing the arbitration clause in Wilko v. Swan was the inequality of
bargaining power between the parties, the possibility that the Customer
Agreement was an adhesion contract was raised briefly, by the dissent,
only to be summarily dismissed.'
0 5
The typical adhesion contract is a standard form contract drafted by
a party with strong bargaining power and offered to a party whose bar-
gaining power is much weaker.' 0 6 The fact that the contract is a stan-
dard, pre-printed form prepared by one of the parties is not
determinative.' 0 7 Because one of the requirements for a valid arbitra-
tion agreement is that it reflects a voluntary decision not to litigate, its
102. 698 P.2d at 254. See also Garmo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 101 Wash. 2d 585,
681 P.2d 253 (1984). Contra Oppenheimer & Co. v. Young, 456 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1984),
(state securities non-waiver provision not applicable due to the Supremacy Clause) vacated,
105 S. Ct. 1830 (1985).
103. 105 S. Ct. at 1240 n.2.
104. The second reason for the Court's decision was that judicial direction was neces-
sary in order to ensure correct application of the Act. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 435-37.
See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. Cf Sterk, supra note 21, at 517; Gruenbaum,
supra note 4, at 62, quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 417 U.S. 506, 521 (1974) (Doug-
las J., dissenting) (disparity in bargaining power not a valid reason for denying
arbitration).
105. 346 U.S. at 440 (Frankfurter, J. and Minton, J. dissenting). The only court directly
addressing the contention that the Customer Agreement was an adhesive contract held
that it was not, and thus the arbitration clause was valid and enforceable as to non-federal
claims. See Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147
(1975); see also Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59 at 61
n.2 ("There is certainly nothing inherently unfair about arbitration clauses, and they are
therefore valid and enforceable."); Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F.
Supp. at 579 n.2 ("My disposition of this matter on other grounds obviates the necessity of
reaching [the issue of whether the] printed options agreement is a contract of adhe-
sion .. "); cf. Hope v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 122 Cal. App. 3d 147, 175
Cal. Rptr. 851 (1981) (NYSE arbitration procedures "one-sided" such that broker-em-
ployee contract unenforceable), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 (1982).
106. Wright, Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 33 ARB. J. 41, 41 (1978).
107. Id. at 43 (citation omitted). See also Weinrott v. Carp, 32 N.Y.2d 190, 298 N.E.2d
42, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973) where the court said of arbitration clauses: "[W]here a form
contract is involved ... a court should give the provision and the circumstances sur-
rounding its inclusion great scrutiny." The court did not, however, indicate that arbitra-
tion clauses in form contracts or contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power
would automatically be invalid. See geneTrally M. DOMKE, supra note 11, at 41-44.
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use is inimical in an adhesion contract, where the party with the weaker
bargaining power "accepts" the contract, either because the stronger
party is the only provider of the desired goods or services, or because all
other parties providing the same goods or services use an identical
contract. 108
The arbitration clause that the investor agreed to in the past was
contained in the brokerage firm's Customer Agreement' 0 9 which the in-
vestor executed when opening a stock, option, or commodity account.
Generally, the arbitration clause varied little from firm to firm. The in-
vestor routinely agreed that "[a]ny controversy between us or arising
out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be set-
tled by arbitration.... .110 The Securities and Exchange Commission
recently adopted Rule 15c2-2111 prohibiting broker-dealers from using
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in customer agreements that purport to
bind public 12 customers to arbitrate all claims relating to the contract,
including those arising under the federal securities laws. The SEC
noted that the arbitration clause formerly contained in the standard cus-
tomer agreement was "a misleading statement of the customer's rights
under the federal securities laws .. .in light of clearly contrary law in
this area,""l 3 i.e., the Wilko decision. As originally proposed, the new
rule would have required the standard arbitration clause to be supple-
mented by a disclosure advising the customer of his or her right to liti-
gate any federal securities claims. As enacted, however, the rule states
that "[i]t shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or prac-
tice 14 for a broker or dealer to enter into an agreement with any public
customer which purports to bind the customer to the arbitration of fu-
108. Wright, supra note 106, at 41.
109. As used in this article, "Customer Agreement" is a generic term describing the
agreement, set out on a pre-printed form provided by the brokerage firm, which delineates
the rights and obligations of each party regarding the particular type of account the inves-
tor has opened.
110. 550 F. Supp. at 579 n.1 (Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.). See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. at 432 n.15; Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59, 60
n.1 (8th Cir. 1984); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 314, 315 n.l & 2 (6th Cir.
1983); Kroog v. Mait, 712 F.2d 1148, 1150 (7th Cir. 1983); Sawyer v. Raymond, James &
Associates, 642 F.2d 791, 792 (5th Cir. 1981); Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176,
1178-79 n.2 (2nd Cir. 1974); Ging v. Parker-Hunter Inc., 544 F. Supp. 49, 54 (W.D. Pa.
1982); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Vernon v.
Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147, 149 n.2 (1975).
111. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1984).
112. The Wilko doctrine, providing that investors are not bound by waivers of their
right to judicial resolution of federal securities claims, does not apply to self-regulatory
organizations. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(3), (a)(24) (1982).
This section was amended by § 21 (1) of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982). The principal effect of the
amendment was to expand the provision to include members of and participants in the
self-regulatory organizations. See generally Gruenbaum, supra note 4, at 69, 70.
113. SEC Release No. 34-20397, File No. 57-976. As a further justification for the
adoption of this rule, mandating a prominently placed disclosure of the effects of arbitra-
tion, and the customer's right to litigate the federal securities claims, the SEC noted that
"years of informal discussions have failed to correct" the text of the standard misleading
arbitration clause. Id.
114. In other words, violations of §§ 10(b), 15(c) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c).
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ture disputes between them arising under the federal securities
laws. . "1 15
The possibility exists that pursuant to section 29(b) of the 1934
Act, 1 6 any Customer Agreement not containing the supplemental dis-
closure required by Rule 15c2-2 "shall be void." Section 29(b) excepts
contracts involving violations of rules or regulations promulgated under
paragraphs (2) or (3) of subsection (c) of section 15 from the invalidity
imposed by section 29. However, an investor may be able to present a
convincing argument that this exception does not apply to Customer
Agreements not including the arbitration disclosure, because Rule 15c2-
2 was promulgated under the joint authority of sections 10(b) and
15(c). 1 17 In other words, in order to be able to force an investor to
arbitrate state and common law claims against it, a brokerage firm's Cus-
tomer Agreement must contain the Rule 15c2-2 disclosure clarifying
that federal securities claims may not be arbitrated.
C. The Arbitral Process
At present, none of the Securities Acts specify arbitration as a
method of customer dispute resolution, and one commentator is of the
opinion that an amendment of these acts may be necessary in order to
completely resolve the conflict between the Securities Acts and the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act. 1 8 In the interim, the Securities Industry Confer-
ence on Arbitration was formed in 1977 to draft and propose uniform
arbitration rules for self-regulators such as the securities exchanges and
the National Association of Securities Dealers. Uniform rules for small
claims of less than $2500 were adopted in 1978 by the New York Stock
Exchange and the NASD with SEC approval. 1 19
Although the arbitral process is quicker and less expensive 120 than
115. 17 C.F.R. 240.15c2-2(a) (1984).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982), in pertinent part provides:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this title or any rule or regu-
lation thereunder, and every contract. . . heretofore or hereafter made the per-
formance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any
relationship or practice in violation of, any provision of this title or any rule or
regulation thereunder, shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who,
in violation of any such provision, rule or regulation, shall have made or engaged
in the performance of any such contract. . .Provided, (A) that no contract shall be
void by reason of this subsection because of any violation of any rule or regula-
tion prescribed pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (c) of section 15 of
this title . ..
117. S- also Stansbury & Klein, suppra note 35 at 38.
118. See 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP., No. 10 (BNA 1984), where SEC General Counsel
Daniel Goelzer was quoted as saying that the SEC "should consider the feasibility of legis-
lation to reverse Wilko v. Swan" substituting instead an industry regulated arbitration sys-
tem. Id. at 470 (from a speech given to the Securities Industry Association Legal &
Compliance Committee, in New York City, on Jan. 17, 1984).
119. See, e.g., NASD Securities Dealers Manual, paragraph 3701, Code of Arbitration
Procedure, paragraph 3712-3744, Part III, Uniform Code of Arbitration, Section 12; New
York Stock Exchange Guide, Vol. 2, paragraph 2600-2630, Arbitration, Rules 600-630.
120. Anderson, Arbitration and the Law; "A Better Way," 30 LAB. L.J. 259 (1979). But Cf.
Vaglahn, Arbitration Costs/Time: Labor and Management Views, 30 LAB. L.J. 49 (1979).
Vaglahn suggests that the time and cost required to arbitrate have been increasing,
although he does not compare these increases to a standard court proceeding.
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litigation, and is a method of dispute resolution commonly used in many
other areas,' 2 ' several questions remain concerning its suitability for
resolution of securities claims. One problem presented by arbitration is
the perception that an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators composed of
members of the securities industry will give the investors' complaints
short shrift.' 2 2 The existence of the intertwining doctrine cases is itself
evidence that investors continue to distrust and strenously resist at-
tempts to arbitrate their state securities and common law claims, despite
the increased expense and protracted delays associated with litiga-
tion.12 3 The absence of published arbitration decisions also makes it
very difficult for an investor to evaluate the behavior and fairness
124
with which his or her claim is likely to be treated.
While the Uniform Arbitration code presently provides that a ma-
jority of arbitrators selected to hear customer-broker disputes will not
be affiliated with the securities industry,' 2 5 another question is raised;
one of the justifications for arbitration is that certain claims, because of
their complexity, should be referred to arbitrators who are more knowl-
edgable about the securities industry than judges sitting in courts of
general jurisdiction. 126 When arbitrators from outside the industry are
selected, the validity of this justification is severely eroded.
D. Collateral Estoppel
One of the primary justifications given by the courts that had
adopted the intertwining doctrine was the view that arbitration is "a
threat . . . posed to the [court's] exclusive federal jurisdiction."'12 7 In
Miley v. Oppenheimer,128 the investor sued her broker and two of its regis-
121. See generally 5 AMJUR. 2d Arbitration and Award § 54-60 (1962).
122. Pursuant to provision of a uniform arbitration code adopted by the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers and New York Stock Exchange, the majority of arbitrators
selected to hear customer/broker disputes are not to be affiliated with the securities indus-
try. In addition, the parties have a right to preemptory challenge of arbitrators, as well as a
challenge for cause. The arbitration director of the sponsoring organization is empowered
to disqualify arbitrators before the hearing commences, and must disclose to the parties
any circumstances revealed by an arbitrator concerning that arbitrator's ability to render a
fair and impartial decision.
123. See, e.g., Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972). In Sobel, the
investor had charged the brokerage firm and two of its registered representatives with
market manipulation, unauthorized trading, and fraudulent misrepresentations in connec-
tion with activities in his accounts. The registered representatives were subsequently in-
dicted (United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The investor elected to
arbitrate his claims, signing an agreement to that effect. The claim went to exchange arbi-
tration where it was denied in an award without decision or reasoning. After the arbitra-
tion, the registered representatives were convicted of conspiracy and market manipulation.
Sobel involved an attempt to overturn the arbitrator's award on grounds that it violated
public policy and was "in manifest disregard" of the securities laws; although the investor
prevailed in the district court, the Second Circuit reversed. See also S. BRODSKY, GUIDE TO
SECURITIES LrrIGATION 293-312 (1974) for an extensive discussion of Sobel.
124. See Note, Arbitration of Investor-Broker-Disputes, supra note 4, at 129 n.59.
125. See Stansbury & Klein, supra note 35, at 38.
126. See Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d at 646; Stansbury & Klein, supra
note 35, at 32.
127. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. 637 F.2d 318, 336 (5th Cir. 1981).
128. 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
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tered representatives, seeking recovery under federal securities laws,
Texas common law and Texas statutes for the alleged "churning"'
129 of
her account. After the district court entered judgment for the plaintiff
on the breach of fiduciary duty count, awarding both actual and punitive
damages, the defendant appealed, arguing that the district court had
erred in refusing to order arbitration of the state law claims. In a section
of the opinion entitled "Refusal to Order Arbitration: Preserving Ho-
mogenized Milk," the court of appeals noted that
when the same factual (and legal) conclusions must be drawn
from the common evidentiary facts in order to resolve the fed-
eral and pendent state claims - when the same 'ultimate facts'
underlie each claim - a threat is posed to the exclusive federal
jurisdiction. A federal forum is charged with the sole responsi-
bility and is correlatively granted the sole right to decide the
ultimate issues essential to a federal securities claim, based on
its own appraisal of the evidence. Allowing an arbitrator to
make the primary appraisal of the evidence and reach the pri-
mary conclusions on the issues central to the resolution of the
case presents a threat of binding the federal forum through col-
lateral estoppel, and, at the very least, forces the federal court
to reach its findings in light of prior conclusions on the very
same issues. 
1 3 0
The court concluded that when a violation of the federal securities
laws is found, subsequent arbitration of the state claims "makes no
sense." Because the plaintiff has suffered but one legal wrong, a judg-
ment can be entered only once, even though several alternate routes of
recovery are proposed. Thus, the investor "could be forced to endure a
long and protracted arbitration procedure"' 3 1 before his court judg-
ment could be realized. In many cases, the plaintiff would choose not to
pursue his state claims, in order to more quickly collect the federal judg-
ment in his favor, "thereby effectively undercutting the very purpose of
pendent jurisdiction." 1
3 2
129. "Churning occurs when a securities broker enters into transactions and manages a
client's account for the purpose of generating commissions and in disregard of [the] cli-
ent's interests." Id. at 324 [citations omitted]. To successfully prove that his or her ac-
count has been churned, an investor must prove that: "(1) the trading in his account was
excessive in light of his investment objectives; (2) the broker in question exercised control
over the trading in the account; and (3) the broker acted with the intent to defraud or with
willful and reckless disregard for the investor's interests .. " Id If proven, the broker
may be held liable for violations of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Id. (citations omitted).
(Churning is classified as a "device, scheme or artifice to defraud," language used to define
a type of Rule lOb-5 violation.) In addition, the investor will, in most if not all cases, also
be entitled to hold the broker liable for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. and n.4.
130. Id. at 335-36.
131. Id. at 336.
132. Id. at 337. This very point is raised, and expanded on in Cunningham v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. at 584:
By raising the spectre of bifurcated proceedings, the Dickinson solution also cre-
ates an incentive for plaintiffs to try one set of claims in order to obtain speedier
justice. The [Dickinson] court's analysis has assumed that plaintiffs typically drop
neither set but continue with the bifurcated proceedings. In reality, some plain-
tiffs can be expected to drop their pendent common law claims, and to proceed
only with the federal action in order to speed collection. As Judge Goldberg
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In jurisdictions which did not recognize the intertwining doctrine,
the perceived "threat" of collateral estoppel was eliminated by severing
the arbitrable federal securities claims from the non-arbitrable state and
common law claims, and then staying the arbitration of the state and
common law claims pending litigation of the federal action.13 3 This was
the procedure followed by the court in Stockwell v. Reynolds Co. 134 and
appeared to be a "commendable compromise because it preserves the
parties' contractual right to arbitration, while recognizing that the fed-
eral securities laws claims form the gravamen of the action, the state law
claims are generally pendent in a very real sense."
13 5
The Byrd Court summarily disposed of this "threat" by noting that
the basic premise that an arbitration award must be accorded preclusive
treatment by a federal court was a "misconception." 1 36 Citing a case
decided the previous Term, McDonald v. City of West Branch,'3 7 the Court
stated that:
The full faith and credit statute [28 U.S.C. § 1738] requires
that federal courts give the same preclusive effect to a State's
judicial proceedings as would the courts of the State rendering the
judgment, and since arbitration is not a judicial proceeding, we
held that the statute does not apply to arbitration awards. The
same analysis inevitably would apply to any unappealed state
arbitration proceeding. 1
38
The McDonald decision also refrained from fashioning a federal com-
mon-law rule of preclusion, leaving the lower courts to "directly and
effectively protect federal interests by [themselves] determining the
preclusive effect to be given to an arbitration proceeding. . . In fram-
ing preclusion rules in this context, courts shall take into account the
federal interests warranting protection."'
3 9
pointed out in Miley, this violates the policy of pendent jurisdiction. It is also
conceivable that some plaintiffs would drop their federal cause of action, hoping
for faster and cheaper results through arbitration. This would defeat the purpose
of exclusive federal jurisdiction for cases arising under the federal securities laws.
(citations omitted)
Id. at 584 n.7.
133. See Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
134. Id. In a somewhat analogous situation, it was suggested that a court could decide
not to give collateral estoppel effect to an arbitrator's findings of fact in subsequent litiga-
tion of an intertwined antitrust claim. See University Life Ins. Co. of America v. Unimarc
Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1983); accord, Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1243-44. This would
seem, however, to constitute defacto review of the arbitrator's findings, which is not per-
mitted by the Arbitration Act except in very unusual circumstances. See supra notes 18-19
and accompanying text. If the investor should voluntarily proceed with arbitration, how-
ever, the arbitrator's decision is final, and res judicata will prevent a subsequent court
determination (absent the circumstances outlined supra notes 18-19). See Blumberg v. Ber-
land, 678 F.2d 1068 (11th Cir. 1982).
135. Note, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, supra note 19, at 146.
136. 105 S. Ct. at 1243.
137. 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
138. 105 S. Ct. at 1243 (citing 104 S. Ct. 1799, at 1802).
139. 105 S. Ct. at 1243-44. Compare the "federal interests warranting protection," id.,
with the Wilko rationale prohibiting arbitration of federal securities claims. "The protec-
tive provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly as-
sure their effectiveness..." 346 U.S. at 439. This would seem to indicate that no effect
be given to the arbitrator's decision.
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E. Duplication and Inefficiency
The second justification cited by courts that had utilized the inter-
twining doctrine was that litigation of federal claims and arbitration of
state or common law claims based on the same facts and circumstances
was duplicative and inefficient.
140
Although Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd presented the Court with
a case of first impression regarding the intertwining of federal securities
claims with state and common law claims, recent Supreme Court cases
dealing with related situations clearly laid the groundwork for the rejec-
tion of the intertwining doctrine. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp. ,141 a dispute over payment for increased costs
arose between a contractor and its employer or hospital. The contractor
filed an action in state court against the hospital seeking a declaratory
judgment that there was no right to arbitration. 142 The hospital subse-
quently filed an action in federal district court based on diversity juris-
diction seeking an order compelling arbitration. 143 The federal court
stayed its action pending resolution of the state court suit because both
suits involved the identical issue of the arbitrability of the hospital's
claims. 144 The trial court's stay of the federal action pending a decision
by the state court regarding arbitration was appealed; the court of ap-
peals reversed and remanded with instructions to enter an order to arbi-
trate and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The hospital sought to prevent arbitration of the dispute because it
believed that it was caught in the middle. If it was found to owe the
contractor delay and impact costs, it would seek indemnity from the ar-
chitect. The dispute with the contractor was subject to a valid arbitra-
tion agreement, but there was no such agreement between the hospital
and the architect. One court's decision to compel arbitration meant that
the hospital would "be forced to resolve these related disputes in differ-
ent forums."' 14 5 The Court went on to note that:
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation
140. Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
However, courts which have recognized the intertwining doctrine would apply it only
'when it is impractical if not impossible to separate out non-arbitrable federal securities
law claims from arbitrable contract claims. A court should deny arbitration in order to
preserve its exclusive jurisdiction over the federal securities act claims." Sibley v. Tandy
Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977) (citations omitted).
By way of illustration, the court stated in a footnote that "[i]f an arbitrator were to resolve
plaintiff's Texas securities law and common law fraud complaints, he would be dealing
with the same facts which form the basis for plaintiff's claim of federal securities law viola-
tions. Therefore, we hold that plaintiff's claims under Texas securities law, like his claims
under the federal securities laws, are not arbitrable." Id. at 543 n.3.
141. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
142. Id. at 7.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 20.
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of waiver, delay or a like defense to arbitrability.' 46
The support cited by the Court for this statement includes Dickinson v.
Heinold Securities, Inc., 14 7 the leading Seventh Circuit case repudiating
the intertwining doctrine. The Byrd Court echos these sentiments, again
citing Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc.,148 stating "even where the result
would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in
different forums. . . courts [must] compel arbitration of arbitrable
claims, when asked to do so.'
149
CONCLUSION
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd presented a conflict between the
policies underlying the Arbitration Act, 150 and the desire to avoid dupli-
cative and inefficient splitting of factually related causes of action
through the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.' 5 ' Two other concerns-
that the contract containing the arbitration clause is not subject to nego-
tiation, and is possibly an adhesive contract 152 and the previous partial-
ity problems of industry-affiliated ar'bitrators'53-appear to have been
satisfactorily addressed by the securities industry. A third potential
problem, the possibility that a federal court might be stripped of its ex-
clusive jurisdiction to hear federal securities claims, was explained away
by the Byrd Court as a "misconception"' t 4 and not a problem at all.
The last uncertainty and one which the Court cannot resolve is the prac-
tical effect that the Byrd decision, which requires litigation of federal
claims and arbitration of related claims, will have on an investor. Will
this bifurcation be "so coercive that it [will] force plaintiffs to abandon
their statutorily protected right to have judicial resolution of their secur-
ities claims"? 155 Or will it "create an incentive" for plaintiffs to "drop
their pendent. . . claims, and to proceed only with the federal action in
order to speed collection"?' 56 And finally, although the potential loss
of punitive damage awards raises a serious problem, 15 7 a much more
ominous threat to the continued vitality of the state securities laws is
presented. 158 It would therefore seem that the uprooting of the inter-
twining doctrine has sown the seeds of questions that will remain with us
for some time.
Lynn Hahn
146. Id. at 24-25.
147. Id. at 25 n.31.
148. 105 S. Ct. at 1241.
149. Id.
150. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
151. 383 U.S. at 726.
152. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
154. 105 S. Ct. at 1243.
155. 661 F.2d at 644 n.13.
156. 550 F. Supp. at 584 n.7.
157. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 81-102 and accompanying text.
PRINCIPLES & LAW OF COLORADO's NONTRIBUTARY
GROUND WATER*
INTRODUCTION
In 1964, a legislative committee studying Colorado's nontributary
ground water' characterized the administration of this resource as being
in a state of anarchy. 2 The law governing this type of ground water has
since been referred to as inadequate,3 arcane, 4 and neglected. 5 Criti-
cism culminated in 1979 when uncertainty as to who could remove non-
designated ground water resulted in what the Colorado Supreme Court
called "one of the great emergencies in the history of Colorado water
* This article was published shortly before Senate Bill 5, 1985 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch.
285, was enacted into law. Whether this legislation, which purports to clarify the
confusion surrounding the management of Colorado's ground water, succeeds should be
assessed in light of the hydrologic principles and economics of ground water discussed
herein. It is the opinion of the author and editors that S.B. 5 fails to achieve its goal of
establishing a comprehensive ground water management scheme. Accordingly, this article
provides an analytical framework for ascertaining the viability and anticipated efficacy of
S.B. 5.
1. As used in this article, there are three classifications of ground water: tributary
ground water; nontributary ground water found within designated basins (hereinafter des-
ignated ground water); and nontributary ground water found outside of designated basins
(hereinafter non-designated ground water).
Tributary ground water is underground water "which can influence the rate or direc-
tion" of a natural, or surface, stream. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(11) (1973). Such
tributary ground water is subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation as are other "natu-
ral streams," in accordance with the Colorado Constitution. See infra notes 18-20 and ac-
companying text. However, tributary ground water that takes more than a century to
reach or influence a surface stream is considered de minimis and is not subject to the consti-
tutional doctrine of prior appropriation. See Kuiper v. Lundvall, 187 Colo. 40, 529 P.2d
1328 (1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 996 (1975).
Designated ground water "means that ground water which in its natural course would
not be available to and required for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights ...and
which ...is within the geographic boundaries of a designated ground water basin."
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-103(6) (Cum. Supp. 1984). In other words, designated ground
water is that underground water which is not tributary to a surface stream, or which is de
minimis, and is located in a basin which the ground water commission has established as a
designated basin. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
Non-designated ground water, like designated ground water, is not needed for de-
creed surface rights and is not tributary to a surface stream. However, unlike the source of
designated ground water, the source of non-designated ground water has not been estab-
lished as a designated basin. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
As used in this article (exclusive of quoted materials and hydrologic comparisons in
Section II, Jffra), the term "ground water" when not modified by an adjective refers to
nontributary ground water. The terms "withdrawal" and "removal," describing the ex-
traction of ground water, are used synonomously.
2. COLORADO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, WATER PROBLEMS IN COLORADO, Research Publ.
No. 93 at 4, 45th Gen. Assembly (November 1964) (quoting Felix L. Sparks, Director,
Colorado Water Conservation Board, Minutes of Committee Meeting, October 8, 1964).
3. Id.
4. RocKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUNDATION WATER LAw NEWSLETTER, Vol. XIV, No. 1 at 4
(1981).
5. Carlson, Has the Doctrine of Appropriation Outlived its Usefidness?, 19 RocKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 529, 552 (1974).
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law." 6
The "great emergency" occurred when the Colorado Supreme
Court consolidated a number of water cases wherein several applicants
sought adjudication of rights7 in non-designated ground water located
throughout the state.8 The court referred the consolidated cases to a
special water judge.9 The basic issue in all of the consolidated claims
was: What law governs the use of non-designated ground water in Colo-
rado?10 The special water judge's decision, I I the Colorado Supreme
Court's reversal, 12 and the legislative actions which intervened' 5 and
followed 14 put an end to five years of litigation and left the law gov-
erning the use of non-designated ground water substantively un-
changed. Certain questions, however, remain unanswered and,
according to Huston, require legislative clarification. 15 Whether such
clarification requires substantive modification is, in part, the subject of
the following survey. It is herein suggested that resolution of this issue
requires careful consideration of the principles of ground water which
are relevant to the law governing its use.
This article examines the evolution of ground water law in Colo-
rado. The primary focus is upon those characteristics of ground water,
both designated and non-designated, which warrant its distinctive treat-
ment in the Colorado appropriation scheme. 16 The article concludes
with a discussion of Huston and its legislative progeny. 17
I. BACKGROUND: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS OF COLORADO GROUND
WATER LAw
A. The Constitutional Question
The right to appropriate the waters of Colorado antedates the
adoption of the state constitution.' 8 Commonly referred to as the doc-
6. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Huston, 197 Colo. 365, 376, 593
P.2d 1347, 1354 (1979). It is suggested here, with the benefit of hindsight, that the "great
emergency" was overstated by the court. The substantive law governing the removal of
ground water remains as it was in 1973, six years before the "great emergency." See infra
notes 143-5 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
8. 197 Colo. at 368, 593 P.2d at 1348.
9. "The chief justice of this court is appointing the same district judge as an addi-
tional water judge in each of the seven water divisions of the state. For convenience, he is
here called the special water judge." Id. at 369, 593 P.2d at 1349. See infra note 125 and
accompanying text.
10. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
11. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Huston, No. 79 CW 1 (Dist. Ct.
Colo. Water Div. 1-7, Feb. 11, 1981) (hereinafter cited as Consolidated Ruling).
12. State v. Southwestern Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1929 (1984) (hereinafter cited as Huston).
13. See infra note 136.
14. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
16. The appropriation of Colorado's tributary ground water is governed by a separate
body of law. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
17. See infra notes 125-42 and accompanying text.
18. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882), in which the court stated:
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trine of prior appropriation, the right to divert and apply to beneficial
use the unappropriated waters of the state has long been recognized as
the most reasonable water use doctrine for Colorado's arid climate. 19
The doctrine was formalized in the state constitution as follows: "The
water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the
state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public,
and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of this state, subject
to appropriation as hereinafter provided."
20
The doctrine of prior appropriation has been applied in various
forms to surface water in practically all of the western states, 2 1 including
Colorado;2 2 however, the doctrine, in its pure form, 2" has not proved
workable to govern the removal of ground water.24 Accordingly, Colo-
rado courts and the legislature have expressly stated that the constitu-
tional provisions for prior appropriation apply only to "natural streams"
and waters tributary thereto; thus excluding nontributary ground water
from the constitutional appropriation scheme.
25
Although the argument persists that this limited application of the
doctrine was not intended by the drafters of the constitution, 26 the Hus-
It is contended. . . that the common law principles of riparian proprietor-
ship prevailed in Colorado until 1876, and that the doctrine of priority of right to
water by priority of appropriation thereof was first recognized and adopted in the
constitution. But we think the latter doctrine has existed from the date of the
earliest appropriations of water within the boundaries of the state.
Id. at 446. The unadulterated doctrine of prior appropriation as discussed in Coffin is be-
yond the scope of this article. For a discussion of the doctrine as applied in Colorado, see
Note, A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 226 (1970).
19. Huston, 671 P.2d at 1304-5. For a discussion of alternative doctrines, such as the
absolute ownership, reasonable use, and correlative rights doctrine, as applied to ground
water, see Martz, Who Has the Better Right to Non-tributary Ground Waters in Colorado-Land-
owner or Appropriator?, 31 DICTA 20, 22-5 (1954).
20. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
21. See generally 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAw IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES, 226-650 (1974).
22. See supra note 16.
23. In regard to the removal of designated ground water, Colorado Statutes provide a
"modified" doctrine of prior appropriation. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102 (1973 & Cum.
Supp. 1984). See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
24. Moulder, Legal and Management Problems Related to the Development of an Artesian
Ground Water Reservoir, United States Geological Survey, Circular 6, Ground-Water Series,
at 3 (1962).
25. Huston, 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1929 (1984); Kuiper v.
Lundvall, 187 Colo. 40, 529 P.2d 1328 (1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 996 (1975); Whit-
ten v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 385 P.2d 131 (1963). See also COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-82-101
(Cum. Supp. 1984) wherein it is stated:
The waters of natural streams of Colorado do not include underground waters
not in or tributary to natural surface streams nor underground waters which,
when withdrawn, do not impair the flow of natural surface streams. All waters not
in or tributary to a natural stream. . . shall be subject to such administration and
use as the general assembly may provide by law.
26. See, e.g., Consolidated Ruling, supra note 11, at 39. The special water judge con-
cludes that the drafters of the state constitution "intended subjectively" (emphasis as it ap-
pears) that ground water was encompassed by the constitutional reference to waters "of
every natural stream," and, accordingly, that all ground water is subject to appropriation.
The special water judge premised this conclusion on the "limited technical knowledge"
available to the drafters which prevented their distinguishing between tributary and non-
tributary ground water. Id But see Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 532, 541 (1850) (wherein
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 & 4
ton court's rejection of this contention signals a continuing unwilling-
ness to break with long established precedent. 2 7  Thus, the law
governing the administration of Colorado's nontributary ground water
has been left to the general assembly.
28
B. Statutory Guidance. The Colorado Ground Water Management
Act of 1965 29
Notwithstanding the recognized importance and value of Colorado
ground water,30 the law governing this resource has been slow to de-
velop.3 1 It was not until the 1930's that hydraulic technology made pos-
sible the large scale withdrawal of ground water for irrigation. With
improved technology, notably the development of irrigation pumps and
rural electrification, came increasing demands for use of the state's
ground water.32 The general assembly, however, acted only sparingly
with regard to the administration and withdrawal of ground water re-
sources,3 3 and until 1965 failed to distinguish between tributary and
nontributary ground water in legislation on the subject.
3 4
The Management Act finally established a regulatory scheme for the
removal of ground water found within certain administratively specified
"designated basins."' 35 The Management Act provided for the designa-
the distinction between tributary and nontributary ground water is clearly recognized and
stated: "Water, whether moving or motionless, in the earth .
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-82-101 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
29. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-101 to 141 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984) [hereinafter
Management Act].
30. Ground water reservoirs probably hold several times as much useable water as the
combined capacities of all lakes and surface waters. Address by Thomas M. Stetson, Engi-
neering Consultant to the Department ofJustice, State of California, 4th Annual Summer
Natural Resources Law Short Course, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colo-
rado School of Law (June 6-9, 1983). See also H.E. THOMAS, THE CONSERVATION OF
GROUND WATER (1951). Today, the value of water rights often represents more than 80
percent of the value of a real estate parcel. COLORADO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR 1982 COMMITEES ON: AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Research
Publ. No. 262, at 5, 52nd Gen. Assembly (December 1981). The legal right to any reliable
source of water in Colorado has recently been estimated to be worth between $1,000 and
$6,000 per acre-foot. The Denver Post, April 17, 1984, at 1, col. 8.
31. See Huston, 671 P.2d at 1311. "The subject of withdrawal of nontributary water by
wells has been characterized as the 'neglected stepchild' of our water law." Id. at 1313
n.30 (quoting Carlson, supra note 5).
32. See generally Hamsburger, Deltjen & Fisher, Ground Water: From Windmills to Compre-
hensive Public Management, 52 NEB. L. REV. 179, 188-92 (1973); Martz, Who Has the Better
Right to Non-tributary Ground Waters in Colorado-Landowner or Appropriator?, 31 DICTA 20
(1954).
33. Huston, 671 P.2d at 1311.
34. Id. at 1311-12. But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-18-5 (1963) (wherein the legisla-
ture provided the first well registration requirements). CoLo. REv. STAT. § 148-18-7
(1963), enacted in 1957, expressly distinguished a well permit from a "water right" as
follows: "A permit shall not have the effect of granting or conferring a ground water right
upon the user nor shall anything in this article be so construed."
35. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-101 to -141 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984) with
Moulder, supra note 24. (In a paper presented at the National Meeting of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, Edward A. Moulder, of the United States
Geological Survey, outlined the scheme which was, in large part, incorporated into the
Management Act four years later.).
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tion of ground water basins throughout the state3 6 by the Colorado
Ground Water Commission.3 7 Once a basin is designated, priority of
appropriation is determined through a tentative user priority list, com-
piled by the commission soon after the basin is designated.3 8 Tentative
users and objectors are given notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the tentative list is made permanent.
3 9
Priority dates are determined and permits are issued after appli-
cants specify, among other things: the beneficial use to which the water
will be applied;40 the name of the owner of the land on which the well is
to be located;4 ' the amount of water to be applied;42 and, the proposed
pumping rate. 43 All claims based on actual taking of ground water prior
to May 17, 1965 are determined by an application of the doctrine of
prior appropriation. Priorities relate back to the date of the initial bene-
ficial use of the ground water.4 4 Claims initiated after May 17, 1965
relate back to the date of the filing of an application with the Ground
Water Commission. 4 5 Thus the regulatory scheme for the removal of
ground water is considered a "modified" doctrine of appropriation.
4 6
While the Management Act, as originally enacted, prescribed a de-
tailed management system for designated ground water, it was not until
1973 that the Act was amended to include regulations governing the
removal of non-designated ground water, and therein only brief men-
tion was made as to how non-designated ground water was to be appro-
priated.4 7 Claims to non-designated ground water lay at the heart of the
issues addressed and decided in the Consolidated Ruling and Huston.
Following Huston and the legislative responses thereto, the law gov-
erning the withdrawal of Colorado's non-designated ground water re-
mains to be found in the 1973 amendment to the Management Act.48
The 1973 amendments provided that the state engineer4 9 may issue a
permit to construct a well outside designated areas subject to provisions
similar to those governing the withdrawal of designated ground water.
50
Additionally it is required that the desired water be appropriated only by
36. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-106 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
37. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-104 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
38. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-109 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
39. Id.




44. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-109(1) (1973).
45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-109(1) (1973).
46. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102 (1973). The principles of the doctrine of prior ap-
propriation as applied to designated ground water are modified only by the requirement
that reasonable water pumping levels are to be maintained. Danielson v. Kerbs AG, Inc.,
646 P.2d 363, 370-1 (Colo. 1982).
47. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(4) (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
48. Id. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
49. The state engineer is ex officio the executive director of the ground water com-
mission and is charged with enforcing "the decisions, orders, and policies of the commis-
sion." CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-104(6) (1973).
50. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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the owner of the overlying land or with his consent. 5 1 Although a "per-
mit" may be issued subject to these provisions, the determination of ac-
tual "water rights" is deferred until after such time as a designated basin
is established.
52
II. THE PRINCIPLES OF GROUND WATER
To better understand the statutory distinctions found in the respec-
tive Colorado water laws, 53 it is useful to examine the hydrologic differ-
ences which form the context in which legislation on the subject is
drafted. Generally, nontributary water-specifically nontributary
ground water-is distinguished from tributary water 54 in three respects:
hydrologically, economically, and politically.
55
A. The Hydrology of Ground Water
Tributary waters are annually replenished. Nontributary ground
water is subject to eventual depletion. When the withdrawal rate from a
ground water basin exceeds the recharge rate, a "mining condition" de-
velops.5 6 "Mining" ultimately lowers the ground water table to a level
from which withdrawal is no longer economically efficient. 5 7 Statutory
recognition of this fundamental hydrologic difference is evidenced in
the Legislative Declaration5 8 of the Management Act. Therein the doc-
trine of prior appropriation is "modified" to "permit full economic de-
velopment of the designated ground water resources."
'59
51. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(4) (1973). Cf COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-109(4)(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1983) (wherein applicants for designated ground water must only provide
the name of the overlying landowner). See infra note 52.
52. Because the determination of "water rights" is not involved in the issuance of a
well permit for non-designated ground water, the state engineer need not adopt any rules
or regulations to assist in the granting or denial of such permits. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 37-90-137(4) (1973).
It has been suggested that requiring the establishment of a designated basin prior to
the adjudication of water rights thereto was a "purposeful legislative decision" which en-
sured that sufficient information was available before priorities were granted. Brief for
Appellant, State of Colorado, at 47, Huston, 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983). See also Gardner
v. State, 614 P.2d 357, 361 (Colo. 1980).
The question of how to resolve potential conflicts between "permits" and "water
rights" is as yet unanswered. In this regard, the Huston Court commented: "The subject
of judicial recognition of rights to nontributary water outside designated basins and the
principles to be applied in establishing the rights of users and adjustment of conflicts
among users might benefit from further legislative attention." Huston, 671 P.2d at 1313
n.27.
53. See supra note 1.
54. As used here, the term "tributary water" encompasses both surface and under-
ground tributary water.
55. For purposes of this Section II, "political" means "of or pertaining to exercise of
rights and privileges or the influence by which individuals of a state seek to determine or
control its public policy. ... BLAcx's LAW Dic'rloNAY 1042 (5th ed. 1979).
56. Fundingsland v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 171 Colo. 487, 496, 468 P.2d
835, 839 (1970).
57. See infra notes 101-107 and accompanying text.
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102 (1973).
59. Id. See also COLORADO LEGISLATvE COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 2. The Legislative
Council, in a report to the General Assembly prior to passage of the Management Act,
suggested that water laws which fail to distinguish tributary waters from nontributary wa-
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The specific hydrologic characteristics of legislative concern relate
to ground water pressure levels and recharge rates. First, whereas tribu-
tary water can be simply diverted or "controlled in its natural course," 60
nontributary ground water must be pumped; thus the maintenance of
natural pressure within a ground water basin is of paramount concern.
6 1
Second, whereas high recharge rates and rapid transmissivity serve to
prevent long range harm from over-appropriations in tributary systems,
nontributary ground water lacks this self-adjusting feature.
6 2
I. THE PRESSURE PROBLEM
Water pressure is generally of greater concern to those administer-
ing and using ground water than is water quantity. Notwithstanding the
large storage capacities of certain aquifers, 63 withdrawal is limited by the
amount of pressure available since the ground water must often be lifted
hundreds of feet to the surface. 4
Basically it is this "pressure problem" that prevents strict adherence
to the doctrine of prior appropriation in regulating the withdrawal of
ground water. In a surface system, a senior appropriator's rights are
adequately protected by curtailing, in times of shortages, diversions by
junior appropriators. 65 This administrative procedure, however, proved
unworkable to protect the priorities6 6 of senior ground water appropria-
tors. In Whitten v. Coit,67 the Colorado Supreme Court rhetorically ex-
plained the unsuitability of the prior appropriation doctrine vis-a-vis
ground water as follows:
ters "pose many problems to water users and to those concerned with the optimum benefi-
cial use of nontributary ground water." Id.
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(7) (1973):
"Diversion" or "divert" means removing water from its natural course or loca-
tion, or controlling water in its natural course or location, by means of a ditch,
canal, flume, reservoir, bypass, pipeline, conduit, well, pump, or other structure
or devise.
Although "diversion" as statutorily defined includes wells and pumps as means thereof,
the respective processes of diverting surface water and pumping nontributary ground
water are clearly different. The former "intercepts" or changes the direction of a flow into
a headgate or ditch. The latter "mines"; since nontributary water is effectively direc-
tionless, no "interception" or change of direction is effected. See Consolidated Ruling,
supra note 11, at 7.
61. See infra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
63. E.g., The Laramie and Fox Hills formation, located within the Lost Creek Ground
Water Basin, has an estimated 3,000,000 acre-feet of ground water in storage; however,
only 27,000 acre-feet was deemed recoverable when the basin was designated in 1968.
Before the Ground Water Commission of the State of Colorado, In the Matter of the De-
termination of a Designated Ground Water Basin in the Lost Creek Basin of the State of
Colorado (May 1, 1968).
64. Whitten v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 169, 385 P.2d 131, 138 (1963).
65. Huston, 671 P.2d at 1313.
66. Currently there is no judicial recognition of "rights" in non-designated ground
water, see supra note 52; therefore, as used hereunder, "rights" to non-designated ground
water means only those withdrawal privileges conferred upon permittees by the state engi-
neer pursuant to CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984). See supra notes
50-52 and accompanying text.
67. 153 Colo. 157, 385 P.2d 131 (1963).
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Assume that the most junior well is many miles from the most
senior and the intermediate well is close to the senior. The in-
termediate well has a greater effect on the senior in a shorter
period of time, but ultimately and irretrievably the junior well
will have an effect on both the intermediate and the senior well.
Question: If "appropriation" doctrine is to be applied, which
well should be restricted in order to protect the senior?
68
The question posed by the Whitten court quickly received a legisla-
tive response through the enactment of the Management Act. The Man-
agement Act, as previously discussed, 69 generally empowered the
Ground Water Commission to impose withdrawal limitations "as neces-
sary to protect prior appropriators.' 70 This power is broadly conferred
and, with few limitations, 7 1 leaves great discretion to the Commission in
the selection of measures to effectuate the legislative policy protecting
senior appropriators.
To date, the Ground Water Commission has adopted a preventative
approach by seeking to avoid, rather than administer, the potential
problems posed by the Whitten court. 72 One such preventative measure,
adopted pursuant to the Commission's discretionary powers, received
judicial approval in Fundingsland v. Colorado Ground Water Commission.
73
At issue in Fundingsland was denial by the Ground Water Commis-
sion of a well permit application for property located in the Northern
High Plains Ground Water Basin.7 4 The denial was based on a so-called
"three mile test." The test is designed to assess the effect of proposed
use on nearby appropriators.7 5 Based in part on policy, fact, and the-
ory, 76 the test requires an imaginary circle with a three mile radius be
68. Id. at 170, 385 P.2d at 138. See also Moulder, supra note 24, at 7 (wherein it is
suggested that a system of curtailing junior users to protect seniors in ground water basins
would result in a junior user being prevented from withdrawing water and the senior not
obtaining any additional water "until it was too late to be of any benefit.").
69. See supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
70. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-90-11 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984). The Ground Water
Commission is to protect prior appropriators by: limiting or prohibiting withdrawals; es-
tablishing reasonable pumping levels; regulating replacement or substitution wells; and
ensuring that water is applied to a beneficial use. Id.
71. E.g., the Commission shall not issue permits which will unreasonably affect prior
water rights in designated basins. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-11 (b) (1973). The Commis-
sion must confer with local management districts, see infra notes 101-4 and accompanying
text, before issuing permits or promulgating regulations which would affect those districts.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-90-111 (d) (1973). Notice and hearing provisions must be complied
with. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-112 (1973) and 37-90-113 (1973 & Gum. Supp. 1984),
respectively.
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
73. 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835 (1970).
74. The Northern High Plains Ground Water Basin was established as a designated
basin in May, 1967. At that time the Ground Water Commission determined that the basin
held 1,066,000 acre-feet of ground water. Annual recharge rate was estimated at 8,000
acre-feet. Projected annual withdrawal rates were: 12,000 acre-feet in 1966; 18,500 acre-
feet in 1976; 10,000 acre-feet in 1986; and 5,500 acre-feet for thirty years thereafter.
Before the Ground Water Commission of the State of Colorado, In the Matter of the De-
termination of a Designated Ground Water Basin (May 1967).
75. Fundingsland, 171 Colo. at 491, 468 P.2d at 836.




drawn around a proposed well site. The boundaries of this area theoret-
ically determine which existing appropriators will be affected by the pro-
posed use.7 7 If it is determined that a rate of pumping currently exits,
or will exist if the proposed well is allowed to become operational, which
will exceed a 40 percent depletion of available ground water located in
the circle within 25 years, new permit applications will be denied. 78 It is
the natural pressure contained in a basin or aquifer 7 9 which in large part
determines the amount of water "available" as used in the three mile
test.8 0 Thus, consideration of the hydrologic characteristics of non-trib-
utary ground water was fundamental to the development of the ground
water management system approved in Fundingsland.
The "pressure problem" is of additional concern and further illus-
trates nontributary ground water's distinctive hydrology because only a
small amount of nontributary ground water can be withdrawn from a
single point within the ground water system. Large quantities of tribu-
tary waters or "natural streams," on the other hand, can be diverted at a
single point.8 1 This distinction raises questions concerning the right to
condemn rights-of-way for well sites, and must be considered in the for-
mulation of a ground water management system. Whereas the Colorado
Constitution guarantees the right to divert surface waters8 2 and the
right to condemn a right-of-way for such diversion,8 3 no state constitu-
tional guarantee provides a right to condemn land to construct a well or




79. " 'Aquifer' means a formation, group of formations, or part of a formation con-
taining sufficient saturated permeable material that could yield a sufficient quantity of
water that may be extracted and applied to a beneficial use." CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-90-
103(2) (1973).
80. The Ground Water Commission implemented the three-mile test, in Fundingstand,
in order to ascertain whether the proposed use would impair existing uses by lowering the
water level to a point at which pumping costs would no longer be economic. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-90-107(5) (1973).
81. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
82. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5, supra note 20.
83. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 7: "All persons shall have a right-of-way across private
lands for the construction of ditches, canals, and flumes for conveying water."
84. Although, as already mentioned, "diversion" as statutorily defined includes with-
drawal by wells, see supra note 61, the constitution provides no right-of-way across private
lands for the construction of a well. Compare supra note 83 with statutes governing the
condemnation of rights-of-way which provide only that appropriators are entitled to
rights-of-way "which lie between the point of diversion and point of use or proposed use
for the purpose of transporting water for beneficial use." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-86-102
(1973). The issue as to whether the above-quoted statute encompasses the construction of
wells has not yet been judicially answered. But see Bubb v. Christiansen, 200 Colo. 21, 610
P.2d 1343 (1980). Therein, Justice Lohr stated that the right of condemnation for rights-
of-way is "not dependent upon whether the source of supply (of water) is characterized as
a well or a spring." However, the decision is expressly limited to the facts of that case,
namely: a trespass had already "peacefully" occurred and condemnation proceedings
were in progress; the landowner had no development of his own; and, it was determined
that the water source was a "spring" and not a well. Moreover, Justice Lohr expressly
excludes any determination of a right to trespass in order to initiate a water right. 610
P.2d at 1346-47.
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2. Recharge and Transmissivity8 5
The amount of water in a tributary system, often referred to as the
"surface flow" in connection with surface waters, can be controlled by
curtailing diversions by junior appropriators.8 6 In the event of periodic
over-appropriations, it has been stated that "no long range harm" is
occasioned "since the streams are subject to seasonal recharge."
8 7
Nontributary ground water, however, does not enjoy the luxury of sea-
sonal recharge,8 8 overdrafts inevitably result in premature and long-
term reduction of the water table. As the water table drops, pumping
lifts and costs become greater.8 9 Accordingly, if withdrawals are not ad-
ministratively controlled, the legislative policy of "full economic devel-
opment," 90 as declared in the Management Act, is compromised.
It has been suggested that the characteristics of ground water do
not lend themselves to even a "modified" appropriation scheme and,
accordingly, that uncontrolled development would result in near opti-
mum use.9 1 The prevailing opinion, however, is that the non-replenish-
ing nature and other hydrologic characteristics of Colorado's
nontributary ground water warrant special controls and distinctive regu-
latory treatment.
92
B. The Economics and Politics of Ground Water
In any basin where a mining condition exists, two problems arise:
(1) how to extend the water supply to obtain economic stability; and
(2) how to allocate equitably the depleting supply of water. 93 The first
question involves consideration of how long the water supply must last
in order to maximize efficient economic withdrawal for the appropriat-
ing community. Hence, the first question is subject to engineering and
economic analysis. The second is political in nature.
85. The low transmissivity, or rate of movement, of nontributary ground water is both
a cause and effect of a basin's recharge rate; therefore "transmissivity" and "recharge" are
interdependent, and as used hereunder are effectively synonornous.
86. See supra note 65.
87. Fundingsland v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 171 Colo. 487, 496, 468 P.2d
835, 839 (1970).
88. Id. "Due to the slow rate at which underground waters flow through and into the
aquifers, it may be many years before a reasonable water level may be restored to a mined
aquifer." Id.
89. Ten years ago energy costs for pumping ground water were about one to two
dollars per acre-foot. Today they are six to ten dollars per acre-foot depending upon the
source of the energy. Stetson, supra note 30.
90. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102 (1973).
91. See, e.g., Moulder, supra note 24, at 6. This suggestion presupposes several facts
and opinions which are subject to dispute, namely: (1) that the most beneficial uses of
ground water will be made by those who can afford to pay the most for its withdrawal;
(2) that available ground water is naturally located to serve the most beneficial needs; and
(3) that priorities should be accorded those most favorably situated in the particular basin.
Id.
92. See generally Huston, 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983); Fundingsland v. Colorado
Ground Water Comm'n, 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835 (1970).
93. COLORADO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 18.
NONTRIBUTARY GROUND WATER
1. The Economics
Some ground water users responded to the Management Act with
trepidation. They feared that their economic well being, and that of the
state as well, "would ultimately suffer severe damage." 94 Substantial
investments in wells and pumping equipment and, more importantly,
the right to withdraw ground water, were all believed to be in jeop-
ardy.9 5 These apprehensions were largely the result of rumors,
96
legislative oversights, 9 7 and the widely held belief that ground water was
owned as property by the overlying landowner. 9 8 Rumors were quelled
and oversights corrected;9 9  however, the property concerns
remained. 100
Responding to these concerns, the general assembly, in the Man-
agement Act, provided for the formation of local management dis-
tricts. 10  The districts, in concert with the Ground Water
Commission,' 0 2 are empowered to "develop comprehensive plans" for
the efficient use of designated ground water within each district. 103 It is
through these comprehensive plans, formulated primarily at the local
level, that the desired "economic stability" 10 4 is sought to be obtained.
Factors considered by a management district in the development of
a water use plan include hydrological data, such as yield and recharge
values for each locality. 10 5 Various economic factors are also consid-
ered. For example, the selection of the 25-year limitation period for a
40 percent depletion, which was litigated in Fundingsland,10 6 was partly
based on a finding that construction loans for wells and pumping facili-
ties are amortized over a 25-year period.'
0 7
94. COLORADO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Implementation of 1965 Water Legislation, Research
Publ. No. 114, at xvi (December 1966). Ground water users also suggested that the state
was losing new additions to its economy since farmers and industries needed assurances of
available water supplies in the future. COLORADO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 2, at
19.
95. Id.
96. Id. One of the first problems resulted from rumors that it would take the state
engineer two to three years to issue permits.
97. The Management Act, as signed into law (S.B. 367) contained no provisions for
replacement wells and no recognition of wells in existence at the time the Act was passed.
98. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
99. The statutes were amended to empower the Ground Water Commission to issue
permits for replacement and substitute wells by virtue of original appropriations. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-90-111(c) (1973).
100. See inf'a notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
101. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-118 to -135 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
102. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-130(1) (1973). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-111(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1984).
103. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-130(2) (1973).
104. It was suggested that the premature development of comprehensive plans and the
conferring of water rights before a barn is designated could deprive local water users of
participation and representation through their respective management districts. Brief for
Appellant, State of Colorado at 50, Huston, 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983).
105. See Thompson v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 194 Colo. 489,499, 575 P.2d
372, 380 (1978).
106. 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835 (1970).
107. Id. at 492, 468 P.2d at 837.
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Notice and hearing provisions in the Management Act' 0 8 ensure an
opportunity for members of the user community to participate in the
development of comprehensive plans. 10 9 Thus, it is intended that those
who depend most on the designated ground water determine their own
requirements for "economic stability" and develop a compatible with-
drawal plan. 10
2. The Politics
The right given tax-paying electors to create local management dis-
tricts 1 and to elect a district's board of directors 112 evidences the leg-
islature's response to the political question; namely, how is the
diminishing supply of ground water to be equitably allocated? 1 13 Lo-
cally based decision-making reflects the strong ties of ground water to
private property. 1 4 These ties have been the subject of law review arti-
cles 1 5 and Colorado Supreme Court decisions, 1 6 including Huston.
In Huston, proponents of the private ownership theory who sought
rights to non-designated ground water relied on two arguments to sup-
port their position. First, they argued that ground water was not sev-
ered from the land when the federal government patented land to
private owners. 1 17 Second, an argument was based on language found
in Whitten v. Coit 1 8 wherein the Colorado Supreme Court cited with ap-
proval a law review article which stated that "(t)he landowner has prop-
erty in the water in his soil." 19 The Huston court rejected both of these
arguments. 1
2 0
108. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-131 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
109. Id.
110. See generally North Kiowa-Bijou Mgt. Dist. v. Ground Water Comm'n., 180 Colo.
314, 317-18, 505 P.2d 377, 380-81 (1973) (District has power to limit exportation of
ground water outside the district). Cf COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137 (1973 & Cum. Supp.
1984) (wherein it is provided that the state engineer need not adopt rules or regulations
for granting or denying well permits to non-designated ground water and for the adminis-
tration of this underground water).
111. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-119 to -124 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
112. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-121 to -127 (1973).
113. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
114. This is not to suggest that any of Colorado's water, whether surface or ground
water, is susceptible of private ownership. It merely recognizes that the private ownership
theory has received judicial attention and has been the subject of extensive law review
commentary.
115. See Hannay, Recent Developments in Colorado Groundwater Law, 58 DEN. LJ. 801
(1981); McHendrie, The Law of Underground Waters, 13 ROCKY MN. L. REV. 1 (1940); Martz,
Who Has the Better Right to Non-tributary Ground Waters in Colorado-Landoumer or Appropriator?,
31 DicrA 20 (1954); Note, A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 226 (1970).
116. See Huston, 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983); Whitten v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 385 P.2d
131 (1963); Safranek v. Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951); McClellan v.
Hurdle, 3 Colo. App. 430, 33 P. 280 (1893).
117. Huston, 671 P.2d at 1304-07.
118. 153 Colo. 157, 385 P.2d 131 (1963).
119. Id. at 174, 385 P.2d at 140.
120. The court addressed the first argument by reference to the Desert Land Act of
1877 and its grant of broad authority to the states to adopt their own water use systems "in
accordance with the needs of its citizens." 671 P.2d at 1307. The language upon which
the second argument was premised was dismissed as dictum and, to the extent that it
recognized a property interest in ground water, it was repudiated. Id. at 1317.
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Despite repeated rejections of the private ownership theory by the
Colorado Supreme Court, the continuing concern for the property right
character of ground water is indicated through legislation on the sub-
ject. The requirement of land ownership or landowner consent as a pre-
requisite to ground water withdrawal1 2 ' or well construction1 2 2 is
perhaps the most striking example of this recognition of quasi-property
rights. Other examples are found in the numerous statutory provisions
creating and defining the powers of management districts, 123 and ensur-
ing notice and hearing opportunities for the user community.'
2 4
III. HuSTON
In 1978, lawyer-geologist John Huston of Denver filed applications
in water courts' 25 across Colorado for the appropriation of nearly 1.3
million acre-feet of non-designated ground water. 126 Huston's claims,
based on the doctrine of prior appropriation, were consolidated with
other claims based on other theories such as the private ownership the-
ory previously discussed.' 27 Common issues of law were submitted to
the special water judge for resolution.12
8
Huston argued that the constitutional references to "natural
streams" encompass all natural water in the state and, accordingly, non-
designated ground water is subject to the doctrine of prior appropria-
tion.1 2 9 These arguments were accepted by the special water judge who
found "no distinction" between designated and non-designated ground
waters.1 30 He ruled that non-designated ground water, like designated
ground water,' 3 1 was subject to appropriation.1
3 2
121. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 82-4 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 101-4 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
125. The term "water court" is a common reference to the district courts of all counties
situated within a particular water division, acting collectively through a water judge. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-203(1) (Cum. Supp. 1984). There are seven water divisions
within the state. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-201 (1973).
126. The Denver Post, April 17, 1984, at 1, col. 8.
127. See, e.g., supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
128. Five specific questions were assigned to the special water judge:
QI. Whether non-tributary (sic) waters in Colorado are subject to appropria-
tion; and, in the event that the answer to this question is in the affirmative, for the
determination of the following additional questions of law;
Q2. By what authority can such waters be appropriated?
Q3. Can non-tributary waters outside the boundaries of designated ground
water basins be appropriated by persons having no property interest in the
surface?
Q4. Can non-tributary waters outside the boundaries of designated ground
water basins be appropriated by persons other than the claimant or those whom
the claimant represents?
Q5. Can applications for non-tributary waters outside the boundaries of desig-
nated ground water basins be filed (a) without first obtaining permits from the
state engineer and, if so, (b) without first applying for such permits?
Huston, 671 P.2d at 1302-3.
129. Consolidated Ruling, supra note 11, at 39.
130. Id. at 13.
131. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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Four years and over 200 intervenors later,' 3 3 the Colorado
Supreme Court reversed the special water judge. Specifically, it was
held that non-designated ground water is not subject to appropria-
tion.13 4 Therefore, rights to non-designated ground water were prop-
erly obtainable through the state engineer, not the water courts.
1 35
Moreover, the district courts had jurisdiction over review of the state
engineer's actions, not the water court.13 6 Pursuant to this holding,
Huston's applications and those of other applicants were remanded to
the water courts, and the water judges were directed to dismiss all claims
to non-designated ground water.
13 7
The Huston decision was quickly followed by the enactment of legis-
lation which placed the determination of "rights" to non-designated
ground water in the exclusive jurisdiction of the water court.' 3 8 Control
over the granting of well permits, however, was left with the state
engineer. 1
39
132. Consolidated Ruling, supra note 11, at 13. For a summary of the rulings by the
special water judge on other assigned questions, see Huston, 671 P.2d at 1302-03.
133. See Huston, 671 P.2d at 1296-1300 (these pages are devoted exclusively to the list-
ings of parties and their respective counsel).
134. Id. at 1303. The reversal of this threshold ruling made it unnecessary to consider
other rulings by the special water judge. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
However, the supreme court did comment on the special water judge's ruling that applica-
tions for non-designated ground water could be filed in the water court. The supreme
court held that "[clontrary to the ruling of the special water judge,. . . the only statutory
means available for obtaining rights" to non-designated ground water "is application for a
well permit from the state engineer. 671 P.2d at 1320.
135. Id. at 1320.
136. The question as to the proper forum in which to appeal the state engineer's ac-
tions in the granting or denial of a well permit (to non-designated water) was considered
by the Colorado Supreme Court under dubious conditions. The statute which provided
for appellate procedures, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-90-115 (1973), was repealed and reen-
acted subsequent to the ruling by the special water judge and prior to the rendering of a
decision by the Colorado Supreme Court. Whereas the statute, before the 1983 revision,
provided for review of actions by the state engineer (in granting or denying well permits)
in district court, the revised statute is silent on the subject. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-90-
115 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1984) (as amended, 1983 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 409, at 1416 (H.B.
1310)).
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the statute, before revision, provided for
review in the district court. The ruling, however, was arguably a moot point, as the court
refused to express an opinion on procedures for the review of a state engineer's action
after the statutory revision. 671 P.2d at 1314-15.
137. 671 P.2d at 1323.
138. Senate Bill No. 439, as signed into law on October 11, 1983, amended CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-203(1) (Cum. Supp. 1984) to include, in pertinent part:
Water matters [over which water courts have exclusive jurisdiction] include deter-
minations of rights to nontributary ground water outside of designated ground
water basins.
S. 439, 44th Gen. Assembly, 1983 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 516 at 2079. The question as to
how the above quoted language, particularly reference to "rights" to non-designated
ground water, is to be reconciled with the Hutton court's concern regarding the recogni-
tion of such rights is as yet unanswered. See supra note 52.
139. House Joint Resolution No. 1038 (1983) in pertinent part provides:
That the General Assembly hereby finds and declares that its intention in
enacting Senate Bill No. 439, enacted at the First Regular Session of the Fifty-
fourth General Assembly, was that its provisions were procedural only, and that
the provisions of section 37-90-137(4), Colorado Revised Statutes, shall continue
to control the granting of permits for nontributary ground water basins.
H.RJ. Res. 1038, 44th Gen. Assembly, 1983 Colo. Sess. Laws 2125.
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Subsequent to the enactment of this legislation, certain parties in-
volved in the Huston litigation requested a hearing to argue the legisla-
tion's effect on the Huston court's ruling. 140 The request for rehearing
was denied. 141 However, the Colorado Supreme Court directed that on
remand, the water judges were to consider the "applicability, validity,
and effect of those legislative enactments and their impact on [the
court's] previous determination" that the applications for non-desig-
nated ground water be dismissed.
14 2
In summary, the law currently governing the removal of non-desig-
nated ground water is found in section 37-90-137(4) of the Colorado
Revised Statutes.14 3 Therein it is provided that the state engineer may
issue well permits to non-designated ground water, but that the determi-
nation of "water rights"' 144 is to be deferred until the source of the de-
sired water is established as a designated basin. 14 5 Jurisdiction as to
review of the state engineer's granting or denial of such a permit in ac-
cordance with recent legislation lies in the water court for the county in
which the ground water is located.1
4 6
By leaving the Management Act substantively unchanged, Huston
impliedly recognizes the purposefulness of the Act and the distinctions
therein between designated and non-designated ground water. The
postponement of the determination of "rights" to non-designated
ground water provides the state engineer time to locate and identify
these ground water sources. The Ground Water Commission may then
gather the factual and hydrologic data necessary to the establishment of
a designated basin.
The alternative allocation systems, as presented and rejected in
Huston, fail to consider the relevant principles of ground water and
would result in a premature designation of permanent rights. Appropri-
ation, prior to the establishment of designated basins, will hamper-or
make meaningless-the gathering of factual and hydrologic data neces-
sary to equitably allocate and protect senior rights. Recognition of the
private ownership theory improperly presupposes that those who own
land overlying non-designated ground water, or those who can afford to
buy them out, will put the water to its most beneficial use.
The Management Act, and Huston's approval thereof, ensures a fac-
tual basis for the development of permanent ground water management
systems. Community users are assured representation in the develop-
ment of comprehensive plans. Water can be equitably allocated. Senior
users can be adequately protected.
In the aftermath of Huston and its legislative progeny, certain ques-
tions remain. Will the recently enacted legislation withstand judicial
140. Huston, 671 P.2d at 1323.
141. Id. at 1324.
142. Id. at 1323.
143. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
145. Id.
146. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny? For example, will there be judicial recognition of "rights" to
non-designated ground water? How will the water court respond to the
Huston remand in light of the new legislation? Until a source of non-
designated ground water is established as a designated basis, what
"rights" do users and overlying landowners have, and how will conflict
between them be resolved? Is the establishment of a designated basin a




Nontributary ground water in Colorado is an anomaly. It is capable
of neither common law ownership nor constitutional appropriation.
The legislatures and the courts have thus seen fit to incorporate ele-
ments of both doctrines into a hybrid "modified" doctrine of
appropriation.
The intermingling of theories has raised judicial questions and
prompted legislative refinements for over 20 years. There is no reason
to believe that this evolutionary process has been truncated by Huston.
Questions remain unanswered. Conflicts remain unresolved.
It is clear, however, that these questions and conflicts must be ap-
proached with an understanding of the principles of the ground water
itself, namely, its hydraulics, economics and politics. It is within this
context that full economic development, for both the state and user
communities, can be achieved in an equitable fashion.
Brett Heckman
147. The Office of the State Engineer, Division of Water Resources, as of March 13,
1984, has located and identified seventeen basins and aquifers containing an estimated
688.6 million acre-feet of non-tributary ground water. As of publication of this article
none of these sources have been officially designated or administered in accordance with
"designated basin" provisions of the Management Act.
A USTIN V. LITVAK, COLORADO'S STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: AN UNEASY SLEEP
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1970s, the "medical malpractice crisis" received exten-
sive media coverage and commanded the attention of state legislators as
well.' Legislative response to the "crisis" resulted in substantive
changes in the common-law tort system of compensation for injured pa-
tients. 2 One of the most popular reforms adopted was the reduction of
time periods in statutes of limitation. In the years following their pas-
sage, these reforms faced constitutional challenges in the courts and dis-
satisfaction in the legal community engendered by their harsh effects on
plaintiffs.3 Consequently, many statutes were amended and refined;
4
legislative and judicially-created exceptions to the new laws arose.
These exceptions have subsequently been challenged on constitutional
grounds.
5
In Austin v. Litvak,6 the Supreme Court of Colorado found the lim-
ited exceptions to the state's statute of repose to be unconstitutional as
applied to the plaintiffs. The court held that the classifications created
by the exceptions were arbitrary, and that they denied certain groups of
plaintiffs equal protection under both the Colorado and United States
Constitutions. 7 Of paramount importance is the court's remedy, which
extended the discovery rule beyond its former limitation to victims of
fraudulent concealment and foreign objects claims, 8 and granted bene-
fits to victims of negligent misdiagnosis as well.9
This comment will first examine the policy considerations behind
statutes of limitation and repose and the social phenomena which trig-
gered their recent evolution in Colorado. Next, this comment will focus
on the decision in Austin v. Litvak, analyzing the court's reasoning and
discussing the case's relationship to past landmark decisions in this state
involving medical malpractice statutes of limitation. Finally, this com-
1. See infra text accompanying text 52-60.
2. Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid
Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HAsv. J. ON LEGIS. 143, 146 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Graley v. Satayatham, 74
Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976). See generally Redish, Legislative Response to the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REv. 759 (1977)
(advocating judicial restraint in the controversial area of reform measures designed to alle-
viate the crisis).
4. White & McKenna, Constitutionality of Recent Malpractice Legislation, 13 FORUM 312
(1978).
5. See id at 313-15.
6. 682 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1984).
7. Id at 52; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25.
8. 682 P.2d at 53.
9. Id at 44.
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ment will examine the decision's impact on the medical malpractice cri-
sis in Colorado.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutes of Limitation: The Origin of the Constitutional Challenge
Statutes of limitation have existed in common-law jurisprudence
since the seventeenth century. 10 Rooted in public policy, they are
designed to protect potential defendants from the burden of defending
claims originating in the distant past. I This protection is accomplished
by prescribing a period within which a plaintiff "must bring his cause of
action to the courts or lose his right to assert it thereafter."' 12 Thus,
statutes of limitation relieve a defendant from having to defend a claim
which he reasonably assumed was forgotten. Additionally, they elimi-
nate the evidentiary problems that accompany "stale claims," such as
the unavailability of evidence and witnesses, and the deterioration of
memories over time.' 3 Other recognized benefits of these statutes in-
clude the prevention of plaintiffs "sitting on their rights," and the elimi-
nation of fraudulent claims or claims brought merely to harass
defendants. 14
Statutes of limitation begin to run when a plaintiffs claim "ac-
crues." The time of accrual varies according to statute and jurisdiction.
Courts and legislatures commonly adopt one of two methods for deter-
mining time of accrual: date of the negligent act or omission which
causes injury or time at which the plaintiff discovers or reasonably could
have discovered his cause of action.
15
B. Absolute Statutes of Repose: A Stricter Limitation
Absolute statutes of repose differ from statutes of limitation in that
the time of the accrual of the cause of action is immaterial since "the
prescriptive period of a statute of repose begins upon the occurrence of
a specified event regardless of when the injuries result or when the cause
10. See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HAuv. L. REV. 1177, 1177
(1950).
11. See, e.g., Kelley, The Discovery Rule for Personal Injury Statutes of Limitations: Reflections
on the British Experience, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1641, 1645 (1978).
12. Note, Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose: An Unconstitutional Denial of Access to the
Courts: Colton v. Dewey, 63 NEB. L. REv. 150, 153 (1983).
13. Note, Preserving Causes of Action in Latent Disease Cases: The Locke v. Johns-Manville
Corp. Date-of-the-Injury Accrual Rule, 68 VA. L. REv. 615, 619 (1982). See Recent Cases, Medi-
cal Malpractice: Ohio's Statute of Limitations: Baird v. Loeffler, 16 AKRON L. REv. 302, 305
(1982).
14. Kelley, supra note 11, at 1645. See Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Diseases, 36
A.D.2d 31, 35, 319 N.Y.S.2d 674, 678, appeal denied, 29 N.Y.2d 483 (1981). See generally
Kubrick v. United States, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) (unjust to compel defendant to defend
against state claims); Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944) (purpose of
statute of limitations is discouraging unnecessary delay and avoiding the prosecution of
stale claims); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977) (purpose of
the statute of limitations is fairness to the defendant).
15. 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WiLmAs, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 13.07 (1981).
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of action accrues." 1 6 However, both statutes of limitation and absolute
statutes of repose are designed to compel the exercise of a right of ac-
tion within a reasonable time and to suppress stale or fraudulent claims.
Statutes of repose were one of the legislative responses to the per-
ceived medical malpractice crisis. 1 7 Between 1975 and 1977, absolute
statutes of repose were instituted in twenty-five states. 18 The actual ef-
fectiveness of such statutes depends a great deal upon whether the pre-
scriptive period may be tolled and, if so, the circumstances required for
tolling. Many legislatures have instituted exceptions to their statutes of
repose, the most prevalent of these being the "foreign object" excep-
tion.' 9 Under this exception, the discovery rule applies and the statute
is tolled until the plaintiff discovers his cause of action.
20
C. The Discovery Rule
The primary purpose of the discovery rule is to prevent statutes of
limitation from depriving injured patients of their causes of action
before they are aware that they exist. 21 Under the rule, a plaintiff's
cause of action does not accrue until he discovers, or has a reasonable
opportunity to discover, his injury and its cause. 22 The rationale behind
the widespread acceptance of the discovery rule is the unavoidable injus-
tice and harsh results stemming from the imposition of the traditional
theory of accrual, 23 under which the statutory period begins to run upon
the occurrence of the negligent act or omission. Both legislators and
judges have found the effects of the old theory on plaintiffs' rights to be
unfair and unconscionable. 24 The discovery rule was first advocated in
1917 in Hahn v. Claybrook,25 a medical malpractice case involving negli-
gent treatment. It was not used again until 1936, in Huysman v. Kirsch,26
another malpractice case in which a foreign object was left in a patient's
body. Application of the rule spread with the rise in the number of la-
tent disease actions brought to the courts. 2 7 The most well known of
16. Note, supra note 12 at 153. See McGovern, The Variety, Polity and Constitutionality of
Products Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579, 584 (1981). See, e.g., Howell v.
Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 693, 568 P.2d 214, 225 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) (Sutin, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (N.M. 1977).
17. Note, supra note 12 at 153.
18. See id. note 54 at 162.
19. See supra note 15.
20. 682 P.2d at 46.
21. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, PUB. No. (OS) 73-88, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 22, 30
(1973) (hereinafter cited as HEW Report); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses
to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1432 (1975).
22. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (4th ed. 1971).
23. See Rosane v. Senger, 149 P.2d at 375-76; Comment, Medical Malpractice Statute of
Limitations as Special Legislation: Woodward v. Burnham City Hospital, 55 CH.-KENT L. REv.
519, 521 (1978).
24. See id See also supra note 15.
25. 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917).
26. 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
27. See Note, Preserving Causes of Action in Latent Disease Cases: The Locke v. Johns-
Manville Corp. Date-of-the-Injuy Accrual Rue, 68 VA. L. REv. 615 (1982). See infra note 29.
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these cases, Urie v. Thompson,2 8 involving recovery under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, has greatly influenced state courts in their adoption of
the discovery rule.29 Some states have extended the discovery rule to
latent disease cases, finding it too difficult to distinguish such cases from
foreign object cases.3
0
D. Medical Malpractice Statutes of Limitation and Repose in Colorado
From 1925 until 1971, Colorado plaintiffs had two years after their
cause of action accrued to file a complaint.3 1 Colorado courts construed
"accrue" to mean the time at which a plaintiff discovered or could have
discovered his cause of action;3 2 a 1971 amendment to the statute ex-
plicitly adopted the discovery rule. The amendment also imposed, how-
ever, a strict six-year statute of repose on all claims with the exception of
foreign object cases.3 3 In 1976, that period was reduced to five years,
3 4
and in 1977 it was further reduced to the current three-year period.
3 5
At that time an exception for fraudulent concealment cases was added to
the foreign object exception.3 6 Currently in Colorado the statutory pe-
riod begins to run on the date of the negligent act or omission giving
rise to the injury, or upon the date of discovery if the claim involves
fraudulent concealment of a foreign object.3 7 Thus, a plaintiff whose
claim does not come under either of the two exceptions must bring his
cause of action to the courts within three years of the act or omission or
forfeit his right to assert it.
3 8
28. 337 U.S. 163 (1949). In this case, the plaintiff had contracted silicosis as a result
of inhaling silica dust for 30 years at his job. One year after retirement, he learned of his
injury and filed a claim. Abandoning the traditional rule of accrual, the Court handed
down a landmark decision declaring that the plaintiffs "blameless ignorance" should not
bar his claim since the purpose of the statute of limitations is to require the assertion of a
claim after notice of the invasion of legal rights. Id. at 170.
29. The rationale enunciated in Urie was first applied to a medical malpractice case
under the Federal Tort Claims Act in Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.
1962). In that case, injuries resulting from the transfusion of the wrong blood type at a VA
Hospital did not manifest themselves until several years later. The court held that "a claim
for medical malpractice accrues . . . when the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the acts constituting . . . malpractice." Id
at 240. The states of Kentucky, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania have carved
out exceptions to their statutes of limitations for latent disease plaintiffs: Louisville Trust
Co. v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Ky. 1979) (mesothelioma); Harig
v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (mesothelioma); Ray-
mond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977) (blindness caused by oral
contraceptive); Anthony v. Koppers Co., Inc., 284 Pa. Super. 81, 425 A.2d 428 (1980)
(lung cancer from coke oven emissions), rev'd, 496 Pa. 119, 436 A.2d 181 (1981) (discovery
rule does not prevent running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action and sur-
vival action brought more than two years after the death from cancer).
30. See supra note 29.
31. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 87-1-6 (1953).
32. See, e.g., Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970); Rosane v.
Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
33. 1971 CoLo. SEss. LAws 232.
34. 1976 CoLo. SEss. LAws 90.





E. The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Menace or Mirage?
Peaking in notoriety in the mid-1970s,3 9 the "medical malpractice
crisis" was the phrase coined to describe a situation where physicians
experienced on unprecedented, meteoric rise in their insurance premi-
ums for medical malpractice coverage. 40 These escalating rates alleg-
edly resulted in a movement of doctors to lower risk areas of medicine
and lower risk areas of the country,4 1 a scarcity of insurance companies
willing to insure doctors, 42 and soaring health care costs. Reports of
these problems generated concern in the public and in the medical pro-
fession which, in turn, pressured legislators to take remedial action.
This resulted in the enactment of statutes which sacrificed the rights of
plaintiffs in the interest of alleviating the "crisis" and thereby benefiting
the community as a whole.
43
The causes of the crisis most frequently cited are an increase in the
size of awards,4 4 the number of medical malpractice suits, 4 5 and the re-
sulting practice of insurance companies maintaining huge reserves to
cover the payment of judgments. 4 6 Various authorities, however, have
noted the dearth of statistical data to support allegations that these are,
in fact, the causes of the crisis.4 7 Other critics of the purported crisis,
among them members of the Colorado legislature, have laid the blame
on insurance companies themselves, claiming that they reap huge profits
from unduly high premiums. 4 8 Still others claim that insurance compa-
nies have been forced to charge high rates, not because of huge amounts
39. See HEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 73-78. See generally Note, supra note 12, at 160
n.37 (author examines the legislative reaction to the malpractice crisis and its results).
40. See HEW REPORT, supra note 21; Segar, Is Malpractice Insurable?, 51 IND. L.J. 128,
128 (1975); Redish, supra note 3, at 759-760 (between 1960 and 1970, insurance rates for
some sectors of the medical profession increased tenfold).
41. Redish, supra note 3, at 760.
42. As with other facets of the "crisis," the unavailability of insurance is disputed.
One source states that there has been a 90 per cent decrease nationally in the number of
insurance companies writing medical malpractice insurance. Oregon Medical Ass'n v.
Rawls, No. 421-496, slip. op. at 1 (Or. Cir. Ct. May 4, 1966), rev'don other grounds, 276 Or.
1101, 557 P.2d 64 (1976). The HEW REPORT, on the other hand, reported that medical
malpractice insurance was currently widely available. HEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 38-
39.
43. See Note, supra note 12, at 160. See generally HEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 12-13.
44. HEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 6-12.
45. Redish, supra note 3, at 760-61.
46. Insurance companies often impose artificially high premiums to protect them-
selves against high damage awards in the future, a phenomenon termed by the industry as
the "long tail problem." Learner, supra note 2, at 145. For a discussion of the "long tail
problem" and the insurance scheme which makes it a problem, see Comment, The "Claims-
Made" Dilemma in Professional Liability Insurance, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 925, 926 (1975); see also
Sepler, Professional Malpractice Litigation Crisis: Danger or Distortion?, 15 F. 493 (1980) (an in-
depth statistical analysis of the data relied upon by lobbyists and legislators when claiming
the existence of the malpractice crisis reveals serious discrepancies between data and
conclusions).
47. See, e.g., Note, The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. Legislative Surgey on Patient's
Rights, V~A.. U.L. REV. 303, 344 (1976) (authorities cited therein).
48. HEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 6-12; S. Res. 150, 51st G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., H.R.
Floor Debate, May 4, 1977, Colo., Tape No. 46A-M2T. The Colorado Senate Judiciary
Committee Proceedings produced data indicating that 15.4 million dollars in premiums
were paid annually by the states' physicians while only 200,000 dollars were paid out by
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paid out in damages, but rather to cover poor investment practices. 49
Finally, the relationship between high premiums and rising health care
costs has been questioned.
50
Thus, the malpractice crisis may be in part a creation of the me-
dia,5 1 and therefore grossly exaggerated. 52 The Supreme Court of
Idaho has indeed questioned whether a medical malpractice crisis ever
truly existed.53 Many more critics have stated that the crisis, if it did
exist, was not of national proportions and that the majority of states
were not experiencing a malpractice crisis. 54 Colorado legislators op-
posing the most recent amendment to the statute of repose expressed
the opinion that there was no medical malpractice crisis in Colorado.
55
Although many factual issues have been raised regarding the "cri-
sis," one thing is certain: it has generated on enormous amount of legis-
lative activity. Almost every state responded with some sort of
legislation aimed at eliminating the problem,5 6 and numerous jurisdic-
tions have enacted strict statutes of repose similar to Colorado's.
57
Again, the need for this flurry of activity has been questioned since sen-
sational media coverage and extensive lobbying by medical associations
and physicians' groups imposed intense pressure on state legislatures to
enact remedial legislation. 58 Unfortunately, such legislation has failed
to impede the escalation of insurance rates in states where it has been
passed, and there are no guarantees that efforts on the part of Colorado
lawmakers will fare any better.
59
insurance companies to cover medical malpractice liability. S. Judiciary Comm. Proceed-
ings, March 9, 1977, Colo., Tape No. 20A-MIT.
49. See Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective, 637 INs. L.J. 90, 96
(1976); Oster, Medical Malpractice Insurance, 45 INS. COUNS. J. 228, 231 (1978).
50. Kelaher, The Legislative Immunization of the Florida Medical Community, 56 FLA. BJ.
616, 616 (1982) (author suspects that rising costs of medical supplies and equipment is
more to blame for increasing costs of medical care than escalating premiums to doctors).
51. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976);
Learner, supra note 2, at 143 (note cites "unprecedented news media coverage").
52. 2 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLAMs, supra note 15, at 20.07 n.55 (Supp. 1979).
53. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, 414 (1976), cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
54. The trial court in Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) concluded
that there was no crisis in the state of North Dakota vis-a-vis the cost or availability of
medical malpractice insurance. The North Dakota court's findings were echoed by the
Supreme Court of Idaho in Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399,
414 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
Senate Comm of Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (statement of Dr. Roger
Egeberg, Special Ass't to the Sec'y for Health Policy) (approximately 35 states are not
experiencing a malpractice crisis).
55. S. Res. 150, 52nd G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., S. Floor Debate, March 18, 1977, Colo.,
Tape No. 27A-M2T.
56. Note, supra note 12, at 150 n.51 (between 1975 and 1977, 52 states and territories
enacted remedial legislation).
57. Twenty-four states, including Colorado, Kansas, Utah, California, and Illinois,
currently have an absolute period of repose in their malpractice statutes of limitation. See
generally id at 150 n.54.
58. Learner, supra note 2, at 143.
59. See 2 D. LOuISEuL. & H. Wi.,IAmsS, supra note 15, at 20.07 n.55 (Supp. 1981); T.
LOMBARDI, JR., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, FOREWORD at xi, 92-93 (1978); Note, The
Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on Patient's Rights, VAL. U.L. Rav. 303, 350
AUSTIN v. LITVAK
II. AUSTIN v. LITVAK
A. Factual Setting
In September, 1963, Richard L. Austin checked into St. Anthony's
Hospital in Denver for the treatment of kidney stones.60 While at St.
Anthony's, he underwent various tests and examinations. At that time,
John Litvak, M.D., informed the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Austin, that the
test results showed that Mr. Austin had a type of brain tumor known as a
parasagital meningioma. Richard Austin retained Dr. Litvak to take
charge of his care. In pursuit of his duties, Dr. Litvak performed addi-
tional tests including exploratory surgery which involved placing a metal
screen in the plaintiff's skull. Following the results of these procedures,
Dr. Litvak confirmed his earlier diagnosis and advised the Austins that
the tumor was not operable without a severe risk, and that Mr. Austin
should not undergo surgery. During Richard Austin's hospitalization at
St. Anthony's, he was taken to Colorado General Hospital where addi-
tional tests were performed at Dr. Litvak's direction. It is alleged that
unbeknownst to the plaintiffs, these tests conclusively established that
Richard Austin did not have a brain tumor. It is further alleged that Dr.
Litvak knew of these test results but did not inform the plaintiffs. Six-
teen years later, in May of 1979, Mr. Austin underwent another series of
medical tests and examinations necessitated by injuries received in an
automobile accident. Tests indicated that Richard Austin did not have,
and never could have had a brain tumor, since they do not disappear by
remission. Eleven months after this discovery, Mr. and Mrs. Austin filed
a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and naming Dr. Litvak and St.
Anthony's Hospital as co-defendants.
B. Holding and Rationale
Reversing the trial court's Order of Summary Judgment in favor of
the defendants, the Supreme Court of Colorado determined in Austin
that the state's statute of repose for medical malpractice claims was un-
constitutional. 6 1 Justice Neighbors, joined by Justices Quinn and
(1976). "[Elven though a large number of states have already adopted one or more of the
[various] malpractice proposals, insurance premiums continue to increase. . . "
Whether legislative reforms can reduce the number of malpractice actions is questionable.
Redish, supra note 3, at 761-62. This scenario may be repeated in Colorado. During the
House floor debates leading to the most recent amendment to Colorado's statute of re-
pose, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 198, evidence was presented that 97 per cent of all medical
malpractice claims are brought within the first two years. S. Res. 150, 51st G.A., 1st Reg.
Sess., H.R. Floor Debate, May 4, 1977, Colo., Tape No. 46A-M2T. Thus, lowering the
period of the statute of repose to three years would have little impact on reducing the
number of medical malpractice suits and, in turn, alleviating the "crisis." In addition,
legislators' conferences with the Insurance Commissioner for the state of Colorado
yielded no assurances that the proposed legislation would lower or even stabilize insur-
ance rates. S. Judiciary Comm. Proceedings, March 9, 1977, Colo., Tape No. 20A-M1T.
Finally, even the representative of the Colorado Medical Association conceded that of the
12 states which he had surveyed that had shortened their statutes of limitations, none had
experienced decreases in insurance premium rates. Iot
60. 682 P.2d at 44.
61. Supra note 35.
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Kirshbaum, concluded that the Colorado statute violated the equal pro-
tection provisions of both the United States and Colorado Constitutions
because it impermissibly distinguished between different classes of
plaintiffs. So finding, the court extended the benefits granted by the
exceptions to include the plaintiff's negligent misdiagnosis claim.
62
The major issue addressed by the court was whether a statute of
repose governing medical malpractice claims which excepted foreign
object and knowing concealment claimants, but did not except negligent
misdiagnosis claimants, 63 denied plaintiffs of the latter class equal pro-
tection guarantees. Applying the rational basis standard, the court con-
cluded that it was a denial. 64
The defendants contended that the court had decided the principal
issue in Mishek v. Stanton6 5 three years earlier.66 The court disagreed,
and distinguished the plaintiff's equal protection challenge in Mishek
from the one at bar.6 7 In Mishek, the plaintiffs attacked the statute of
limitations as a whole, claiming that by distinguishing members of the
medical profession from the rest of society, the statute violated equal
protection principles. 6 8 In the instant case, the court stated that this was
not the issue in question. 69 In determining the appropriate standard to
apply, the court rejected both the strict and intermediate scrutiny tests.
It rejected the former by relying on United States Supreme Court and
state appellate court cases holding that the recovery of damages in tort
does not constitute a fundamental right and that, therefore, the strict
scrutiny standard may not be applied. 70 The court decided against the
latter test as well, declining to address its application to the instant case
62. 682 P.2d at 53.
63. 682 P.2d 41, 52 (Colo. 1984); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CoLo. CONST. art. II,
§ 25. "Foreign object" plaintiffs are those whose cause of action centers around a physi-
cian's negligent act of leaving a foreign object in the plaintiffs body, usually subsequent to
surgery. See Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944). This exception is
probably the most widely accepted basis for application of the discovery rule and excep-
tion to state medical malpractice statutes of repose and statutes of limitations. Supra note
5. Its widespread adoption stems from the belief that foreign object cases do not pose the
evidentiary disadvantages to the defendant posed by other "stale claims" and, that in many
cases, the plaintiff is truly unaware of his or her injury until several years after the negli-
gent act of the doctor. See Allrid v. Emory University, 249 Ga. 35, 285 S.E.2d 521 (1982).
Cases of knowing concealment, also called fraudulent concealment cases, arise when
health care professionals are aware of their negligent infliction of injury on the plaintiff but
intentionally conceal that fact from the victim. Such claimants are often favored by state
legislatures with exceptions to the statute of repose on the ground that "one should not
profit from his wrongful acts." See Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982
(1957).
64. 682 P.2d at 53.
65. 200 Colo. 514, 616 P.2d 135 (1981).
66. 682 P.2d at 48.
67. Id
68. Id. See also Mishek v. Stanton, 616 P.2d at 139.
69. 682 P.2d at 53.
70. 682 P.2d at 49-50 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438
U.S. 59 (1978)); e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 33 Cal. 3d 674, 660
P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555
P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273
Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); State treL
Strykowsky v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1978).
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on the basis that the legislative classification failed under the rational
basis test.
7 '
In Austin, the Colorado Supreme Court identified two distinct
prongs in the rational basis test.7 2 The first requires that the statutory
classification be reasonable and not arbitrary, and that it possess some
rational basis in fact. 73 To pass the second prong of the test, the classifi-
cation must either "bear a rational relationship to legitimate state objec-
tives," or be "reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
interest."' 74 The majority's in-depth examination of the correlation be-
tween legislative goals and classifications resulted in the conclusion that
the statute failed to meet either prong.
75
Following its decision in Owens v. Brockner,76 the court found the
distinctions made between knowing concealment and foreign object
claimants and the claimants of misdiagnosis to be arbitrary for lack of a
reasonable basis in fact.7 7 To support its conclusion, the court observed
that knowing concealment claims are much more likely to pose the evi-
dentiary problems of stale evidence and frivolous claims than are mis-
diagnosis cases. 78 The court also identified a governmental interest in
preserving the causes of action of claimants who have had no reasonable
opportunity to discover the negligence which caused their injury. 79
Thus, the court concluded that since the statute failed to further a legiti-
mate governmental interest, no rational relationship existed.80
The court supported its equal protection analysis with the New
Hampshire case of Carson v. Maurer.8 1 In Carson, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that restricting application of the discovery rule to
foreign object claimants violated the equal protection provision of that
state's constitution, and was not in keeping with the equitable considera-
tions underlying the discovery rule.82 The Supreme Court of Oregon
similarly recognized the inherent unfairness of refusing to extend the
71. 682 P.2d at 50.
72. Id. (citing Hurricane v. Kanover, Ltd., 651 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 1982) and
Smith v. Charnes, 649 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Colo. 1982)).
73. 682 P.2d at 49.
74. Id
75. Id. at 50.
76. In Owens, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970), a case decided before the institu-
tion of a statute of repose in Colorado, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant doctors
had misdiagnosed a brain tumor as malignant when it was, in fact, benign. The plaintiffs'
claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that the discovery rule,
already allowed in cases of concealment and foreign objects, should be extended to cases
of misdiagnosis and all other cases regardless of the type of negligence involved.
77. 682 P.2d at 50.
78. Id The court cites Owens, 474 P.2d at 607, and notes that a course of treatment
prescribed by the physician usually follows a diagnosis. Treatment, therefore, is an objec-
tive fact, the veracity of which can be proved or disproved by persons other than the
plaintiff.
79. 682 P.2d at 50.
80. Id
81. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (plaintiffs challenged several portions of New
Hampshire's statute governing actions for medical injury including provisions regarding
the statute of limitations).
82. Id at 833.
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benefits of the discovery rule to misdiagnosis cases in Frohs v. Greene.8"
While the Austin court also noted contrary decisions8 4 from the Supreme
Courts of Georgia8 5 and Missouri, 86 it chose to follow its own precedent
established in Owens v. Brochner.
8 7
The Austin court chose to remedy the statute's constitutional defects
by extending the discovery rule to the plaintiffs negligent misdiagnosis
claim rather than striking the two exceptions already provided by the
statute of repose.8 8 Again, in view of earlier decisions, the court deter-
mined the former remedy to be the more appropriate choice. 89
In addition to the equal protection question addressed by the court,
four issues of lesser importance were addressed in a more summary
fashion. The plaintiffs and amicus curiae proposed that the Austins'
claim came under both the knowing concealment and the foreign object
exceptions to the statute of repose. The court declined to entertain
either of these theories,90 stating that negligent misdiagnosis was the
gravamen of the plaintiffs' case.9 1 The contention that Mr. Austin had a
foreign object in his skull was rejected on the basis that the object was
placed there for therapeutic purposes with the patient's knowledge and
consent.9 2 The second contention, based on the defendant's knowledge
of tests which indicated that there was no tumor, was based on the know-
ing concealment exception to the statute. The court disposed of this
issue on procedural grounds. 93 The court also refused to address the
83. 253 Or. 1, 452 P.2d 564, 564-65 (1969) (court held that a cause of action based on
misdiagnosis or negligent treatment accrues when discovered or reasonably discoverable).
84. 682 P.2d at 51-52.
85. Allrid v. Emory University, 249 Ga. 35, 285 S.E.2d 521 (1982) (medical malprac-
tice action involving negligent treatment with substance poisonous to the deceased pa-
tient. Plaintiff sued after statutory period had elapsed and suit was barred since it did not
come under an exception. Constitutionality of exclusive foreign object exception upheld).
86. Ross v. Kansas City General Hospital and Medical Center, 608 S.W.2d 397 (Mo.
1980) (surgeon negligently performed sterilization and plaintiffs discovery of the malprac-
tice (subsequent pregnancy) occurred after the termination of the statutory period. Con-
stitutionality of exclusive foreign object exception upheld.).
87. 474 P.2d 603. Owens is particularly authoritative in Colorado, as it followed
Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1949) and Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo.
506, 313 P.2d 982 (1954), both landmark cases in extending the bounds of the discovery
rule. With the Rosane decision, Colorado became one of the first states in the nation to
apply the discovery rule to medical malpractice cases. The foreign object claim, which
would have been barred under the case and statute law of the day, yielded a judicial ration-
ale which has been quoted in a plethora of subsequent cases and law review articles:
"What a mockery to say to one, grievously wronged, 'certainly you had a remedy but while
your debtor concealed from you the fact that you had a right the law stripped you of your
remedy.'" Rosane, 149 P.2d at 376. In Bonebrake, a foreign object case coupled with a
claim of negligent concealment, the court followed Rosane and permitted application of the
discovery rule.
88. 682 P.2d at 53.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 46-47.
91. Id. at 47.
92. Id. The court supported its decision with Shannon v. Thornton, 155 Ga. App. 670,
272 S.E.2d 535 (1980) and Cooper v. Edinbergh, 75 A.D.2d 757, 427 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Ct.
App. 1980).
93. 682 P.2d at 47. The knowing concealment argument was not supported in either
the plaintiffs' trial court brief or in their opening brief to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Plaintiffs failed to come forward with facts supporting their theory in response to defend-
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plaintiffs' due process arguments, choosing to save that issue for an-
other day. 94 In so doing, the majority followed the Mishek opinion in
which the court expressly reserved the question of whether Colorado's
statute of repose was in violation of the due process guarantees of both
the Colorado and United States Constitutions. 95
A final issue in the case was whether the trial court's Summary Judg-
ment Order dismissing St. Anthony's Hospital from the case was
proper.9 6 The court affirmed the lower court on this question, stating
that since the hospital was not itself licensed to practice medicine and no
allegations were made that it was negligent in granting the defendant
staff privileges, there existed no cause of action against St. Anthony's
Hospital.
97
Justice Dubofsky, writing a special concurrence, disagreed with the
majority that the statute of repose violated the equal protection guaran-
tees of the Colorado Constitution, 98 but did not reveal the reasons for
her difference of opinion. Justice Dubofsky did, however, express her
opinion on whether the statute's strict three-year statute of repose vio-
lated constitutional due process guarantees, an issue reserved by the
majority.9 9 Examination of the court's earlier decision in Rosane v.
Senger,10 0 as well as cases from other jurisdictions, 10 1 led her to con-
clude that a vested cause of action could not be barred by the legislature
absent some compelling justification.1 02 In her view, there existed no
such justification. ' 0 3
Justice Rovira concurred with the majority opinion, but he dis-
agreed with the conclusion that the exceptions to the statute of repose
were a violation of the equal protection guarantees of the Colorado
Constitution. 10 4 His opinion was joined by Chief Justice Erickson and
Justice Lohr. The thrust of his dissent was that the majority wrongly
identified the constitutional issue in the case. After refraining the issue,
Justice Rovira cited prior decisions of the court which upheld the legisla-
tive classification in question. He further stated that the determination
of the classes of plaintiffs for whom the statute of repose should be
tolled is within the purview of the legislature and that their decision
should not be disturbed. 1
0 5
ants' affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. Thus, in compliance with Colorado
law governing summary judgments, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the trial court.
94. 682 P.2d at 48.
95. Id (citing Mishek v. Stanton, 200 Colo. 514, 616 P.2d 135 (1981)).
96. 682 P.2d at 53-54.
97. Id at 54.
98. d; CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 25.
99. 682 P.2d at 55.
100. 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 572 (1940).
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III. ANALYSIS
In choosing the rational basis test as its standard of review, the Aus-
tin court applied the correct level of scrutiny for two reasons. From a
purely legal standpoint, it was the appropriate test given the fact that
neither a fundamental right 10 6 nor a suspect class 10 7 was involved; thus,
strict scrutiny was not applicable. From a tactical standpoint, because
rational basis was the most deferential test the court could apply while
still reviewing the legislation, it is impervious to criticism for being too
stringent. The decision to use the rational basis test, therefore,
strengthened the opinion against later attack against the appropriate-
ness of the level of scrutiny chosen.
Additionally, the court's analysis under the rational basis test was,
on the whole, sound. The majority validly concluded that the distinction
made between knowing concealment and foreign object cases and mis-
diagnosis cases, allegedly on the grounds that the former two classes
pose fewer evidentiary problems than the latter class, had no reasonable
basis in fact.
10 8
The court's reasoning on the second prong was somewhat flawed,
106. The recovery of damages in tort is not a fundamental right. 682 P.2d at 49-50
(citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978)). The Duke
court held that limitations imposed by the Price-Anderson Act on the amount of damages
recoverable in tort by nuclear power plant accident victims was not a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Courts in California, Idaho, Indiana
and New Hampshire have determined that the right to recover for injuries is not a funda-
mental right when considering equal protection challenges to their states' medical mal-
practice statutes. See e.g., American Bank & Trust v. Community Hosp., 33 Cal. 3d 674,
660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983), afd 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr.
671 (1984);Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied 431
U.S. 914 (1977);Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980);
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
107. In determining that the exceptions to Colorado's statute of repose did not create a
suspect classification of misdiagnosed plaintiffs, the Austin court followed its holdings in
Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Ed., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) and Pollack v. City and
County of Denver, 194 Colo. 380, 572 P.2d 828 (1977). In both cases, the court held that
"a classification is considered 'suspect' if it singles out religious, racial, or other discrete
and insular minorities such as those based on lineage or alienage." Lujan at 1015 n.8; see
also Pollack at 829. Misdiagnosed claimants, as a group, are not distinguishable from other
medical malpractice claimants on the basis of race, religion, lineage or alienage, and thus
the Austins would not be members of a suspect class.
108. This observation has been noted by courts of several jurisdictions, including Colo-
rado, and by legal scholars as well. In Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 150, 433 P.2d
220 (1967), the Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected the distinction purported to exist be-
tween foreign object cases and misdiagnosis cases. The majority determined that misdiag-
nosis claims are neither more difficult to defend nor more prone to be fraudulent since,
as in the instant case, treatment generally follows diagnosis. The treatment is an
objective fact which may be proved or disproved by people other than the plain-
tiff. The fact that the treatment is the kind normally administered for the ailment
the doctor allegedly improperly diagnosed is strong evidence of the diagnosis.
Id. at 223-24.
This portion of the Yoshizaki opinion was quoted by the Supreme Court of Colorado in
Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970), a case remarkably similar to
Austin. In Owens, the court held that the discovery rule should be extended to all medical
malpractice claims, rather than to foreign object cases exclusively. 474 P.2d at 607.
Other courts have found no valid reason for distinguishing fraudulent concealment
and foreign object claimants from misdiagnosis claimants, stating that it is both unrealistic
and unfair to do so when applying the discovery rule. Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46
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however. Although it is true that the exceptions reveal a governmental
interest in preserving claims where the claimant had no opportunity to
discover his cause of action, the exceptions also manifest the legitimate
governmental interest which is the basis of the statute itself: alleviation,
at least in part, of the "medical malpractice crisis."' 109 Limiting the ex-
ceptions to the statute of repose ensured that that statute will achieve its
remedial purpose. Thus, it can be argued that the limitation of the
number of exceptions furthers the legitimate governmental objective of
maintaining the availability of health care for all of society. 110 The ma-
jority's opinion failed to address this argument in its analysis of the cor-
relation between the classifications created by the exceptions and the
legitimate governmental objectives.
Even so, the course chosen by the court to remedy the equal protec-
tion dilemma posed by the exception was appropriate and in keeping
with its past decisions."'1 And, although it may seem sweeping in some
respects, the decision is actually an example of judicial restraint. For
example, the majority chose to adhere to the conservative stance it took
in Mishek ' 12 rather than decide whether Colorado's unusually strict stat-
ute of repose violated the due process provisions of the constitution.' 
13
The court did not throw open the floodgates and decide that any distinc-
tion between classes of medical malpractice plaintiffs violated equal pro-
tection guarantees, thus making the discovery rule available to all
medical malpractice plaintiffs, as has been done in other jurisdictions. 1
4
Ill.2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170
(1977); Frohs v. Greene, 253 Or. 1, 452 P.2d 564 (1969).
In addition, "most of the evidence necessary to prove or defend against liability is
likely to be documentary in nature. It is not the kind of evidence that is lost or becomes
unreliable as time passes. . . .Certainly, doctors and hospitals meticulously maintain and
store records of patient treatments." Raymond, 371 A.2d 170 at 176 relying on, Note,
Recent Developments in Wisconsin Medical Malpractice Law, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 893, 897 (1974).
See Comment, Medical Malpractice Statutes of Limitation: Uniform Extension of the Discovery Rule,
55 IowA L. REV. 486 at 492 (1969); see also Note, Discovery Rule, Hays v. Hall, Gaddis v.
Smith, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 536 at 541 (1973). See generally D. LOuISE.LL & H. WILLIAMs,
supra note 15, at 7.10 n.48.
Finally, it has been noted that passage of time creates just as many evidentiary difficul-
ties for plaintiffs who have the burden of presenting a prima facie case as for defendants.
Yoshizaki, 433 P.2d at 223; Drill & Hambleton, Applying Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of
Repose, 19 TRIAL 106 (1983).
109. Supra note 55.
110. S. Res. Bill 150, 51st G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., H.R. Floor Debate, May 4, 1977, Colo.,
Tape No. 20A-MIT.
111. In both People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977) and R. McG. v.
j.W., 200 Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666 (1980), the Colorado Supreme Court chose to remedy
statutory provisions which violated equal protection guarantees by affording the petition-
ers the benefits conferred upon the group favored by the classification, rather than correct
the violation by abrogating the benefits of the statute for all classes.
112. 200 Colo. 514, 616 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1981).
113. 682 P.2d at 53. See 1 D. LouISELL & H. WILAMts, supra note 15, at 13.14 (survey
of the statutes of limitation and repose of all the states in the country reveals that the three
year Colorado statute is one of the shortest); legislators speaking at the floor debates in
the Colorado Senate also noticed that the proposed amendment would take Colorado out
of the mainstream, making its statute of limitations one of the shortest in the country. S.
Res. 150, 52nd G.A. 1st Reg. Sess., S. Floor Debate, March 18, 1977, Colo., Tape No.
27A-M2T.
114. E.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
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Furthermore, the majority stressed throughout its opinion that it was
making a narrow ruling on a narrow issue and that its inquiry was lim-
ited to the statute as applied to the facts of the case at bar. 51 5 The rem-
edy is in keeping with this approach and is thereby deferential to the
legislature. Rather than tolling the statute for all medical malpractice
claimants, it only does so for those claiming misdiagnosis.
The court's decision in Austin reflects a trend toward plaintiffs'
rights, not only in Colorado but in the nation as a whole."l 6 Other Col-
orado decisions, such as Bonfls v. Public Utilities Commission11 7 and Lamb
v. Powder River Livestock Company, s"8 illustrate the state's longstanding
commitment to plaintiffs' rights and its view that claimants should not
be denied access to the court.1 19 Additionally, another statute of limita-
tion favoring some groups at the expense of others has been challenged
and found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.' 20 Thus, the
court's decision in Austin v. Litvak is consistent with the jurisprudential
direction of this state.
Several states have promulgated remedial legislation in response to
the perceived malpractice crisis; most of the legislation has not with-
stood constitutional challenges. 12 ' Thirty-six states have declared,
either by legislation or in the courts, that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers or has an opportunity to
discover his cause of action. 122 Furthermore, courts in California, Illi-
115. 682 P.2d at 53.
116. See supra note 108.
117. 67 Colo. 563, 189 P.2d 775 (1920).
118. 132 F. 434 (8th Cir. 1904).
119. In Bonfils v. Public Util. Comm'n, 67 Colo. 563, 189 P.2d 775 (1920), the court
held that a statute of limitations providing no time whatsoever in which to bring an action
is not a "reasonable time" as recognized by the Colorado Constitution. The court in
Lamb v. Powder River Livestock Company, 132 F. 434 (8th Cir. 1904) held that statutes of
limitation are subject to the fundamental principle that a reasonable time must be given
for the plaintiff to exercise his right of action.
120. The court in McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Colo.
1980) ruled that COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127 (1973), a statute of limitation applying only
to contractors, violated the equal protection provisions of both the federal and state con-
stitutions because it created classifications with no reasonable relation to the government
objectives of the statute.
121. Redish, supra note 3, at 762 (several state courts have already invalidated legisla-
tive malpractice proposals on the basis of federal and state constitutional objections); see
Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Haggerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); see also Diamond v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981). See generally McGovern, The Variety,
Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579 (1981);
Taylor & Shields, Limitation on Recovery in Medical Negligence Cases in Virginia, 16 U. RicH. L.
REV. 799, 836 (1982); Note, Ohio's Attempts to Halt the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Effective or
Meaningless?, 9 U. DAYrON L. REV. 361, 374 (1984).
122. Note, Denial ofa Remedy, 8 COLUM.J. OF ENvrL. L. 161, 170 n.55 (1982). In Oliver
v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 449 N.E.2d 438 (Ohio 1983), the court held that the
discovery rule applied to all medical malpractice claims, overruling cases to the contrary.
Courts in the following states have handed down similar decisions: California, Hawaii,
Illinois, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. See
Note, Ohios Attempts to Halt the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Effective or Meaningless ?, 9 U. DAY-
TON L. REv. 361, 367 (1984). See generally S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANs, THE AMERICAN
LAW OF TORTS 102247 (1983).
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nois, New York, Washington, and Idaho have specifically found that leg-
islative classifications which disfavor misdiagnosis claimants while
benefiting others are in violation of equal protection guarantees. 12 3 In-
deed, the outcome of Austin v. Litvak was foreshadowed not only by
events in other states, but also by the legislative debates preceding the
passage of Colorado's statute of repose. Tapes of the floor debate indi-
cate that certain senators warned that the statute would never withstand
the scrutiny of the supreme court due to its equal protection viola-
tions. 12 4 It must be noted, however, that at least one observer has noted
a recent trend in the opposite direction, away from the discovery
rule. 1
2 5
The Austin decision is likely to affect the relatively small segment of
society made up of negligent misdiagnosis claimants much more heavily
than society as a whole. Despite forecasts of the unavailability of health
care which resulted in the enactment of Colorado's strict three-year stat-
ute of repose and the truncation of the discovery rule, extending the
benefits of the statute's exceptions to one additional class of plaintiffs
should not have a significant effect on either the availability or the cost
of health care in this state for several reasons. First, as discussed earlier
in this comment, the very existence of a malpractice crisis in the nation
in general, and in Colorado in particular, has been questioned by courts,
legal scholars, and legislators. 126 Second, even assuming such a crisis
exists in the state of Colorado, the ability of this statute to have any
positive remedial effect is questionable both in theory and in fact.
127
Third, because of the narrowness of the court's holding and its remedy,
the Austin decision's greatest significance is its precedent. Austin could
conceivably foreshadow a holding that the discovery rule must apply
across the board as was the case in New Hampshire.12 8 This would, in
effect, abrogate the entire statute of repose in this area. The fact that
the court has thus far refused to address the due process issue1 2 9 indi-
cates its current uneasiness with extending the holding of Austin.
CONCLUSION
In future years, historians may characterize the flurry of legislative
123. Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal. 2d 338, 217 P.2d 422 (1950) (brain tumor erroneously
diagnosed as malignant and breast removed unnecessarily as result); Lipsey v. Michael
Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970) (malignant tumor wrongly diagnosed as
benign-discovery rule extended); Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found., 5 Ohio St.
3d 111, 449 N.E.2d 438 (1983) (cancer misdiagnosis case, discovery rule extended);
Janisch v. Mullins, 1 Wash. App. 393, 461 P.2d 895 (1969), review dismissed by stipulation, 78
Wash. 2d 997 (1970) (negligent diagnosis, negligent reading of X-ray caused blindness,
discovery rule extended); see Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1970); see
also Camire v. United States, 535 F.2d 749 (2nd Cir. 1976).
124. See supra note 55.
125. Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96
HARv. L. REV. 1683, 1683 (1983).
126. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 59.
128. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
129. Austin, 682 P.2d at 48.
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activity surrounding medical malpractice statutes of limitation and re-
pose across the country and in Colorado as a well-intentioned but mis-
guided overreaction to a phantom crisis.
In Austin v. Litvak, the Supreme Court of Colorado functions in its
most important and traditional capacity as the mediator between the
current demands of society and the time-honored principles of the con-
stitution. The court held that the narrow exceptions to the state statute
of repose created constitutionally invalid classifications and were viola-
tive of the plaintiff's equal protection rights as guaranteed by the Colo-
rado and United States Constitutions. The law in question tolled the
statutory period for foreign object and concealment cases but granted
no such exception for misdiagnosis claimants. The court wisely chose
the most deferential standard of review for its examination of this stat-
ute, although it inaccurately identified the legitimate governmental pur-
pose. Even so, the legislative classification at issue bears no rational
correlation to the true legislative objective of the statute.
Before enacting further legislation in this area, Colorado lawmakers
must strive to obtain verifiable and unbiased data regarding the extent
of the medical malpractice crisis in this state and the effectiveness of
different legislative schemes purporting to solve the problem. Only
then will legislators be in a position to truly benefit the community with




PEOPLE V. MITCHELL: THE GOOD FArrH EXCEPTION
IN COLORADO
INTRODUCTION
In People v. Mitchell, ' the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's suppression of evidence seized in the course of executing an
arrest warrant later held invalid. Relying on Whiteley v. Warden,2 the
court held that the arrest warrant was void and could not support a
search incident to the arrest. Of greater interest and contrary to the
state's assertion, the court found that the facts in the case did not war-




The recently enacted good faith statute is Colorado's response to a
national trend toward limiting the exclusionary remedy to those situa-
tions in which the police officer seizing the evidence has reason to be-
lieve he is violating the fourth amendment. Despite its proponents'
claims that only the remedy is affected, an analysis of the exclusionary
rule's constitutional basis reveals the dangers posed by the good faith
exception to well-established fourth amendment principles.
A. Development of the Exclusionary Rule
Although Weeks v. United States4 is often cited as the seminal exclu-
sionary rule case, Weeks was only one of several early Supreme Court
cases that developed the exclusionary remedy for fourth amendment vi-
olations. In Boyd v. United States,5 decided before Weeks, the Supreme
Court excluded evidence "seized" pursuant to a government subpoena
because the subpoena violated defendant's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. In Weeks, the Court excluded evidence seized
in an illegal search and held that exclusion of wrongfully seized evidence
from federal court proceedings was required by the Constitution 6 and
1. 678 P.2d 990 (Colo. 1984).
2. 401 U.S. 560 (1971). In that case, the United States Supreme Court suppressed
evidence seized in a search incident to an arrest because the arrest warrant was issued
based on an insufficient affidavit of probable cause.
3. COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-3-308 (Supp. 1984).
4. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
6. The Court in Weeks held the exclusionary rule to be constitutionally required:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
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by considerations of judicial integrity. 7
It was not until 1949 that the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the fourth amendment, including the exclusionary rule, also ap-
plied to state courts. 8 In a departure from its earlier stated constitu-
tional basis for the exclusionary rule, the Court separated the right from
the remedy and held that although states were compelled to observe
fourth amendment rights through the fourteenth amendment, they were
free to develop alternative remedies for fourth amendment violations. 9
Twelve years later in Mapp v. Ohio,' 0 the Court overruled its decision in
Wolf and held that state courts were obliged to exclude unconstitution-
ally seized evidence. I I Thus, at the time of the Mapp decision, the exclu-
sionary rule had become an inseparable element of the fourth
amendment. It was not long, however, before the attack began.
B. The Deterrence Rationale
While much of the Court's opinion in Mapp was grounded in con-
cerns for the preservation of judicial integrity12 and in the need to en-
sure that victims of fourth amendment violations were accorded a
meaningful remedy,' 3 subsequent Court decisions have significantly
eroded Mapp by limiting the holding to a narrow concept of deterring
police misconduct. 14 In effect, the deterrence rationale has replaced the
judicial integrity rationale that was of paramount importance to the
court in Mapp as the primary, if not sole, rationale for invoking the ex-
clusionary rule. 15
7. The Court was also concerned with the integrity of the courts:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures ... should find no sanction in the judg-
ments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Consti-
tution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights.
Id at 392.
8. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
9. Id at 31.
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. The issue of whether Wolf v. Colorado should be overruled and the exclusionary
rule applied to the states was not argued at the state court level by the defendant. Rather,
it was first raised in an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court. Id at 646 n.3.
12. The Court warned that "[nlothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."
Id at 659.
13. Referring to the application of the fourth amendment to the states in Wolf, the
Court held that "we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise." Id at
660.
14. While critics of the exclusionary rule have narrowed the concept of deterrence to
the behavior of the individual police officer at the time he or she is committing the fourth
amendment violation, proponents of the exclusionary rule argue that the deterrent ration-
ale is valid only if it encompasses a system-wide deterrence achieved by the knowledge that
all evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment will be excluded. See Ashdown,
Good Faith, The Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule Oriented Adjudication in the Criminal Process, 24
WM. & MARY L. Rv. 335, 339 n.14 (1983); Ingber, Dending The Citadek The Dangerous
Attack of "Reasonable Good Faith", 36 VAND. L. Rv. 1511, 1542-44 (1983); Mertens & Was-
serstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing
the Law, 70 GEO. LJ. 365, 431-32 (1981).
15. It is felt by some that, for all practical purposes, the judicial integrity rationale has
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The substitution of the deterrence rationale has resulted in the
Court admitting evidence despite fourth amendment violations in those
instances where it has felt that suppression of the evidence would not
deter future unlawful police conduct. 16 Thus, for example, unlawfully
obtained evidence is admissible in grand jury proceedings, 17 in federal
civil proceedings,' 8 to impeach defendant's testimony at trial, 19 when
seized pursuant to a statute that is later declared unconstitutional,2 0 and
when it is used against someone other than the person whose fourth
amendment rights were violated.
2 1
Closely connected to the emergence of the deterrence rationale is
the Court's use of a balancing test to determine whether the exclusion-
ary rule should be invoked in cases of police misconduct. The exclu-
sionary remedy is now available when there is a violation of fourth
amendment rights and when, in the Court's judgment, the benefits of
increased deterrence outweigh the costs of freeing criminals.2 2 In this
way, the Court has significantly limited the application of the exclusion-
ary remedy, leaving in doubt the degree to which the exclusionary rule is
perceived as a constitutionally required remedy.
23
C. The Good Faith Exception
The latest effort to restrict the exclusionary rule is the reasonable
good faith exception. Proponents of this exception argue that the deter-
rence goal is not furthered when a police officer, acting in good faith,
does not know he is violating the fourth amendment. 24 Appended to
been abandoned. See Ashdown, supra note 14, at 338; Jensen and Hart, The Good Faith
Restatement of the Exclusionary Rule, 73J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 916, 918 (1982). But see
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968), in which the Courts warned that "[clourts which sit
under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the con-
stitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of
such invasions."
16. But see United States v.Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), which retroactively applied
the holding in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), that police must obtain a search
warrant before entering a suspect's home to make an arrest. In rejecting the government's
argument that retroactive application would not serve the purposes of the exclusionary
rule, the Court explained that "[i]f, as the Government argues, all rulings resolving unset-
ded Fourth Amendment questions should be nonretroactive, then, in close cases, law en-
forcement officials would have little incentive to err on the side of constitutional
behavior." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 561 (footnote omitted).
17. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
18. United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
19. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
20. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
21. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
22. In all the cases cited supra notes 17-21, the Court applied the balancing test and
held that the benefits could not justify the costs of suppressing the evidence.
23. In a recent law review article, former Supreme Court Justice Stewart explored the
basis of the exclusionary rule and concluded that the exclusionary rule is a remedy re-
quired by the fourth amendment. For further development of this theory, as well as
others, see Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond- The Origins, Development and Fu-
ture of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1380-89
(1983).
24. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3419 (1984); United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 542 (1975). It has been suggested by many that the solution does not lie in
further limiting of the exclusionary rule, but rather in creating so-called "bright lines"
1985]
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this subjective standard is the objective requirement that such ignorance
be reasonable. Due in part to the primacy of the deterrence rationale
and the balancing test, and in part because of the growing realization
among criminal justice experts that the Court opinions which form
much of fourth amendment law are unclear and difficult to apply,2 5 the
good faith exception has become a major topic in fourth amendment
law.
Although the exact origins of the good faith exception are un-
clear,26 the reasonable good faith exception first received national atten-
tion as a result of Justice White's dissent in Stone v. Powell.2 7 He
suggested that the time had come to modify the exclusionary rule by
incorporating therein a two-pronged subjective/objective good faith
standard. In Justice White's view, a police officer should first have to
show a good faith belief that his conduct was in accordance with the
law.28 He should next be obligated to show reasonable grounds to sup-
port that belief.2 9 Thus, if the officer knew or should have known that
the search was unconstitutional under the fourth amendment, the exclu-
sionary rule would result in suppression of the evidence.
Four years later, in United States v. Williams,30 considered the
landmark case on the good faith exception, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted a reasonable good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule in an alternate disposition of the case. Explaining that no deter-
rence would be achieved by suppression and that the costs to society
could not justify the benefits where a good faith error was made, 3 ' the
Fifth Circuit became the first federal court to adopt the good faith
exception.
Although there was some expression of support among the
Supreme Court justices for the good faith exception,3 2 it took some time
for those favoring the exception to gather the necessary majority. In
which are clear-cut guidelines articulating permissible investigatory practices. In this way,
a police officer who has violated the fourth amendment cannot be said to have done so in
good faith if his behavior lay outside those practices declared permissible. For greater
development of this theory, see LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Pro-
cedures'" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 127.
25. Jensen & Hart, supra note 15, at 924-28. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 490-91 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974), the Court observed that
"[w]here the official action was pursued in complete good faith,. . . the deterrence ration-
ale loses much of its force." Given the Court's predilection for not invoking the exclusion-
ary rule where police deterrence is deemed unlikely (see supra notes 17-21 and
accompanying text) this observation by the Court in Tucker created the necessary basis for
a good faith exception.
27. 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
28. Id at 538.
29. Id
30. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
31. "Mhe exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or flagrant actions by police, not
reasonable, good-faith ones. Where the reason for the rule ceases, its application must
cease also. The costs to society of applying the rule beyond the purposes it exists to serve
are simply too high ....... Idl at 840.
32. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983) (White, J., concurring); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. at 501-02 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-
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1982, after hearing oral arguments on the fourth amendment violation
at issue in Illinois v. Gates,3 3 the Supreme Court set the case for reargu-
ment on the issue of whether a reasonable, good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule should be adopted.3 4 The Court subsequently opted,
however, to decide the case on other grounds because the good faith
issue had not been raised at the state court level.
3 5
Finally, in United States v. Leon,3 6 the Supreme Court adopted a rea-
sonable good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.3 7 Beginning with
the premise that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally required,
and by following the deterrent rationale and balancing test approaches,
the Court determined that an analysis of the costs and benefits of ex-
cluding evidence seized by officers relying in good faith on a warrant
"leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissible in the
prosecution's case-in-chief."
3 8
In applying the good faith exception rule, the Court indicated that
courts should focus upon the objective reasonableness of the officer's
conduct, rather than upon the officer's subjective good faith.3 9 The
Court ruled that each trial court must decide whether its good faith anal-
ysis will follow an inquiry into the fourth amendment violation pleaded
in the case. 40 While it remains for future courts to interpret the extent to
which the good faith exception of Leon will apply, it is already apparent
that by adopting the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the
Court has reduced the protection of the fourth amendment.
4 1
II. FACTS
The relevant facts in People v. Mitchell42 were undisputed. The de-
fendant was stopped by a Greenwood Village police officer for speeding.
12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542 (1975) (Rehn-
quist, J.).
33. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
34. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028 (1982) (mem.).
35. Gates, 462 U.S. at 217.
36. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
37. On that same day, the Court applied the Leon good faith exception to a companion
case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984), in which the search warrant had
been held invalid for failure to identify with particularity the items for which the police
were searching.
38. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3416.
39. In opting for an objective standard, the Court quoted from Justice White's con-
curring opinion in Gates: "Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness, how-
ever, retains the value of the exclusionary rule as an incentive for the law enforcement
profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth Amendment." let
at 3420 n.20 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 261 n.15 (White, J., concurring)).
40. 104 S. Ct. at 3422-23. One wonders what will happen to the development of
fourth amendment law if courts are free to apply an exception to the remedy for a fourth
amendment violation, without ever deciding that a violation has occurred. See Ashdown,
supra note 14, at 343.
41. Justice Brennan expressed the fears of many by lamenting that "in case after case,
I have witnessed the Court's gradual but determined strangulation of the rule. It now
appears that the Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete." 104 S. Ct. at
3430 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
42. 678 P.2d 990 (Colo. 1984).
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Following established procedure, the officer took defendant's driver's
license and radioed the police station to determine whether there were
any outstanding arrest warrants for defendant. Upon searching the
computer files, the dispatcher determined that a Greenwood Village
arrest warrant had been issued in defendant's name for failure to pay a
traffic fine. This information was confirmed by the dispatcher's manual
check of the warrant files.
43
On the basis of this information, the officer arrested the defendant
and transported him to the Greenwood Village police station. During a
search of the defendant, a small vial was discovered in his pocket and
seized. An analysis revealed that the vial contained cocaine, and the de-
fendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance.4 4 After
the search, it was discovered that the original arrest warrant had been
issued in error; prior to the issuance of the arrest warrant the defendant
had paid the traffic fine. 4 5 Upon this discovery, the defendant filed a
motion to suppress the evidence seized from the search incident to his
arrest.
4 6
At the suppression hearing the state agreed that the defendant had
"timely paid the traffic fine" and that the arrest warrant had been erro-
neously issued.4 7 The district court granted the defendant's motion to
suppress since the defendant had been arrested pursuant to a void war-
rant. From that ruling the state took an interlocutory appeal to the state
supreme court alleging that the Colorado good faith statute48 was appli-
cable to the case and that the district court erred in not applying that
statute to what the state alleged had been a "good faith mistake" or
"technical violation" on the part of the arresting officer.
III. INSTANT CASE
A. Majority Opinion
The Colorado Supreme Court's resolution of two issues in Mitchell
43. Id. at 991.
44. Id. at 992. See CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 12-22-310(l)(a)(v), 18-18-105(1)(a) (Supp.
1984).
45. Justice Rovira, in his dissenting opinion, raises the question of whether the traffic
fine was, in fact, paid prior to the issuance of the warrant, and states that the record is
unclear on that point. Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 999 n.2 (RoviraJ., dissenting). He concludes
that such a determination is irrelevant. lId However, that issue is of major importance. It
was Mitchell's paying of the fine prior to the issuance of the warrant that rendered the
warrant void for lack of any facts supporting its issuance. lId at 992 n.2. The record is not
ambiguous as to which event occurred first, the payment of the fine or the issuance of the
warrant, id, and both parties agreed in their briefs to the Colorado Supreme Court that
the traffic fine was timely paid, and that the arrest warrant had been issued in error. See
Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, People v. Mitchell, 678 P.2d 990 (Colo. 1984);
Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 2, People v. Mitchell, 678 P.2d 990 (Colo. 1984).
46. 678 P.2d at 992.
47. Itd
48. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-3-308 (Supp. 1984). In pertinent part, that statute pro-
vides "[e]vidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be sup-
pressed by the trial court if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace
officer. . . as a result of a good faith mistake or of a technical violation."
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summarily foreclosed the state's argument that the district court had
erred in suppressing the evidence. Thus, the court affirmed the district
court's ruling.
1. Constitutional Standards
The first issue addressed by the court was whether the arrest vio-
lated the fourth amendment as an unlawful seizure of a person.4 9 Rely-
ing exclusively on the United States Supreme Court decision in Whiteley
v. Warden,50 the Colorado court concluded that the suppression of evi-
dence under the facts in Whiteley required a similar result in the instant
case. The Whiteley decision concerned an arrest warrant issued on the
basis of a conclusory complaint that did not provide support for prob-
able cause. 5 1 A radio bulletin was issued announcing the warrant and an
officer in another part of the state, relying on the bulletin, arrested
Whiteley.
In the course of a search incident to the arrest, burglary tools and
items taken in the burglary were seized. In addition to finding that the
information acquired by the arresting officer was not corroborative of
the fact that Whiteley had committed the crime, the Court rejected the
state's argument that the police bulletin itself constituted the requisite
probable cause for the arrest. 5 2 Contrary to the state's suggestion, the
arrest warrant was fatally deficient from its inception, and the fact that
other officers had no choice but to rely on it could not make constitu-
tionally valid that which was unconstitutional.
53
Following Whiteley, the court in Mitchell found unpersuasive the fact
that the arresting officer was required to arrest Mitchell based on the
information relayed to him by the dispatcher. An arrest warrant issued
49. The Colorado Constitution has a provision identical to the fourth amendment,
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7, and it also was deemed violated by the arrest here. Mitchell, 678
P.2d at 996.
50. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
51. Id at 565.
In Whiteley, the Court noted that "[t]he actual basis for Sheriff Ogburn's conclusion
was an informer's tip, but that fact, as well as every other operative fact, is omitted from
the complaint." Id. Although the determination of whether probable cause exists in a
particular situation is fraught with uncertainty, the definition of probable cause is well-
settled. Probable cause to arrest exists when the officer has knowledge of facts and cir-
cumstances from reasonably trustworthy information and those facts and circumstances
are sufficient in themselves to warrant in a man of reasonable caution the belief that the
accused has committed an offense or is committing an offense. E.g. McCray v. Illinois. 386
U.S. 300 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). As its very name implies, probable
cause involves probabilities, and the information known to the officer need not be suffi-
cient to establish guilt. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). Magistrates issuing arrest warrants are similarly obligated to
determine whether the officer's affidavit alleges facts sufficient upon which to base a find-
ing of probable cause. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); FED. R. ClUM. P.
4(a).
52. Whitely, 401 U.S. at 567-68.
53. In acknowledging the propriety of the arresting officer's conduct, the court
warned that although police officers are entitled to assume that an arrest warrant taken out
by a fellow officer is supported by probable cause, "[w]here ... the contrary turns out to
be true, an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of
the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest." Id at 568.
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without probable cause is void ab initio and any evidence seized thereun-
der must be suppressed. 54 The court found the rule in Whiteley to be
even more readily applicable to Mitchell's situation because there was no
factual basis of any kind for the arrest warrant issued by Greenwood
Village.5 5
In continuing its analysis, the court distinguished Hill v. California.
56
In that case, probable cause existed for the issuance of the arrest war-
rant. The mere fact that the officers arrested another, thinking he was
Hill, could not defeat the validity of the underlying warrant. Finding
that it was reasonably probable that the person arrested was Hill, the
Court held the officers' actions to be constitutional and permitted the
evidence seized in the search to be used against Hill.5 7 The Mitchell
court concluded that Hill did not address the issue of the validity of an
arrest warrant which was not founded on probable cause, while Whiteey
addressed precisely that issue. 58 Accordingly, applying Whiteley, the
court found that Mitchell's arrest violated his constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
2. Applicability of the Good Faith Statute
In ruling that Colorado's good faith statute 59 did not apply to the
facts in Mitchell, the court pointed out that it was merely applying the
statute as written and was not ruling on its constitutionality. 60 The good
faith statute is divided into good faith mistakes and technical violations
each of which was discussed separately by the court.
The court noted that the statutory definition of "good faith mis-
take"-an error in facts that if true would otherwise be probable cause-
was merely a redefinition of probable cause and would not operate to
change federal exclusionary rule law.6 1 There was no evidence, the
court concluded, that the arresting officer had relied on mistaken facts.
Rather, he had relied on a warrant that had been mistakenly issued. The
court ruled that a good faith mistake could not be found within the
meaning of the Colorado good faith statute without a showing of factual
error underlying the issuance of the warrant.
62
54. Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 992 n.2.
55. IA at 993.
56. 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
57. Id. at 804.
58. Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 994.
59. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-3-308 (Supp. 1984).
60. 678 P.2d at 994-95.
61. Id at 995.
Noting that the statutory definition of good faith mistake includes "reasonable judg-
mental errors of fact made by an officer in applying for or in executing a warrant, or simi-
lar factual errors made by a court in issuing a warrant," the court found that, "[v]iewed in
this light, the statutory definition of 'good faith mistake' serves to make explicit what is
already implicit in federal exclusionary rule doctrine." Id (citation omitted).
62. The court noted that no evidence was presented at the suppression hearing con-
cerning the reason the arrest warrant was mistakenly issued. Without such a "factual pred-
icate" the court had no basis to find a "good faith mistake" on the part of the arresting
officer. The court, thus, at least suggests that its ruling might have been different if the
reasons behind the issuance of the arrest warrant were known. Id at 995-96.
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In concluding that there had been no technical violation, the court
relied in part on its conclusion that there were no facts to support a
finding of good faith mistake. Technical violation, as applicable to the
facts in Mitchell,63 is defined as "a reasonable good faith reliance upon
. . . a warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake
.... ,,64 Again, the court pointed out that there was no evidence that
the warrant had been issued in reliance on certain facts which later
proved to be false. Instead, the warrant failed because the evidence
showed that there had been no facts to justify its issuance. 65 In sum, the
majority concluded that the Colorado good faith statute would not per-
mit the introduction of evidence seized during an arrest based on an
invalid arrest warrant.
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Rovira's dissenting opinion 66 relied on Hill v. California
67
and on decisions by several state courts68 for the proposition that, by
the existence of the warrant, whether issued erroneously or not, the of-
ficer in Mitchell had probable cause to make the arrest. 6 9 Although the
Court in Hill found that probable cause existed for the issuance of the
arrest warrant and that no fourth amendment violation had occurred,
Justice Rovira concluded that Hill was applicable to the facts of Mitchell.
He argued that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to Mitchell
because no deterrence would be achieved by doing so.7 0 This position
is confusing because under Hill the arrest in Mitchell would not have vio-
lated the fourth amendment. Without a fourth amendment violation,
there is no need to apply the exclusionary rule and no need to deter-
mine whether deterrence would be achieved by its application.
The dissenting justice further argued that when other jurisdictions
were faced with facts similar to those in Mitchell, they found the initial
63. The definition of technical violation in section 16-3-308(2)(b) of the Colorado Re-
vised Statutes includes a good faith reliance on a statute later ruled unconstitutional and a
good faith reliance on a court precedent later overturned, neither of which is applicable to
the situation in Mitchell. CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 16-3-308(2)(b) (Supp. 1984).
64. Id
65. The court concluded that:
Whatever the outer limit of the "technical violation" exception might be, we are
satisfied that it was not intended to encompass an arrest warrant that is totally
devoid of any factual support and comes into being only as the result of some
unexplained mistake on the part of the issuing court. The defect in such a war-
rant is a fundamental one, far beyond the purview of a "technical violation."
Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 996.
66. Id at 996 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
67. 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
68. Childress v. United States, 381 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1977); Patterson v. United States,
301 A.2d 67 (D.C. 1973); New Jersey v. Cross, 164 NJ. Super. 368, 396 A.2d 604 (1978);
People v. Lent, 105 Misc. 2d 831, 433 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1980), rev'd, 92 A.D.2d 941, 460
N.Y.S.2d 369 (1983); State v. Somfleth, 8 Or. App. 171, 492 P.2d 808 (1972); Common-
wealth v. Riley, 284 Pa. Super. 280, 425 A.2d 813 (1981).
69. 678 P.2d at 997.
70. Id at 998. Essentially he argues that no deterrence would be achieved by applying
the exclusionary rule to Mitchell and that "the cost of applying the rule in a case such as
this would outweigh any deterrent effect it might achieve." Id (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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arrest to be supported by probable cause and, therefore, not a violation
of the fourth amendment.7 1 Justice Rovira cited six state court cases in
which the information upon which the arrest was based later turned out
to be incorrect. In all six cases the state courts permitted introduction
of evidence seized in the course of the arrest. 72 However, there is a
critical distinction between those cases and the Mitchell case. In all but
one of those cases, the original arrest warrants or stolen car reports
were validly issued, but were rendered incorrect because of events which
followed their issuance. 73  In the remaining case, State v. Sorfieth,
74
based on reliable information and suspicious behavior by defendant,
75
the officers suspected the defendant of being involved in a recent nar-
cotics burglary and, thus, approached him for questioning.7 6 A routine
check showed that the defendant was absent without leave from the mili-
tary service and he was detained on the basis of that information. 7 7 Af-
ter a search at the station house in which illegal drugs were discovered
on the defendant, the AWOL report was found to be incorrect. 78 Be-
cause the Court in Somfleth held that the officers had probable cause to
arrest and search defendant based on the drug-related information and
observations, 7 9 that case is inapposite to the facts of Mitchell.
Justice Rovira concludes his dissent by indicating that he and the
majority view the exclusionary rule differently: while he favors a case-
by-case analysis of whether the rule's deterrent effect would be achieved,
the majority, he believes, has adopted a per se approach.8 0 Because of
his differing approach to the exclusionary rule, Justice Rovira would find
that there was probable cause to arrest Mitchell. 8 '
71. Id. at 998-99.
72. Id. at 999-1000.
73. Childress v. United States, 381 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1977); People v. Lent, 105 Misc. 2d
831, 433 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1980) rev'd, 92 A.D.2d 941, 460 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1983); and Com-
monwealth v. Riley, 284 Pa. Super. 280, 425 A.2d 813 (1981), all involved arrest warrants
that were satisfied through actions of the defendants, but were not canceled on nationwide
information systems or other police records. In Riley and Childress the defendants were
arrested four days after the warrants should have been canceled and in Lent the delay was a
matter of nine hours. Patterson v. United States, 301 A.2d 67 (D.C. 1973) and NewJersey
v. Cross, 164 N.J. Super. 368, 396 A.2d 604 (1978) concerned stolen car reports which
were not canceled after the stolen cars at issue had been retrieved.
74. 8 Or. App. 171, 492 P.2d 808 (1972).
75. The officers observed defendant stomping a hypodermic needle into the pave-
ment and noted his difficulty in locating his billfold and papers after being asked for iden-
tification. 492 P.2d at 809.
76. Id.
77. Id, at 809-10.
78. The facts as set forth in the opinion are unclear whether there was ever any basis
for the AWOL report or whether defendant had already dealt with the military authorities
on the AWOL question. Id. at 810.
79. Id. at 811. When the officers asked defendant to get out of his car, they addition-
ally noted that he exhibited signs of being under the influence of alcohol and in possession
of narcotics. Defendant's walk was uncertain, his speech was slurred and incoherent, and
although he claimed to have been drinking heavily, the officers could not detect any sign of
alcohol. Id.
80. Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 1000.
81. Justice Rovira failed to make the important distinction between whether a fourth
amendment violation had occurred, and whether a particular fourth amendment violation
is entitled to the sanction of the exclusionary rule.
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IV. ANALYSIS
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when the demise of the exclusionary
rule began, but there can be no doubt that the exclusionary rule is no
longer the stronghold of fourth amendment guarantees that it was at the
time of Mapp v. Ohio. 8 2 This is clearly illustrated in the state and dissent
arguments in Mitchell.83 The state argued that a search pursuant to an
arrest, which blatantly violated one of defendant's constitutional
rights,8 4 should be upheld because the police officer could not have
known the arrest warrant was invalid and, thus, acted in good faith.
Despite Justice Rovira's dissenting opinion, the court could not
have reached any other conclusion under the facts in Mitchell. At the
time of the Mitchell opinion, the United States Supreme Court had not
adopted a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and, thus, the
Colorado court's analysis was limited to the applicability of the good
faith statute.8 5 In order for the statute to survive constitutional scru-
tiny,86 it could not diminish fourth amendment rights8 7 by dispensing
with the requirement of probable cause. That, in effect, would be the
result of denying the remedy of suppression to one whose privacy was
unreasonably invaded by an arrest and search unsupported by probable
cause. 88 Accordingly, the court correctly limited the Colorado statute to
those situations already excepted from application of the exclusionary
rule.89
A. Probable Cause
Those who disagree with the majority opinion in Mitchell ignore the
fact that there was no factual basis for the arrest warrant issued by
Greenwood Village, and that, therefore, the arrest warrant was unsup-
ported by probable cause. Without probable cause, an arrest warrant
cannot survive fourth amendment scrutiny. Neither the courts nor the
legislature can cure a constitutionally defective arrest warrant.
82. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
83. 678 P.2d 990 (Colo. 1984).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 7. Because Colorado's constitu-
tional provision is identical to the fourth amendment, and the decision in Mitchell con-
cerned both constitutional provisions, this section will only refer to the fourth amendment.
85. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-308 (Supp. 1984).
86. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
87. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 (1968) ("The question in this Court upon
review of a state-approved search or seizure 'is not whether the search [or seizure] was
authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.' ") (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967)).
88. The Bill of Rights developed as a system of protecting the minority from certain
abuses of the majority. The cost-benefit analysis used with the exclusionary rule ignores
the fact that constitutional rights are granted irrespective of the cost to society. See Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353 (1974); see also
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (the fourth amendment relies on the exclusionary remedy for its
legitimacy).
89. For the proposition that the Colorado statute merely redefines probable cause
since probable cause is not concerned with truth but reasonable appearances, see Note,
The Colorado Statutory Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: A Step Too Far?, 53 U.
COLO. L. REv. 809, 816-17 (1982).
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As the Colorado court correctly pointed out, the distinguishing fea-
ture between Whitely v. Warden,90 a case in which the Court suppressed
the evidence, and Hill v. California,91 in which the Court admitted the
evidence, was the existence of probable cause in the issuance of the
arrest warrant. 92 In Hill, despite the arresting officer's mistake in identi-
fying his suspect, the fact remained that there was probable cause for the
issuance of the arrest warrant in Hill's name. The underlying validity of
the warrant was not altered when the officer made an error in executing
the arrest. The fourth amendment's requirement that one be protected
from unreasonable seizures of his person, except for probable cause,
was met when an arrest warrant for Hill was obtained by establishing
probable cause to the satisfaction of the issuing magistrate and subse-
quent reviewing courts.
Whiteley presented the opposite circumstance: the facts underlying
the warrant were insufficient to constitute probable cause, but the ar-
resting officer made no error in the execution thereof. However, the
constitutionality of searches and seizures within the fourth amendment
is determined by an analysis of the facts known at the time of the search;
subsequent events cannot cure an otherwise defective warrant. 93 Thus,
the Court excluded evidence that had been seized from Whiteley with-
out probable cause and similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court ex-
cluded the evidence that had been seized from Mitchell.9
B. The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement
Once the Mitchell court acknowledged the fourth amendment viola-
tion, it was required to apply the remedy for such violations first an-
nounced in Mapp: exclusion of all wrongfully seized evidence. As the
Court in Mapp aptly pointed out, the exclusionary rule, although not
expressly provided for by the Constitution, is nonetheless a constitu-
tionally required remedy for fourth amendment violations. 9 5 This view
90. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
91. 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
92. Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 994.
93. See United States v.Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1657 (1984) and cases cited therein
at note 9.
94. Justice Rovira exhibits his misunderstanding of the essential issue in Mitchell by
opting to apply Hill rather than Whiteley to the fourth amendment question. At no point in
his dissent is it acknowledged that the arrest warrant for Mitchell was unsupported by
probable cause as was the case in Whiteley. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. This
misapplication is made all the more glaring after careful analysis of the state court cases
used by Rovira to support his argument that no fourth amendment violation occurred in
Mitchell. In all but one of the cases, probable cause existed for the issuance of the docu-
ments upon which the arrests were based. In the one case in which the arrest document
was not founded on probable cause, the court cited other factors which constituted prob-
able cause for the arrest. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
95. In discussing the origins of the exclusionary rule, the Court in Mapp noted that:
This Court has ever since required of federal law officers a strict adherence to
that command which this Court has held to be a clear, specific, and constitution-
ally required--even if judicially implied-deterrent safeguard without insistence
upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to a "form of
words."
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648.
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of the exclusionary rule as a constitutionally required remedy is not an
aberration of the Mapp decision, but is the interpretation given the ex-
clusionary rule by many constitutional scholars.
9 6
The issue of whether the exclusionary rule is constitutionally re-
quired depends on whether other adequate remedies exist for fourth
amendment violations. 97 While the Mapp Court concluded that other
remedies did not exist, 98 today's courts must believe there are other
means of remedying the fourth amendment wrong.9 9 However, an anal-
ysis of the alternatives to the exclusionary rule reveals that which the
rule's critics can only deny: there are no other adequate remedies for
fourth amendment violations.
C. Alternative Remedies
A damage suit in tort against the individual police officer and his
employer, the city, is one remedy often proposed. 100 The disadvantages
of the damage suit reveal its inadequacy: (1) much of the harm suffered
by the tort victim is immeasurable in monetary terms;' 0 1 (2) the police
may be immobilized through fear of ruinous civil damage judgments;
(3) many officers will be judgment proof; and (4) to collect a judgment
against the city, the plaintiff is required to show that the violation was a
result of the city's official policy.'
0 2
A suit seeking an injunction is even less satisfactory as a remedial
device, primarily because the case law has placed a nearly impossible
burden of proof on the plaintiff. In Rizzo v. Goode, '0 3 the Court held that
one must show that widespread constitutional violations result from a
policy of the government agency against which the injunction is sought.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3430 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Stewart, supra note 23. For a constitutional interpretation of Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), see Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 295-307 (1974).
97. Stewart, supra note 23, at 1384.
98. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 652-53.
99. One of the more respected critics of the exclusionary rule contends that alterna-
tive remedies must be found because "[i]t would be intolerable if the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure could be violated without practical consequence." Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 665, 756 (1970).
100. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Katz, The
Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and The Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 8-33 (1968); Stewart, supra note 23, at 1398.
One commentator has proposed that Congress establish a joint liability plan by stat-
ute whereby one whose fourth amendment rights are violated by the police would be enti-
ted to compensation in a fixed amount plus an additional amount for actual damages. If
the police violation were intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent, the police officer
would be liable for payment of the entire amount, as well as subject to administrative
sanctions. Levin, An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule for Fourth Amendment Violations, 58
JUDICATURE 74 (1974).
101. Stewart, supra note 23, at 1398.
102. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-56 (1980). For a general
discussion of the inadequacies of the tort remedy, see Ingber, supra note 14, at 1540-41
and Schroeder, Detering Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69
GEO. LJ. 1361, 1386-96 (1981).
103. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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Moreover, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 10 4 established a requirement that
essentially forecloses all injunction actions against offending police de-
partments. In Lyons, the Court held that a plaintiff must show he is likely
to be injured in the future by the police department's practices. 10 5
A more drastic and therefore less acceptable remedy is criminal
prosecution of the individual officer. 10 6 However, no one wants to pun-
ish officers who are working to protect society from crime by declaring
that they are criminals. 10 7 Moreover, in Screws v. United States, 108 the
Court held that only willful violations of constitutional rights were
actionable.
Informal remedies such as internal administrative review and civil-
ian review boards are equally ineffective. It is doubtful that an internal
police review board would be willing to sanction one of its own for do-
ing what any other officer might have done.' 0 9 Citizen review boards
would be difficult to establish and maintain primarily because of police
resistance to review by outsiders. 10
In sum, the exclusionary rule, despite its deficiencies,"" is the only
remedy for fourth amendment violations that balances desirable crime
enforcement techniques" 12 with the individual's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.' 13 As the only adequate remedy
for fourth amendment violations, the exclusionary rules must be seen as
an inseparable element of the fourth amendment, and not as just an-
other remedy to be separated from the right.
D. The Good Faith Exception
Because the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally required remedy,
104. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
105. Id at 102.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982) provides that it is a crime for anyone acting under color of
law to deprive a person of his constitutional rights.
107. See Note, Grievance Response Mechanisms for Police Misconduct, 55 VA. L. REv. 909, 928
(1969).
108. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
109. For a detailed exploration of the problems inherent in police review boards, see
Schroeder, supra note 102, at 1401-07. One commentator has proposed that the invoca-
tion of the exclusionary rule be tied to police department programs aimed at reducing
fourth amendment violations. The more aggressive an officer's police department is in
punishing and deterring fourth amendment violations, the more likely the court would
admit the illegally seized evidence. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 SwTN. L.
Rv. 1027, 1050-55 (1974).
110. Note, supra note 107, at 943. For a discussion of citizen review boards, see Hud-
son, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, 36 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 515 (1971).
111. For various criticisms of the exclusionary rule, see Ingber, supra note 14, at 1519-
21; Jensen & Hart, supra note 15, at 921-29; Comment, The Evolution and Confusion of Exclu-
sion: Does "Good Faith" Make Good Sense Under the Fourth Amendment?, 4 DET. C.L. REV. 1587,
1602-06 (1983).
112. Remedies more effective at deterring fourth amendment violations would severely
restrict the police's ability to fight crime. See Ingber, supra note 14, at 1555-56; Stewart,
supra note 23, at 1388-89.
113. Justice Murphy warned that "[a]lteratives are deceptive. Their very statement
conveys the impression that one possibility is as effective as the next. In this case their
statement is blinding. For there is but one alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no
sanction at all." Woy', 338 U.S. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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the good faith exception, which would permit certain fourth amendment
violations to go unremedied, presents a significant reduction of individ-
ual fourth amendment rights. The unfairness of applying the good faith
exception to the facts in Mitchell 14 magnifies that which is fundamen-
tally wrong with the good faith exception. By framing the issue in terms
of denying a remedy, the courts have succeeded in limiting fourth
amendment guarantees without addressing that limitation. It is the
fourth amendment standard of probable cause that declares a police of-
ficer's good faith actions to be unreasonable and thus violative of the
fourth amendment. Denying a remedy to the victim because the officer
acted in good faith allows the court to find that no constitutional right
was violated" 5 without having to address openly the fourth amendment
issue. 116
As society becomes increasingly concerned with the rising crime
rate, it may be willing to sacrifice some individual privacy guarantees for
greater police protection. That issue must, however, be addressed on its
merits and in the context of reducing the level of probable cause re-
quired by the fourth amendment for searches and seizures. We must
not allow so fundamental an issue to be decided unwittingly. The good
faith exception is more than another exception to a fourth amendment
remedy; it represents a potentially significant reduction in fourth
amendment guarantees.
CONCLUSION
Under then-existing fourth amendment doctrine, the Colorado
Supreme Court correctly affirmed the suppression of evidence in People
v. Mitchell. Now that fourth amendment guarantees have been radically
114. In contrast to the situation in Leon, where two judges merely differed on whether
probable cause existed and the reviewing court determined that the search warrant was
based on insufficient probable cause, in Mitchell, there were no facts supporting issuance of
the arrest warrant. In fact, the Court in Leon strongly implies that the rule of Whiteley
would remain unchanged under its newly announced good faith rule. Officers who rely on
a warrant issued on another officer's affidavit and are ignorant of the warrant's underlying
basis are not entitled to the protection of the good faith exception. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at
3421 n.24.
115. Justice Stevens' dissent in Leon points out the paradox of disallowing a remedy for
a violation of the fourth amendment because the court determines that the violation was
reasonable. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3446-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Until the decision in Leon, it was well settled that mere good faith on the part of
the officer did not constitute the level of probable cause required by the fourth amend-
ment. E.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959);
Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 (1923). Although the Leon
Court did not acknowledge that its decision will probably result in reducing the level of
probable cause, that is the practical effect of its recognition of a good faith exception. It
now appears that good faith will constitute probable cause. Unwittingly, Justice Rovira, in
his dissenting opinion, makes the connection between the exclusionary rule and the fourth
amendment which most exclusionary rule critics attempt to avoid, but which is the neces-
sary result of the good faith exception. In essence, he argued that no fourth amendment
violation occurred because deterrence would not be furthered by application of the exclu-
sionary rule. Justice Rovira would seemingly limit the requirement of probable cause to
those situations where the exclusion remedy would deter future fourth amendment viola-
tions. Mitchell, 678 P.2d at 997-98 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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altered by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, the
Colorado courts must be persuaded to deny recognition to the good
faith exception as announced in that decision. Adoption of such an ex-
ception not only denies a remedy for acknowledged fourth amendment
violations, it confuses fourth amendment analysis by dealing with what
are essentially fourth amendment problems in the less controversial
context of reducing the availability of the exclusionary remedy.
Denise W Kennedy
COLORADO V. NEW MEXICO II: JUDICIAL RESTRIMNT
IN THE EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT OF
INTERSTATE WATERS*
INTRODUCTION
In Colorado v. New Mexico (Colorado II), 1 the United States Supreme
Court clarified the evidentiary standard of review used pursuant to the
doctrine of equitable apportionment in original jurisdiction actions in-
volving the allocation of interstate waters.2 Because the Court un-
characteristically disregarded the Special Master's report, the case is
noteworthy and marks the sole instance in which the Court has totally
rejected the Special Master's findings in an equitable apportionment ac-
tion involving interstate waters.
3
This comment will review the development of the doctrine of equi-
table apportionment prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado
II. The legal principles and public policy considerations underlying the
majority and dissenting opinions will then be examined. Finally, this
comment will conclude that the "clear and convincing evidence" stan-
dard is inappropriate for equitable apportionment actions involving in-
terstate water disputes. Instead, the Supreme Court should employ the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard because maintenance of the
"status quo between states"4 should give way to the paramount concern
for the beneficial use of a scarce natural resource.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
The doctrine of equitable apportionment is the federal common law
governing the Supreme Court's determination of interstate water
rights.5 The doctrine is grounded in the federal Constitution's provi-
* The author would like to express his gratitude to Mr. Robert F. Welborn of
Welborn, Dufford, Brown & Tooley, Denver, Colorado, for his invaluable assistance in the
preparation of this case comment. Of course, all errors, inconsistencies, and opinions
expressed are this author's responsibility.
1. 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984). In Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984), the
United States Supreme Court re-examined the findings of a Special Master after remand-
ing the original action, Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982), for additional find-
ings. To avoid the possibility of any confusion, the Court's 1982 decision in Colorado v.
New Mexico will be cited as Colorado I, while the Court's 1984 decision in Colorado v. New
Mexico will be cited as Colorado II.
2. Colorado 1I, 104 S. Ct. at 2438-42.
3. See NewJersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995, 996 (1954); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589, 601, 604, 606, 608, 620-21 (1945); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343
(1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); see also Mississippi v. Arkansas,
415 U.S. 289, 297 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (findings of Master entitled to respect,
especially where the credibility of witnesses is significant); 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4054 (1985) (findings of Special Master
should be deemed presumptively correct).
4. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. at 195 (O'Connor, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring).
5. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907); see also U.S. CONST., art. III, cls. I & 2.
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sion for states' equal rights. 6
In Kansas v. Colorado,7 the Supreme Court set out the doctrine of
equitable apportionment for the first time, albeit not in those exact
words. 8 In that case, Kansas had brought an original action to restrain
Colorado appropriators from diverting water from the Arkansas River.9
Kansas contended that it had a right to the natural and customary flow
of the river l ° under the natural flow theory of the riparian doctrine"
because it was a downstream state on an interstate river. Conversely,
Colorado argued it had a sovereign right to retain the river's entire flow
for its own benefit, regardless of any injury such appropriation might
cause downstream users.12 The Court rejected both contentions13 and
concluded that its decision was to be guided by the particular exigencies
of the case, 14 the rules of equity, 15 and a balancing of both states' inter-
ests. 16 After reviewing the evidence presented by both states, 17 the
Court held that although diversions in Colorado had caused some per-
ceptible injury,' 8 the detriment was insubstantial in light of the great
benefit such diversions afforded to Colorado. 19
The role of local water law in equitable apportionment actions was
first addressed by the Court in Wyoming v. Colorado. 20 Wyoming brought
(constitutional grant of original jurisdiction over controversies between states); see generally
2 C. CORKER, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 132.1 (1967) (overview of the foundations of
equitable apportionment); Kelly, Rationing the Rivers: A Decade of Interstate Waters and Inter-
state Commerce in the Supreme Court, 14 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 12 (1941) (concise summary of
the principles of equitable apportionment).
6. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 97.
7. 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Kansas v. Colorado is reviewed in Bannister, Interstate Rights
in Interstate Streams in the Arid West: Kansas v. Colorado and Wyoming v. Colorado, 36 HAtv.
L. REV. 960 (1923) and in Friedrich, The Settlement of Disputes Between States Concerning Rights
to the Waters ofInterstate Streams, 32 IOWA L. REv. 244 (1947).
8. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 117. The Court spoke of Kansas' right to petition
for an "equitable division" of the waters of the Arkansas River if its citizens were being
substantially injured by the upstream appropriations of Colorado users. Id
9. Id at 46.
10. Id at 58-60.
11. There are two basic doctrines governing water rights: the riparian doctrine, recog-
nized largely by states east of the hundredth meridian and the doctrine of prior appropria-
tion, recognized in most of the western states.
The riparian doctrine has two distinct theories of water use: the natural flow theory
and the reasonable use theory. Under the former, riparian landowners may use the waters
of a stream so long as that use does not affect either the quantity or quality of the stream-
flow. The reasonable use theory entitles riparians to the reasonable use of the streamflow
for normal consumptive purposes and the discharge of wastes.
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, water rights may be acquired by diverting
water and using it for a beneficial purpose. The rule of priority determines the relative
rights of appropriators, whose appropriations are ranked in the order of their seniority. 1
W. HUTrcINs, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 16, 18, 19 (1967).
1.2. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 98. See also Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419,
466 (1921) (where Colorado again unsuccessfully used this argument).
13. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 98-105.
14. Id at 48.
15. Id at 98.
16. Id at 117.
17. Id at 105-17.
18. Id. at 117.
19. Id. at 114.
20. 259 U.S. 419 (1922). Wyoming v. Colorado is discussed in CoLoaDo WATER
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suit to enjoin a proposed diversion from the Laramie River by Colorado
users.2 1 Both Wyoming and Colorado followed the doctrine of prior
appropriation.2 2 After reviewing the evidence presented, the Court
concluded that the doctrine of prior appropriation controlled because it
furnished the only just and reasonable means of resolving an interstate
water dispute between two appropriation states.
23
The Court's final decree, however, evinced a significant departure
from the doctrine's "priority principle."'24 Recognizing the importance
of conservation in promoting water's paramount beneficial use, the
Court concluded that the doctrine of equitable apportionment imposed
upon each state a duty to exercise its rights in a manner reasonably cal-
culated to conserve the "common supply."'25 Therefore, in order to
promote conservation of the common supply, the Court granted junior
Colorado appropriators priority over senior Wyoming users for all years
during which the streamflow falls below the judicially-established "fairly
constant and dependable" flow.
26
In Connecticut v. Massachusetts,2 7 the Court first addressed an inter-
state water dispute between contending riparian states.28 Connecticut
sought to prohibit the diversion of water to the Boston metropolitan
area from two tributaries of the Connecticut River.2 9 The Court denied
the injunction, holding that Connecticut had failed to show by "clear
and convincing evidence" that the threatened injury was of a "serious
magnitude."' 30 Further, the Court found that because water is essential
for human consumption and other domestic uses, equity could not abide
the granting of an injunction.
3 1
In response to Connecticut's contention that because both states
were riparian doctrine states the riparian doctrine's natural flow theory
should control the Court's determination,3 2 the Court reiterated the eq-
uitable apportionment principles first announced in Kansas v. Colorado:33
that local water law was merely a persuasive consideration;3 4 that each
CONSERVATION BOARD, LARAMIE RIVER LITIGATION (1950); Carman, Sovereign Rights and Re-
lations in the Control and Use of American Waters, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 266 (1930); and Wehrli,
Decrees in Interstate Water Suits, 1 Wyo. L.J. 13 (1946).
21. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 456.
22. Id. at 467, 470.
23. Id at 470.
24. See supra text accompanying note 11.
25. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 484.
26. Id at 480.
27. 282 U.S. 660 (1931). Connecticut v. Massachusetts is discussed in Stephenson,
Interstate Rights to the Waters of the Connecticut River: Issues Raised by the Proposed Northfield
Diversion, 4 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 641 (1982) and Recent Important Decisions, 29 MicH. L. REv.
1067, 1104 (1931).
28. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 662.
29. Id
30. Id. at 669. This evidentiary standard first appeared in Missouri v. Illinois, 200
U.S. 496, 521 (1906), where Justice Holmes stated that "[b]efore this court will intervene,
the case should be of serious magnitude, dearly and fully proved.
31. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 673.
32. Id at 669-70.
33. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
34. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 670.
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determination involved consideration of the existing exigencies;3 5 and
that all relevant facts should be considered in determining what consti-
tutes a just apportionment of disputed interstate waters.
3 6
In the next equitable apportionment case, Washington v. Oregon,
3 7
the state of Washington alleged that upstream appropriators in Oregon
wrongfully diverted an excessive amount of water from a Walla Walla
River tributary, and requested an equitable apportionment of the
river.38 The Special Master appointed by the Court found no "clear and
convincing evidence" that the upstream appropriators had seriously im-
paired the rights of Washington water users.3 9 The Court agreed with
the Special Master's findings and dismissed Washington's complaint.
40
In 1943, the Court once again addressed an interstate water rights
dispute involving Colorado and Kansas. 4 ' On this occasion, however,
Colorado brought the original action, seeking to enjoin Kansas and one
of its citizens from the further prosecution of suits which attempted to
restrain Colorado users from appropriating water from the Arkansas
River. 4 2 Kansas cross-claimed, alleging that Colorado had substantially
increased the volume of diversions to the detriment of Kansas water
users and requested a decree of equitable apportionment.
43
Upon reviewing the findings of the Special Master, the Court
granted Colorado's request for an injunction,4 4 noting that Kansas had
failed to present sufficient evidence that the increase in upstream appro-
priations had worked a discernible injury to the rights of Kansas and its
water users. 45 Further, the Court, in dictum, suggested that the negotia-
tion of an allocation agreement, pursuant to the compact clause of the
United States Constitution, 46 should be the preferred medium for the
35. Id.
36. Id at 671. During the same term, the Court decided the only other equitable
apportionment case involving contending riparian doctrine states, New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931), modified per curiam, 347 U.S. 995 (1954). NewJersey had sought
to enjoin New York from diverting water from the Delaware River Basin to New York City.
The Court again refused to strictly apply the natural flow theory of the riparian doctrine,
noting that different considerations took precedence when the parties to a dispute were
quasi-sovereigns rather than private parties. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 342.
The Court accepted the Special Master's findings in toto and denied the requested injunc-
tion. Id at 343-46. For a more complete discussion of New Jersey v. New York, see Car-
men, Is There a New Era in the Law of Interstate Waters?, 5 S. CAL. L. REV. 25 (1931).
37. 297 U.S. 517 (1936). Washington v. Oregon is discussed in Recent Decisions, 35
MICH. L. REV. 130, 176 (1936).
38. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. at 518-19.
39. Id at 522-23. This finding had an equitable character because even if the Oregon
diversions had been enjoined very little of the water would have reached Washington due
to the porous nature of the riverbed. Id
40. Id at 522-24, 528-30.
41. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943). The case is discussed in Decisions, 44
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437 (1944).
42. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 387-88.
43. Id at 388-89.
44. Id at 400.
45. Id at 398-400.
46. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The definitive work on interstate compacts is
Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-a Study in Interstate Adjustments,
34 YALE LJ. 685 (1925).
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settlement of interstate water disputes.4 7
In Nebraska v. Wyoming,48 the Court decreed three competing prior
appropriation states' rights to waters of the North Platte River.49 Gen-
erally the Court adopted the Special Master's findings50 that an equita-
ble apportionment was necessary to reduce the over-appropriation of
the river.
51
In Nebraska, the Court employed the doctrine of prior appropriation
as a general guide in its deliberations, but expressly declared that other
factors deserved thoughtful consideration.5 2 Several practical and equi-
table considerations also influenced the Court's final decree. Among
these were the avoidance of restraining upstream appropriations when
downstream users would not materially benefit,53 the protection of es-
tablished economies dependent on existing junior appropriations,54 and
the relative importance and efficiency of various uses. 55 After balancing
the relative priorities, equities, and practical considerations, the Court,
using the Master's specific findings as guideposts, apportioned the "de-
pendable" flow of the North Platte among the appropriators of the con-
tending states.
56
Although each of the equitable apportionment cases focused on one
consideration more heavily than another, all maintained that the doc-
trine is a flexible analysis of pertinent states laws, exigent economic and
social factors, and the relevant facts of each particular case.5 7 Both Colo-
rado 158 and Colorado 159 contributed to the potpourri of legal and equi-
table considerations by suggesting a "conservation ethic" in the former
decision and clarifying the claimant state's burden of proof in the latter.
An appreciation for the rationale and significance of these two develop-
ments requires an examination of the facts.
II. THE ORIGINS OF COLORADO v. NEW MEXICO
A. The Situs of the Controversy
The Vermejo River is a non-navigible stream which originates in
Colorado. 60 The Vermejo's three major tributaries-Little Vermejo
Creek, Ricardo Creek, and the North Fork of the Vermejo--originate on
47. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 392.
48. 325 U.S. 589 (1945), modified per curiam, 345 U.S. 981 (1953). Nebraska v. Wyo-
ming is discussed in Friedrich, supra note 7.
49. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 599-600.
50. Id at 601-07, 620-39, 655.
51. Id at 608-10.
52. Id at 618.
53. Id at 618-19.
54. Id at 618, 621-22.
55. Id. at 656.
56. Id at 621-56, 665-72.
57. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1982).
58. Id at 176. Colorado I is discussed in Cohen, An Interstate Water Problem Between Mis-
sasippi and Alabama-The Escatawm River, 35 ALA. L. REv. 291 (1984).
59. 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984).
60. Colorado H1, 104 S. Ct. at 2436.
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the eastern slopes of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in south-central
Colorado.6 1 Approximately one mile south of the Colorado-New Mex-
ico border, these tributaries combine to form the main stem of the Ver-
mejo River.6 2 A minor tributary, Fish Creek, joins the Little Vermejo
Creek just north of the state line.
65
The main stem of the Vermejo flows in a southeasterly direction for
approximately fifty-five miles before its confluence with the North Cana-
dian River. 64 There are four major appropriators of water from the
main stem: the Phelps Dodge Corporation, the Kaiser Steel Corpora-
tion, the Vermejo Park Corporation, and the Vermejo Conservancy Dis-
trict.6 5 A Colorado user has never appropriated Vermejo tributary
water.
6 6
The waters of the Vermejo River have been filly appropriated by
New Mexico users.6 7 New Mexico appropriators use roughly 11,600
acre-feet annually. 68 The Vermejo Conservancy District is the most sig-
nificant appropriator, using approximately 10,200 acre-feet annually.
69




On June 20, 1975, the Colorado Fuel and Iron Steel Corporation
(C.F.&I.) obtained a conditional water right from the Colorado District
Court for Water Division No. 2 to appropriate seventy-five cubic feet of
water per second (c.f.s.) from the headwaters of the Vermejo River.71
Using a ditch and some 3,000 feet of tunnel, C.F.&I. proposed to divert
forty-five c.f.s. from Ricardo Creek, twenty-five c.f.s. from Little Vermejo
Creek, and five c.f.s. from Fish Creek to a storage reservoir on a small
stream in the adjacent Purgatoire River Basin. 7 2 Because the Purgatoire
River is over-appropriated, the imported water was to be used to meet
present as well as future water requirements by industrial, agricultural,
and municipal users.
73
Almost a year later, the four major New Mexico appropriators peti-
tioned the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
for an injunction to prohibit C.F.&I. from diverting water from the Ver-
61. Post-Hearing Brief at 3, Colorado I, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (filed by Colorado).
62. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. at 178.
63. Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 61, at 3.
64. Colorado 11, 104 S. Ct. at 2436.
65. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. at 178.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 177.
68. Reply Brief of the State of Colorado at 9, Colorado 1, 459 U.S. 176 (1982). An acre-
foot is a volumetric unit of water measurement. One acre-foot is that amount of water
needed to cover one acre of land one foot deep and equals 43,560 cubic feet or 325,900
gallons of water. 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 2.3 (1967).
69. Id.
70. Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 61, at 8.
71. Complaint at 6, Colorado I, 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
72. Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 61, at 8.
73. Id at 8, 9, 39.
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mejo's tributaries. 7 4 The state of New Mexico supported the position of
the plaintiffs as amicus curiae. 75 In response to a motion by the plain-
tiffs for summary judgment,76 the court held that the doctrine of prior
appropriation determined the litigants' rights and permanently enjoined
the proposed diversion on the basis that the appropriations by New
Mexico users were prior in time to C.F.&I.'s conditional water right.
77
C.F.&I. then filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. 78 The Tenth Circuit subsequently stayed these proceed-
ings, however, following the Supreme Court's grant of Colorado's mo-
tion for leave to file an original complaint. 79 Colorado's motion to the
Supreme Court followed an unsuccessful attempt by both states to reach
a negotiated settlement.8 0
C. Colorado v. New Mexico I
Colorado's Bill of Complaint requested that a decree be entered
equitably apportioning the water of the Vermejo and its tributaries.8 1
After New Mexico filed an answer to the Bill of Complaint and A Motion
to Refer to a Special Master, the Supreme Court appointed the Honora-
ble Ewing T. Kerr, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for
the District of Wyoming as Special Master.
8 2
The Special Master received an extensive amount of evidence dur-
ing the course of a sixteen-day trial.8 3 On January 9, 1982, he submitted
to the Court the "Report of the Special Master on the Equitable Appor-
tionment of the Vermejo River."'8 4 The Master advised the Court that
most of the river flow was consumed by New Mexico appropriators. 8 5
Moreover, the Master found that if the rule of priority was strictly ap-
plied, Colorado could not be allowed to divert because the entire flow
was needed to satisfy the senior demands of New Mexico users.8 6 Nev-
ertheless, using the doctrine of equitable apportionment as a basis, the
Master recommended that Colorado be allowed to divert 4,000 acre-feet
of water annually from the tributaries of the Vermejo.
8 7
This recommendation stemmed from the Master's conclusion that
such a diversion "would not materially affect the appropriations granted
by New Mexico for users downstream."8 8 Using a balancing analysis of
74. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. at 178.
75. Reply Brief at 15, Colorado 1, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (filed by Colorado).
76. Id
77. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. at 178-79.
78. Id at 179.
79. Id
80. Complaint, supra note 71, at 7. New Mexico broke off the negotiations.
81. Id at 9.
82. Docket Sheet at 1, Colorado I, 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
83. Reply Brief of the State of Colorado, supra note 68, at 1.




88. Report of the Special Master on the Equitable Apportionment of the Vermejo
River at 2-3, Colorado I, 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
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the respective costs and benefits of the diversion to the two states,8 9 the
Master determined the diversion's relative effect. The Master also noted
that the recommended allocation would impair the water rights of only
one New Mexico user, the Vermejo Conservancy District, and character-
ized that appropriator's system of water distribution as wasteful and
inefficient.90
New Mexico filed objections to the Master's recommendation, con-
tending that, in the absence of an established economy in Colorado de-
pendent upon the waters of the Vermejo, the rule of priority controlled
because both states followed the doctrine of prior appropriation. 9 1 As
the river had been previously fully appropriated by New Mexico users,
9 2
strict application of this rule would necessarily preclude any proposed
diversions.93
On December 13, 1982, the Court, in a majority opinion by justice
Marshall, rejected New Mexico's contention that the rule of priority was
controlling and reiterated its long-held view that, although the water
laws of the contending states are an important consideration in the equi-
table apportionment analysis, they are but guiding principles in the allo-
cation of interstate waters. 9 4 The Court then adopted what has been
described as a "conservation ethic" 9 5 as a relevant consideration in the
equitable apportionment analysis. 96 The Court concluded that the Spe-
cial Master's consideration of existing uses and their relative efficiency
compared to the potential benefits and efficiency of uses associated with
the proposed diversion was entirely appropriate. 9 7 The Court found,
however, that the factual findings were insufficient to support a decree
of equitable apportionment.9" Therefore, the Court remanded the case
to the Special Master for specific factual findings as to the potential for
eliminating wasteful water use practices through reasonable conserva-
tion measures and the precise character of the proposed uses and ac-
companying benefits to Colorado from the proposed diversion.9 9
In a brief concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Jus-
tice Stevens, stated that the dominant consideration in the equitable ap-
portionment analysis was the equality of rights of the contending states
to the benefits of interstates waters.' 0 0 While mentioning that ineffi-
ciency of current uses and prior dependence on existing appropriations
were relevant factors, Chief justice Burger did not mention state water
89. Id.
90. Id at 7-8, 23.
91. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 181-82, 184.
92. Id at 177.
93. Id. at 180.
94. Id. at 183-84.
95. Shiffbauer, The Conservation Ethic in the Adjudication of Interstate Water Disputes by the
U.S. Supreme Court: Colorado v. New Mexico, 15 NAT. RESOURCES L. NEWSLETTER 7 (1983).
96. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 185.
97. Id at 184, 186, 188, 190.
98. Id at 183.
99. Id at 190.
100. Id at 191 (Burger, C.J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring).
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laws as being an appropriate consideration in the determination of ajust
apportionment. t01
While also concurring in the judgment, Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justice Powell, distanced themselves from the other justices by strongly
counseling judicial restraint in equitable apportionment actions.
1 0 2
Fearing that the Court may be inviting more original jurisdiction actions
if it freely engaged in a balancing of relative harms, benefits, and effi-
ciencies of interstate water uses, Justice O'Connor urged that the Court
abstain from regulating the water usage of one state absent a showing by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the usage is "unreasonably
wasteful."'
0 3
Despite the difficulty of pointing to a trend in the Court's thinking,
especially because the case law essentially turns on a balancing of equi-
ties, 104 one commentator has argued that the introduction of a "conser-
vation ethic" as a substantive criterion into the equitable apportionment
analysis suggests a willingness by the Court to measure the security of a
water right by the efficiency of use, rather than by the date of appropria-
tion. 10 5 The significance of a "conservation ethic" in the equitable ap-
portionment analysis remains, however, uncertain because the Court in
Colorado I did not elaborate upon its earlier consideration of this new
element of the equitable apportionment analysis.
III. COLORADO v. NEw MEXICO II
On remand, the Special Master denied a motion by New Mexico to
submit new evidence. 10 6 After advancing additional factual findings
based on the previously established record, ' 0 7 the Master reaffirmed his
original recommendation.10 8 New Mexico filed its exceptions to the
Master's second report'0 9 and the case was argued to the Court onJanu-
ary 9, 1984.110
A. The Majority Opinion
Writing for an eight-member majority, Justice O'Connor sustained
New Mexico's exceptions to the report and its additional factual findings
and dismissed the case."' The majority's rejection of the Master's fac-
tual findings and conclusions of law marks the first time in the history of
equitable apportionment cases involving interstate waters that the Court
101. Id
102. Id at 195 (O'Connor, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring).
103. Id
104. See Grant, The Future of Interstate Allocation of Water, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
977, 986-87 (1983).
105. Schiffbauer, supra note 95, at 8.
106. Colorado /, 104 S. Ct. at 2437-38.
107. Additional Factual Findings at 2-28, Colorado H, 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984).
108. Id at 29.
109. Colorado /, 104 S. Ct. at 2436.
110. Docket Sheet, supra note 82, at 3.
111. Colorado II, 104 S. Ct. at 2434.
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has completely rejected the recommendations of a Special Master.'" 2
After reviewing the facts of the case and the Court's decision in Col-
orado 1, l lSJustice O'Connor proceeded to distinguish the Court's analy-
sis in Colorado I from that in Colorado 11.114 Justice O'Connor stated that
the former ruling essentially addressed the question of the relevancy of
various factors in the determination of "a just apportionment."' 15 The
present inquiry, Justice O'Connor maintained, dealt instead with the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the recommendation of a decree
of equitable apportionment.
16
Justice O'Connor stated that the appropriate standard of proof in
an equitable apportionment action is the "clear and convincing evi-
dence" standard, noting that the Court had explicitly informed Colo-
rado of its applicability in Colorado 1.117 The Court had justified this
higher standard of proof for three reasons: first, to protect established
uses from the risks of an erroneous decision; second, to maintain prop-
erty rights; and third, as an assurance that resources will be put to "their
most efficient uses." 1 18 Thus, the majority concluded that Colorado
would not be granted an equitable apportionment decree unless it could
show that the benefits from the proposed diversion or the inefficiencies
of the present uses were "highly probable." ' 19
In turning to the evidence, Justice O'Connor noted that New Mex-
ico had met its initial burden of proof in Colorado I by showing that there
existed a threat of a "real or substantial injury."' 120 The majority then
assessed the sufficiency of Colorado's evidence and found it lacking.
12 1
This assessment differed sharply from that of the Master, who had con-
cluded that Colorado had convincingly made its case. 122
While acknowledging that "the Master's findings . . . deserve re-
spect and a tacit presumption of correctness," ' 2 3 Justice O'Connor nev-
ertheless disagreed with several of the Master's findings. 124 The
majority found that Colorado's evidence was not specific enough in
identifying either "financially and physically feasible" conservation
measures to correct existing inefficiencies in water usage' 2 5 or the fu-
ture benefits and efficiencies associated with the proposed diversion.
12 6
After reaffirming the Court's holding in Colorado I that the water's
point of origin was an improper consideration in the equitable appor-
112. See supra note 3.
113. Colorado II, 104 S. Ct. at 2436-38.







121. Id. at 2439-41.
122. Additional Factual Findings, supra note 107, at 28.
123. Colorado H1, 104 S. Ct. at 2439.
124. Id at 2439-42.
125. Id. at 2439-41.
126. Id. at 2441.
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tionment analysis, 127 Justice O'Connor concluded that the equitites
compelled the protection of existing uses and, thus, a denial of Colo-
rado's request.' 28 The majority, however, made it clear that the Court
believed that the doctrine of equitable apportionment was flexible
enough to recognize state claims to appropriated water for highly prob-
able future beneficial uses.
129
B. The Dissenting Opinion
In an incisive and well-reasoned dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens
criticized the majority for its "cursory" examination of the evidence and
complete rejection of the Master's findings.' 3 0 After noting that the
Master had applied the Court's "clear and convincing evidence" stan-
dard to the proof presented, Justice Stevens raised the question of
whether the majority applied the proper standard when it reviewed the
Master's factual findings. '3 ' Justice Stevens also faulted the majority for
reviewing not the evidence, but rather the factual determinations of the
Master.13 2 The dissent asserted that a substantial degree ofjudicial def-
erence to the findings of a Master is appropriate in equitable apportion-
ment actions because the record is "typically lengthy, technical, and
complex."'
3 3
After an extensive comparison of the evidence to the factual find-
ings of the Master,' 3 4 Justice Stevens concluded that the Master's rec-
ommendation was wholly supported by the record.' s 5 By using excerpts
from the testimony he indicated that there was ample evidence to sup-
port each of the Master's findings;' 3 6 in particular, that reasonable con-
servation measures by New Mexico appropriators would ameliorate any
possible injury stemming from the proposed diversion.' 3 7
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court's decision in Colorado II portends the end of interstate
water rights litigation in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The Court has definitively outlined the onerousness of the claimant's
burden of proof in equitable apportionment actions1 38 and only time
will tell whether any state is willing or able to shoulder such an eviden-
tiary burden.
Although the Court's reluctance to hear original jurisdiction cases is
127. Id. at 2442.
128. Id
129. Id at 2438, 2442.




134. Id at 2444-50.
135. Id at 2450.
136. Id at 2445-49.
137. Id at 2450.
138. Colorado 11, 104 S. Ct. at 2438-41.
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understandable given its crowded docket and the exceptional proce-
dural demands which equitable apportionment actions impose,' 3 9 the
Court's use of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard as a shield
from such litigation is unjustifiable where the crux of the dispute is the
allocation of interstate waters. The following two arguments demon-
strate the impropriety of the majority opinion.
A. Complete Disregard for the Special Master's Findings Seriously Undermines
the Established Practice of Referral in Equitable Apportionment Cases
As noted earlier, the Court in Colorado II broke with tradition by
completely rejecting the findings of the Court-appointed Special
Master. 140 As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, it is unclear whether
the majority actually reviewed the evidence in the record during its de-
liberations. ' 41 Moreover, there is not a single direct reference by Justice
O'Connor to evidence in the record supporting the majority's conclu-
sions concerning the correctness of the Master's findings.
Implicit in the dissent is the criticism that the majority misapplied
the "clear and convincing evidence" standard by using it to test the suffi-
ciency of the findings the Master used to support his recommendation,
rather than using that standard to test the sufficiency of Colorado's evi-
dence. 142 The Court's wisdom in totally rejecting the factual determina-
tions made by an experienced trial judge' 43 on the basis of sixteen full
days of trial is questionable, especially when the majority had no oppor-
tunity to assess the witnesses' demeanor and credibility.
What is most troublesome, however, about the Court's complete
rejection of the Master's findings is that it seriously undermines the effi-
cacy and credibility of the referral process. Because Special Masters
have acted in the past as the eyes and ears of the Court, their factual
determinations have been afforded substantial deference. 144 The Court
chose, however, to ignore the distinct advantage of the Master's proxim-
ity to the litigants and the evidence, relying instead on its own conclu-
sions as to the sufficiency of the Master's findings. By focusing its review
on the Master's findings rather than on the evidence in the record,
14 5
the Court has subtly shifted the crux of interstate water rights litigation
from the presentation of evidence before a Special Master to the presen-
tation of exceptions to the Master's findings.' 4 6 Thus, it would appear
that in order for a state to obtain a favorable judgment, it no longer
must prevail at trial on the basis of its proffered evidence. The Court's
decision offers a state a second opportunity to win. The majority opin-
139. See 2 C. CORKER, WATERS AND WATER Rxirs §§ 132.1, 132.8 (1967).
140. See supra note 3.
141. Colorado H1, 104 S. Ct. at 2443 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Id
143. Judge Kerr represented Wyoming in Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572 (1940),
as Attorney General of the state of Wyoming.
144. See supra note 3.
145. Colorado II, 104 S. Ct. at 2438-41.
146. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 623-54.
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ion indicates that if a state can show that the Master's findings, for rea-
sons of imprecision, lack of clarity, or poor presentation, do not
persuasively support his recommendation, then that state will prevail,
regardless of the evidence in the record supporting the Master's ulti-
mate conclusion.
In light of the equitable attributes of original actions involving in-
terstate water disputes, it hardly seems just that a state which has by
clear and convincing evidence persuaded a Special Master of the exi-
gency of equitable relief should be denied such relief because the Court
finds that the Master's factual findings do not clearly and convincingly
support his recommendation. Faced with the prospect of such an ineq-
uitable outcome, the wiser course of action for a claimant state is to op-
pose the appointment of a Special Master, rather than acquiesce to his
traditional appointment by the Court. 14 7 Thus, the ultimate effect of
the Court's decision may be to discourage the use of Special Masters in
future equitable apportionment actions.
B. Public Policy Considerations do not Support the Use of the "Clear and
Convincing Evidence" Standard in Equitable Apportionment Actions
Involving Interstate Water Disputes Between Prior Appropriation
Doctrine States
Although the Court repeatedly stated that Colorado's evidence was
insufficient to show that New Mexico's water usage was wasteful or that
the benefits associated with the diversion would outweigh any potential
harm to existing users, 14 8 the Court neglected to suggest the degree of
specificity Colorado must attain before relief will be forthcoming. Must
Colorado prepare a detailed water conservation plan for the entire Ver-
mejo River Basin? Is Colorado obliged to devise an elaborate scheme to
improve the arguably lax administration of water rights in New Mex-
ico? 14 9 Furthermore, how much planning and development for future
water usage is Colorado required to undertake in order to prove to the
Court the validity of its intentions?
Although the Court curtly acknowledged that there exist "inherent
limitations [in] proving a beneficial future use' 150 and that "[i]t may be
impracticable to ask the State proposing the diversion to provide unerr-
ing proof of future uses and concomitant conservation measures that
could be taken," 151 the Court failed to appreciate just how daunting its
evidentiary burden of proof may be for a claimant state. Suffice it to say,
147. By this course of action, the state could, perhaps, gain the opportunity to present
its full case to the Court and thus avoid the possibility of losing its case due to some
perceived inadequacy in the findings of a Special Master. Although it is admittedly un-
likely that the Court would agree to hear any case de novo, support for such a procedure
may be implied from the writings of the Founding Fathers. See, e.g., A. HAMILTON, THE
FEDERALIsT No. 80 (McLean ed. 1901).
148. Colorado 11, 104 S. Ct. at 2438-41.
149. Id at 2446-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Colorado II, 104 S. Ct. at 2442.
151. Id. at 2440.
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the total cost of the detailed water use studies and the requisite conser-
vation measures envisioned by the Court could substantially impair the
overall cost-effectiveness of a proposed diversion project.
Although the reluctance of the Court to entertain equitable appor-
tionment actions involving interstate waters may be understandable in
light of the peculiar demands that they impose upon the Court, 152 the
Court's original jurisdiction in controversies between states requires lib-
eral exercise. The founding fathers granted the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction specifically so that interstate disputes might be settled with-
out "the partiality, or suspicion of partiality, which might exist if the
plaintiff State were compelled to resort to the courts of the State of
which the defendants were citizens.' t5 3 The Constitution's article III
grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over suits between
the states is traceable to the frustrations the founding fathers encoun-
tered in the settlement of interstate disputes under the Articles of
Confederation. '
5 4
The inability of these Articles of Confederation to competently re-
solve disputes between the member states led to the drafting and incor-
poration of article III into the federal Constitution.' 5 5 Writing in
support of the need for a supreme national tribunal with original juris-
diction in suits between two states, Alexander Hamilton argued that
"[w]hatever practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony be-
tween the States, are proper objects of federal supervision and con-
trol."' 5 6 Hamilton's reasoning is still appropriate because exercise of
152. See supra note 139.
153. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1888).
154. See 4 JouRN. OF CONGRESS 283 (Congressional resolution urging a peaceful settle-
ment of the conflicting territorial claims by Connecticut and Pennsylvania to lands in the
Wyoming and Susquehannah River Valleys); 15 JOURN. OF CONGRESS 1411 ("Whereas it
appears to Congress, from the presentation of the delegates of the State of Pennsylvania,
that disputes have arisen between the states of Pennsylvania and Virginia, relative to the
extent of their boundaries, which may probably be productive of serious evils to both
states"); 18 JOURN. OF CONGRESS 832-33 (Congressional recognition of boundary dispute
between New Hampshire and New York); 18 JOURN. OF CONGRESS 1147-48 (report to the
Continental Congress on the territorial dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania
over lands in the Wyoming River Valley); 21 JOURN. OF CONGRESS 1115-16 ("a controversy
has long subsisted between the said State of Pennsylvania and the State of Connecticut,
respecting sundry lands lying within the northern boundary of the State of Pennsylvania").
155. SeeJ. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrUrON OF THE UNITED STATES 543-45
(Boston 1833). See also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1791), where Chief
Justice Jay noted that:
[p]rior to the date, of the constitution, the people had not any national tribunal,
to which they could resort for justice; the distribution ofjustice was then confined
to state judicatories, in whose institution and organization the people of other
states had no participation, and over whom they had not the least control. There
was then no general court of appellate jurisdiction, by whom the errors of state
courts, affecting either the nation at large, or the citizens of any other state, could
be revised and corrected. Each state was obliged to acquiesce in the measure of
justice, which another state might yield to her, or her citizens; and that, even in
cases where state considerations were not always favourable to the most exact
measure. There was danger, that from this source animosities would in time re-
sult; and as the transition from animosities to hostilities was frequent in the his-
tory of independent states, a common tribunal for the termination of
controversies became desirable, from motives both of justice and policy.
156. A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 114 (McLean ed. 1901).
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the doctrine of equitable apportionment displaces the efficacy of state
water laws and administrative procedures that frustrate legitimate efforts
by sister states and out-of-state water users to appropriate interstate wa-
ters. 157 If the Court is to respect the rationale underlying its original
jurisdiction in actions between the states, it ought to recognize that
there will be occasions when the Court must act as a constitutionally-
denominated water rights administrator in order to insure that jealous
protection by states of interstate waters within their borders does not
unjustly discriminate against neighboring states.
Although the Court in the past has suggested that interstate water
disputes are best settled through the negotiation of interstate com-
pacts, 158 states seeking an equitable apportionment have found the
Court willing, albeit not eager, to hear such actions. It is crucial that the
Court continue to be receptive to requests for equitable apportionment
decrees when negotiations between contending states have failed, espe-
cially because Congress' 5 9 has been reluctant to impinge upon state
sovereignty by statutorily apportioning interstate waters. 160 Yet, the
Court in Colorado II has elevated the claimant state's search for an equi-
table apportionment to a truly Herculean undertaking by placing the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard in its path.
Although all of the equitable apportionment cases have applied the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard, the salutariness of its applica-
tion to equitable apportionment actions involving prior appropriation
states is questionable. The original purpose in requiring the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard was to insure that states could not easily
force a change in another state's conduct by way of an original jurisdic-
tion action based on a complaint alleging the pollution of interstate wa-
ters. 1 6 ' Thus, if beneficial use is truly the touchstone of an
157. See Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV.
665, 682-83 (1959).
158. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963).
159. The notable exception to this reluctance is the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43
U.S.C. § 617 (1976).
160. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 597 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
161. See Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519-21 (1906). It should be noted that while
Justice Holmes is credited with setting out the "clear and convincing evidence" standard,
he cites the opinion of ChiefJustice Fuller in Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) as
supportive of his formulation of a burden of proof standard for suits between states. A
close reading of Kansas v. Colorado, however, does not reveal any language that either
explicitly or implicitly supportsJustice Holmes' "clear and convincing evidence" standard.
In Kansas v. Colorado, Chief Justice Fuller did no more than advise Kansas that "proof
should be made as to whether Colorado is herself actually threatening to wholly exhaust
the flow of the Arkansas River." Id. at 147.
Even if the "clear and convincing evidence" standard has a laudable function in nui-
sance actions between states over the pollution of interstate waters, whatever worth it pos-
sesses stems primarily from the draconian character of the type of remedy that has been
sought in these cases, namely an injunction. Because equitable apportionment does not
usually require the exercise of injunctions against existing uses but rather an accommoda-
tion among existing users, the partial diminution of existing water rights, or the prohibi-
tion of future uses, the Court should not demand the same burden of proof from states
seeking the equitable apportionment of interstate waters as it might require from states
seeking to enjoin all alleged nuisance activities in an interstate waters pollution case.
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appropriative water right,' 62 then that end rather than the protection of
existing uses should be the Court's principal concern. Moreover, be-
cause the doctrine of equitable apportionment is not controlled by the
water law of the contending states,' 63 the Court may objectively assess
the beneficial effects of existing and proposed water uses and the extent
to which existing water rights are being beneficially applied, removed
from the potentially prejudicial influence of partisan state statutes and
rules. Therefore, if the Court is to adhere to the doctrine of equitable
apportionment, the Court should not hold a prior appropriation state to
the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, but rather to the "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard, because concern for the mainte-
nance of the "status quo between the States"''64 should give way to the
paramount concern for the beneficial use of a scarce resource.
CONCLUSION
Although judicial restraint may often be a laudable judicial princi-
ple, its value is questionable in instances of interstate water rights litiga-
tion following fruitless compact negotiations. When a state has been
unsuccessful in reaching an accord with a contending state whose nego-
tiating position is superior because of existing appropriations, there
should exist a meaningful opportunity to obtain equitable relief through
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
By elevating the protection of existing uses and thereby subordinat-
ing the equality of the rights of states to the beneficial use of interstate
waters, the Court's decision in Colorado II seriously endangers the effi-
cacy of the original action as a means of obtaining equitable settlements
of interstate water rights disputes. Given the rarity of equitable appor-
tionment actions involving interstate waters, it may, however, be many
years before it is known whether Colorado II sounded the death knell for
interstate water rights litigation in the original jurisdiction of the Court.
Peter A. Fahmy
162. See I W. HUTcHINS, WATERS AND WATER RGTrs § 19 (1967).
163. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938).
164. Cokrado 1, 459 U.S. at 195 (O'Connor, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring).
SONY V. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS: CAN THE MARKETPLACE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREATOR AND CONSUMER
BE PRESERVED?
INTRODUCTION
In 1975, the Betamax videocassette recorder (VCR) was introduced
to the American market by Sony Corporation, a Japanese firm. The
Betamax has the ability to record entire television programs and tele-
vised motion pictures off-the-air for later viewing.' VCR technology
represents the first time in the history of copyright law that sizeable
copyrighted works can be copied in their entirety off-the-air in the pri-
vacy of the home.
2
Traditionally, copyright owners have received remuneration for the
use of their works through the marketplace.3 However, direct market-
place remuneration from VCR users for the use of broadcast copy-
righted works is a practical impossibility.4  Indirect marketplace
remuneration to copyright owners from broadcasters for VCR audiences
is at best uncertain. 5 Thus, VCR technology has created a situation
1. The Sony Betamax videocassette recorder combines a tuner capable of receiving
broadcast signals with a cassette recorder capable of making and playing back a copy of the
broadcast programs received by the tuner. The public has the right to receive broadcasts.
47 U.S.C. §§ 153(o), 605 (1982). However, there is no express statutory public right to
copy video broadcasts.
2. Traditionally, copies of entire copyrighted works were made and distributed com-
mercially outside of the home, as by book or sheet music publishers. More recent copying
technologies, such as photocopying or cable television retransmission, see infra notes 126-
46 and accompanying text, have also involved commercial copying and distribution
outside the home. Audio recording technology permits copying of copyrighted music off-
the-air in the home, and thus is relatively analogous to VCR technology. However, VCR
technology is unique in that the copyrighted works which VCRs can copy are lengthy and
very expensive to make.
3. Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this tide
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(3) to distribute copies of phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of... motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly ....
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
4. VCR use is characterized by wide dispersion of the copying activity in private
homes throughout the country, and by the difficulty of channeling remuneration from the
VCR user to the copyright owner of the particular work copied by the VCR user. The high
transaction costs of transferring remuneration to copyright owners from VCR users, and
the low profits which copyright owners would receive from each such transaction, create a
market barrier to transfer of remuneration. For a detailed analysis of the effect of market
failure on copyright law, see Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analyss of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982).
5. When a program recorded by VCR is viewed later, the viewer is able to fast-for-
ward through commercial messages with little difficulty. The viewer is also able to delete
commercial messages if the viewer wishes to manually do so as the program is being re-
corded. The ability of VCR viewers to delete commercials interferes with the complex
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wherein copyrighted works can be consumed on a vast scale with no or
only partial remuneration to copyright owners.
6
Exclusive copyright protection is granted to authors and other cre-
ators on the theory that remuneration encourages the creation and dis-
semination of artistic and scientific works, which ultimately benefit the
public. 7 Some limited exceptions to copyright protection do exist, how-
ever, which allow use of copyrighted works without remuneration to the
copyright owner.8 In Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.,9 the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether VCR use
should fall within the copyright protection or its exceptions.' 0 The
Court could have found that the public interest would be best served by
including VCR copying within the copyright protection, on the theory
that remuneration to owners of broadcast copyrighted works would en-
courage the creation of additional works.' ' Instead, the Court chose to
permit the de facto marketplace status of VCR use with uncertain remu-
neration to copyright owners to continue, by holding VCR use to fall
within exceptions to the copyright monopoly.
12
This article will evaluate the Sony Court's majority and dissenting
opinions by tracing the development of the cases through the district
court and court of appeals, and by comparing the Court's treatment of
VCR technology with its treatment of two similar technologies, photo-
copying and cable television retransmission. This article will then out-
line the "marketplace relationship" between creator and consumer, and
propose congressional action to restore that marketplace relationship by
establishing a system for royalty payments to copyright owners.
broadcasting industry system for remuneration to copyright owners. Under the system,
viewers remunerate copyright owners indirectly through the payment of increased prices
for advertised goods and services to manufacturers. The manufacturers in turn remuner-
ate the advertisers, who remunerate the broadcasters, who remunerate the copyright own-
ers. Amicus Brief of General Electric Co., et al. in Support of Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 13, Sony Corp. of America
v. University City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984) ["Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit" hereinafter
cited as "Petition for Writ of Certiorari"]. However, if VCR viewers are not watching
commercials, advertisers may be unwilling to pay for the VCR audience. See infra note 162
and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
8. For example, limited exceptions to the owner's exclusive copyrights are allowed
under the "fair use" doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). See infra note 28.
9. 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
10. Sony Corporation's Petition for Writ of Certiorari presented four basic questions
to the Court. First, is home VCR copying of broadcast copyrighted works by individuals
for household viewing at a later time an infringement of statutory copyright on such pro-
gramming? Second, if so, does the manufacture and sale of a VCR per se constitute con-
tributory infringement? Third, does household VCR use of broadcast copyrighted works
constitute a "fair use" of such works? Fourth, can a royalty payment system be imposed
on a VCR manufacturer as a remedy for statutory copyright infringement? Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at i.
11. The positions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (see infra notes 41-54 and
accompanying text) and of the Supreme Court dissent (see infra notes 86-112 and accompa-
nying text) favor remuneration to copyright holders.
12. 104 S. Ct. at 796. See infra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
SONY v. UNIVERSAL STUDIOS
I. BACKGROUND
The Constitution empowers Congress "To Promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries." 13 In response to this mandate, Congress passed the first
Copyright Act in 1790.14 The Act granted exclusive copyright protec-
tion to authors of books, maps and charts, with respect to printing, pub-
lishing, and vending these works. 15 Over the years, Congress has
gradually expanded the scope of exclusive copyright protection' 6 to
cover additional media and developing communications technologies.
17
In 1955, Congress began its most recent revision of statutory copy-
right protection. 18 The result, after extended legislative consideration,
was the 1976 Copyright Act. 19 The Act provided copyright owners the
exclusive rights to reproduce or to authorize the reproduction of the
copyrighted work. 20 However, although VCR technology was known at
the time the Act was passed, the Act did not specifically mention the
rights of copyright owners with regard to home VCR use.2 1 Thus, it was
not clear whether Congress had intended to include home VCR use
within the scope of exclusive copyright protection.
22
13. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1982)).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (extending protection to prints);
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (extending protection to musical compositions); Act
of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (extending protection to dramas and plays); Act of
Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (extending protection to photographs); Act ofJuly 8,
1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212, (extending protection to painting, drawing, and sculp-
ture); Act ofJan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (extending protection to public performances
of dramatic and musical compositions); Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488 (ex-
tending protection to motion pictures); Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (extending protection to sound recordings).
17. Among the communication technologies which have been developed while copy-
right laws have been in existence are: sheet music, photographs, piano rolls, silent movies,
movies with sound, sound recordings, radio and television transmission, rapid and effi-
cient copying machines, microfilm, videotapes and computers. For a discussion of the
adaptation of copyright law to new technologies, see Ladd, Home Recording and Reproduction
of Protected Works, 68 A.B.A.J. 42 (1982).
18. The comprehensive revision was a complex and controversial effort. Congress
was aided in its efforts by the Office of the Register of Copyrights. See, e.g., REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. CoPY-
RIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1961) (printed for the use of the House Comm. on the Judiciary).
19. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)). The
effective date of the Act was Jan. 1, 1978.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982). See supra note 3. The exclusive copyright is subject to
certain exceptions. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1982). A consideration of the entire 1976
Copyright Act is beyond the scope of this article.
21. This legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act contains no definitive statement
on home VCR use. See, e.g., Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646 and
H.R. 6927 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on theJudiciaiy, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 22-
23 (testimony of Barbara A. Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights) (Assistant Register
Ringer indicated that infringement from VCRs was not a problem in the early 1970s.).
22. Prior to the filing of the complaint by Universal City Studios, a few courts had
considered the interaction of copyright law with VCR technology. See, e.g., Walt Disney
Prod. v. Alaska Television Network, 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969) (mem.) (cable
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It was in this atmosphere of statutory uncertainty about the rapidly
developing VCR technology2 3 that two copyright owners, Universal City
Studios and Walt Disney Productions, brought suit to preserve their
copyrights from home VCR infringement. 2 4 Named as principal de-
fendants were Sony Corporation and its American distributor. 25 The
plaintiffs claimed that off-the-air recording of plaintiff's programs by
Sony Betamax consumers constituted direct infringement of plaintiffs'
copyrights. 2 6 Plaintiffs further claimed that Sony was liable for contrib-
uting to this infringing conduct by consumers.
2 7
A. The Decision of the District Court
The United States District Court for the Central Division of Califor-
nia concluded that off-the-air recording by Sony Betamax consumers did
not constitute copyright infringement. Instead, the district court found
off-the-air recording to be a noninfringing "fair use."
28
In making its finding, the district court examined the four factors
indicative of fair use set forth in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright
television system operator may not transmit by making a videotape copy of a broadcast,
and retransmitting at a later time).
23. VCR technology has been in a state of revolutionary expansion since its introduc-
tion. According to current estimates, there are fifteen million VCR households in the
United States. The Video Revolution, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 1984, at 50, 52. See infra note 174.
24. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal.
1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). Universal City
Studios produces and licenses motion pictures for theater showings and for television
broadcasts. Walt Disney Productions has licensed many of its theatrical motion pictures to
network television. 480 F. Supp. at 433-35. [For convenience, plaintiffs are hereinafter
cited as Universal.]
25. In addition to Sony Corporation and its American distributor, Sony Corporation
of America (Sonam), defendants included: Doyle Dane Bernbach, Inc., Sony's advertising
agency; several retailers who demonstrated and sold Betamax VCRs; and William Griffiths,
an individual who had used his VCR to copy plaintiffs' copyrighted materials. 480 F. Supp.
at 433-39.
26. lId at 432. Reproduction of copies without authority from the copyright owner
constitutes an infringement of the owner's copyrights. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
27. 480 F. Supp. at 432. Infringement of copyright is a tort. See, e.g., Porter v. United
States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1337 (5th Cir. 1973) (Lee Harvey Oswald's widow barred from
recovery for printing of Oswald's writings in Warren Commission Report). A contributory
infringer is "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materi-
ally contributes to the infringing conduct of another .. " Gershwin Publishing Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (management
company liable as contributory infringer for arranging performances for musicians for fee,
and printing concert programs which included copyrighted works, without obtaining copy-
right clearance). The 1976 Copyright Act does not define contributory infringement. For
a survey of contributory copyright infringement case law, and a criticism of the Supreme
Court's finding of contributory infringement liability against Sony Corp., see Note, Contrib-
utory Infringement Liability in Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Sony Corp.: "The One and Only"
Pays for Our Sins, 14 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 79 (1982).
28. 480 F. Supp. at 456. Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides that repro-
duction of a copyright owner's work is not infringing if such reproduction is made in con-
nection with a "fair use." Fair use includes such purposes as "criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, .... scholarship, or research .... " Section 107 indicates that the
factors to be considered in deciding whether a use is an infringement or a noninfringing
fair use include:
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Act.29 As to the first factor, purpose and character of the use, the dis-
trict court found that the noncommercial, private-use nature of VCR re-
cording weighed in favor of fair use treatment.3 0 As to the second
factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the district court felt the fact
that televised works are broadcast voluntarily and without direct charge
to viewers indicated fair use treatment.3 1 As to the third factor, the
amount and substantiality of the portion used, the district court noted
that, although copying of an entire work weighed against a fair use find-
ing, such copying was not absolutely preclusive of a finding of fair use if
the copyright owner was not harmed by the copying of the entire
work.3 2 As to the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work, the district court found no
reduction in the market for Universal's copyrights. The finding that
Universal suffered no harm from VCR use indicated to the district court
that VCR use should be treated as fair use.
3 3
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
29. 1976 Copyright Act § 107, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
30. 480 F. Supp. at 453-54. It could be argued that home VCR use is "commercial" in
nature because viewers are (a) making copies of works for which there is an indirect charge
through higher prices on advertised goods, and then (b) distributing the copied works to
themselves at a later time. However, the fact that a given use is of a commercial nature
does not necessarily negate a fair use determination. See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (5th Cir. 1980) (commercial mo-
tive relevant, but not decisive as to fair use); Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306-09 (2d Cir. 1966) (fact that author or publisher reaps economic
benefits from the sale of a work containing the copyrighted material of another not con-
trolling as to fair use determination), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); New York Times
Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.NJ. 1977) (fact that defend-
ants seek to profit financially will not preclude their use from being a fair use.).
31. 480 F. Supp. at 452-53. See infra note 48.
32. 480 F. Supp. at 454-56. Traditionally, the greater the amount of the work copied,
the less likely is a finding of fair use. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d
751, 756-58 (9th Cir. 1978) (dictum) (if a large amount of the work is copied, a fair use
finding may be precluded), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d
1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) (dictum) (extensive verbatim copying of copyrighted material
not within fair use privilege), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Rosemont Enter., 366 F.2d at
310 (dictum) (substantiality weighs against fair use); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780
(8th Cir. 1962) (copying of substantially all of a copyrighted song not fair use merely be-
cause infringer had no intent to infringe); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484,
486-87 (9th Cir. 1937) (use of list of names from telephone company directory by defend-
ants in publishing their own directory not fair use); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp.
v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 251-52 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (videotaping of copyrighted educa-
tional films in their entirety weighs in favor of injunction of such videotaping); Loew's Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165, 182-83 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (a substantial
appropriation of a work for purposes of burlesque not fair use), af'd sub nom. Benny v.
Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), afd by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43
(1958). On the other hand, copying of complete works on a vast scale was found to be fair
use in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (copying of
medical journal articles by national library for physicians nationwide permitted), affid by an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). See infra notes 131-34.
33. 480 F. Supp. at 450-52. The district court noted that Universal's and Disney's
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In addition, the district court found a possible implied VCR use ex-
emption from exclusive copyright protection in the 1971 Sound Record-
ing Amendment to the Copyright Act.3 4 The Sound Recording
Amendment exempted noncommercial home reproduction of sound re-
cordings, a practice arguably analogous to home VCR use.
3 5
The district court further concluded that even if off-the-air record-
ing were considered copyright infringement, the actions of defendant
Sony did not constitute contributory infringement. 36 The court analo-
gized from the patent law "staple of commerce" doctrine. Under patent
law, a manufactured article is a "staple of commerce" unless the article
does not have substantial non-infringing uses. 37 The seller of a "staple
article of commerce" is not liable if the article is later used by the buyer
in an infringing manner.3 8 The court reasoned that expansion of con-
tributory infringement liability to manufacturers of devices used by
some consumers to infringe copyrights would exceed the proper bound-
aries of such liability. 39 It stated that such an expansion of liability
would be judicially unmanageable and would hamper commerce.40
B. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court.4 ' The court of appeals ruled that off-the-air
copying by Sony Betamax consumers of copyrighted broadcast pro-
grams constituted infringement under the 1976 Copyright Act.
4 2
profits were climbing despite VCR use, and that any harm from VCR use to copyrights was
speculative. Id. at 452.
34. 480 F. Supp. at 444-46. The 1971 Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-
553, Title I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2560 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982).
35. Congress did not wish to restrain home audio recording because such recording is
made for private use with no intention of capitalizing on it commercially. H.R. Rep. No.
487, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1566, 1572.
However, the current codification of sound recording copyrights does not mention an ex-
ception for home copying. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982).
36. 480 F. Supp. at 459-61.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982).
38. Compare Aralac, Inc. v. Hat Corp. of America, 166 F.2d 286, 295-97 (3d Cir. 1948)
(manufacturer of a fiber used in making fur felt hats not a contributory infringer because
the fiber is capable of noninfringing uses); with Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replace-
ment Co., 377 U.S. 476, 485-91 (1964) (supplier of replacement fabrics specifically suited
for use in infringing repairs of convertible tops by car owners liable for contributory
infringement).
39. 480 F. Supp. at 461.
40. Id. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912) (dictum) (a rule which
would hold the manufacturer of an article adapted to both infringing and noninfringing
uses to be a contributory infringer would "block the wheels of commerce"), overruled on
other grounds by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517-
18 (1917).
41. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'g 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), cert. granted, 457 U.S. 1116 (1982), reargu-
ment ordered, 103 S. Ct. 3568 (1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). For a criticism of the
court of appeals decision's primary reliance on the plain meaning rule as its chief analytical
tool, see Note, Encouraging Delinquency in the American Home: Sony's Contributory Infringement of
Copyrights, 18 Wil.tAmrE LJ. 673 (1982).
42. 659 F.2d at 969. Exemptions from liability under the 1976 Copyright Act are
limited to those set forth in 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1982). See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th
878
SONY v. UNIVERSAL STUDIOS
The court of appeals concluded that home copying was not a nonin-
fringing fair use because such copying by Betamax consumers was not
done for "productive" purposes. 43 By "productive" purposes, the court
meant those purposes which make use of the copyright owner's work to
produce a further work, such as when a scholar copies copyrighted ma-
terial in writing a thesis. "Intrinsic" purposes, on the other hand, are
purposes which make use of the copyright owner's work without produc-
ing a further product, such as when a viewer watches a televised movie
for entertainment. 4 4 Because intrinsic uses do not add to "Science and
the useful Arts" as productive uses do, the Ninth Circuit felt intrinsic
uses do not merit fair use exemption from exclusive copyright
protection.
45
The court of appeals also concluded that off-the-air copying was not
a fair use in light of the factors set forth in section 107 of the 1976 Copy-
right Act. 46 As to the first factor, the purpose and character of the use,
the court ruled that copying for mere convenience does not qualify for
fair use treatment, even if done in a private, noncommercial setting.
4 7
As to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the court
reasoned that a fair use would be less likely where the work was primar-
ily of entertainment value.4 8 As to the third factor, the amount and sub-
Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5674. Universal
argued that none of these exemptions permits uncompensated reproduction of copy-
righted works for purely private use except § 111 (e), which permits cable television re-
transmitters to make videotapes of programs for purposes of later retransmission. 17
U.S.C. § 11 (e) (1982). Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at 11.
43. 659 F.2d at 969-72.
44. See generally L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24 (1978). The
"productive/intrinsic" use dichotomy is not without its problems. Librarians point out
that it would be difficult for libraries to know, for example, whether a patron intended to
use a requested copy for a permitted "productive" use or a forbidden "intrinsic" use.
Amicus Brief of American Library Ass'n in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7.
45. 659 F.2d at 971-72. Because the Framers of the Constitution intended exclusive
copyright protection to promote "Science and the useful Arts," the judicial doctrine of fair
use was developed to permit use of a copyrighted work when exclusive copyright protec-
tion interferes with that intent. See Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 83-84 (1st
Cir. 1981) (dictum). See also Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting
Co., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (fair use doctrine allows courts to prevent copyright
law from stifling creativity); Rosemont Enter., 366 F.2d at 307 (dictum) (courts may
subordinate copyright owner's interest to public interest in development of art, science
and industry).
46. The four factors set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 107 can be found supra at note 28. Con-
gress, in drafting the 1976 Copyright Act, recognized that movies, such as those produced
by Universal, are particularly vulnerable to copyright infringement. Thus, for example,
libraries may not make copies of movies. 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (1982). Motion pictures and
other audio-visual works are also specifically excluded from the exception to copyright
protection contained in 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(1), 112(a), and 118 (1982).
47. 659 F.2d at 972. The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act indicates that
off-the-air recording for convenience should not be considered fair use "under any cir-
cumstances." S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1975). Fair use does not permit
off-air videotaping merely because videotaping increases public access to information and
entertainment. See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica, 542 F. Supp. at 1175-77, 1179-81 (vide-
otaping of copyrighted educational films for distribution to schools enjoined).
48. 659 F.2d at 972. The line between information and entertainment is difficult to
draw, however. Stanley v. Georgia, 397 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (dictum) (individuals allowed
to possess pornography in privacy of the home). If a work serves the public interest in
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stantiality of the portion used, the court noted that VCR use usually
involves copying the entire work, and that such copying weighs against
fair use.4 9 With regard to the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work, the court con-
cluded that because the VCR copy is to be used as the functional
equivalent of the original, the existence of potential harm was estab-
lished for fair use purposes as a matter of law, making fair use treatment
inappropriate.
50
The court of appeals further ruled that Sony Corporation was liable
as a contributory infringer. 51 It found that Betamaxes as complete units
were adapted specifically for copying broadcast programs, almost all of
which are copyrighted. 5 2 It reasoned that because Sony knew Betamaxes
would be used to infringe copyrights, and because Sony manufactured
and sold Betamaxes enabling consumers to infringe copyrights, Sony
accessibility to information, fair use is more likely to be found. See Rosemont Enter., 366
F.2d at 307 (informational value of biography of Howard Hughes weighs in favor of per-
mitting fair use of copyrighted material in biography). When an educational film ap-
proaches a commercial nature, however, the fair use exception to exclusive copyright
protection is less appropriate. See Iowa State Univ. Research Found, 621 F.2d at 61 (commer-
ical broadcast of portion of educational film held not fair use). If the work is purely en-
tertainment, fair use treatment is unlikely. See, e.g., Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532,
536-37 (9th Cir. 1956) (use of part of a movie for use in satirical work not fair use), afd by
an equally divided Court sub nom., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loews, Inc., 356
U.S. 43 (1958); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217,
221 (work of diligence more likely to fall under fair use than creative work); Rohauer v.
Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 732-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (entertainment film does
not warrant fair use treatment), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 949 (1977).
49. 659 F.2d at 973. Many courts have held that copying of substantially all of the
work precludes a fair use finding. See supra note 32.
50. 659 F.2d at 974 n.13. This "functional equivalent" test has been applied in some
cases to deny fair use treatment. See, e.g., Meeropol, 560 F.2d at 1068-71 (district court
erred in holding substantial verbatim copying of copyrighted letters fair use as a matter of
law); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prod., 479 F. Supp. 351, 360-
61 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (musical comedy based on "Gone with the Wind" does not warrant fair
use protection because musical comedy has the same entertainment function as "Gone
with the Wind" and is therefore likely to harm the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work). Where the infringing activity would have a significant impact on the
copyright holder's economic interest, fair use is generally inappropriate. See, e.g., Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1169 n.13 (9th
Cir. 1977) (tendency of infringing "McDonaldland" commercials to decrease market for
original "H.R. Pufnstuf" series weighs against fair use); Marvin Worth Prod. v. Superior
Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (where distribution of infringing
film containing copyrighted material of Lenny Bruce could be expected to decrease value
of copyrighted material, fair use not appropriate); Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (dictum) (perhaps the most important factor
bearing on fair use is whether the use tends to interfere with the market for copyrighted
work); see also S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975) ("a use which supplants any
part of the normal market for a created work would ordinarily be considered an
infringement").
51. 659 F.2d at 975-76. For a definition of contributory infringement, see supra note
27.
52. 659 F.2d at 975. The court of appeals reasoned that because Betamaxes are
adapted specifically for copying copyrighted broadcast programs, Betamaxes are not capa-
ble of substantial non-infringing use. If Betamaxes are considered not to have substantial
noninfringing uses, Betamaxes would not fall within the district court's "staple article of
commerce" analogy from patent law. Id. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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was liable as a contributory infringer. 53 The court of appeals ordered
the district court to consider on remand remedies of injunction or statu-
tory damages. 54
Within weeks after the court of appeals issued its opinion, Universal
sued 42 other manufacturers, distributors and advertisers engaged in
VCR supply, representing essentially the entire balance of the VCR in-
dustry.55 Congress reacted to the court of appeals decision by consider-
ing a number of bills. Some of the bills sought to exempt home video
recording from copyright liability without compensating copyright own-
ers,56 essentially overturning the court of appeals. Other bills, while
completely exempting VCR consumers from liability, sought to require
payment of compulsory royalty fees by VCR manufacturers and distribu-
tors.5 7 Hearings were held in 1981 and 1982 on these bills.58
53. 659 F.2d at 975-76. In prior contributory infringement cases, several elements
were often present which are lacking in Sony. First, the contributory infringer had the right
and ability to control and supervise the infringing activity. Second, the contributory in-
fringer had a financial interest in the infringing activity. Third, the contributory infringer
expressly or impliedly authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner.
See, e.g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, 554
F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977) (racetrack retained direct infringer to supply music to paying
customers); Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159 (2d Cir. 1971) (company managing musicians printed and distributed programs con-
taining titles of copyrighted musical compositions to be performed by managed musi-
cians); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1974)
(screenwriter used material which he knew had been used in copyrighted movie in writing
screenplay for producer); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d
Cir. 1963) (owner of chain stores retained direct infringer to run store record departments
in return for fixed percentage of gross record department receipts); Dreamland Ball
Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Berstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929) (dance hall hired
orchestra to supply music to paying customers); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co.,
432 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (cocktail lounge hired musicians to supply music to
paying customers); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (proprietor of
cabaret licensed premises for performance of infringing song), afd 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir.
1981); Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (advertisers and distributors of bootleg records can be held liable for con-
tributory infringement if they know they are dealing in illegal goods); Davis v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (sponsor and its advertising agency
approved infringing program); H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 159-60, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5775-76.
54. 659 F.2d at 976. Statutory damages could run from $100 to $50,000 per infring-
ing recording. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1982).
55. The "RCA et al. case," No. 81-5723 FW (C.D. Cal. 1981).
56. S. 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S11810-11 (daily ed. Oct. 21,
1981); H.R. 4783, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H7504 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1981);
H.R. 4794, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H7504 (daily ed. Oct. 20. 1981): H.R.
4808, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H7591 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1981); H.R. 5250,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H9928 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981).
57. Amendment No. 1242 to S. 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S15723-
24 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981); Amendment No. 1333 to S. 1758, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REC. S1675 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1982); H.R. 5488, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG.
REC. H333 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1982); H.R. 5705, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC.
H664 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1982).
58. Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 1981-82: Hearings on S. 1758
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1-1384 [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings]; Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, 1982: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
1-1359 [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
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II. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
In March of 1982, faced with the adverse decision of the court of
appeals, Sony Corporation successfilly petitioned the Supreme Court
for a Writ of Certiorari. After extensive consideration, the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.59 in early 1984.60
A. The Position of the Majority
The majority decided that Sony's sale of Betamax VCRs does not
constitute copyright infringement.6 1 As background for its decision, the
majority noted several points. The exclusive copyright protection, or
copyright monopoly, is "intended to motivate the creative activity of au-
thors and inventors by the provision of a special reward .... "62 The
grant of this reward, however, is made to achieve the important public
purpose of inducing release of creative works. 6 3 Therefore, defining the
scope of the exclusive copyright protection requires a balancing of the
interest in rewarding copyright owners on the one hand and the interest
in the free flow of commerce and information on the other. 64
The majority proceeded to consider the issue of Sony's possible
contributory infringement of Universal's copyrights. 6 5 Adopting the
district court's "staple article of commerce" argument, 6 6 the majority
noted that under patent law, "[a] sale of an article which though adapted
to an infringing use is also adapted to other and lawful uses, is not
enough to make the seller a contributory infringer."'6 7 The majority
59. 104 S. ct. 774, (1984).
60. Oral argument was first heard in January of 1983. Reargument was heard in Octo-
ber of 1983. For a summary of the history of the Betamax case, see Betamax Case Reargued
Before Supreme Court, 26 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 498 (1983).
61. 104 S. Ct. at 778, 796.
62. Id at 782.
63. Id (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
64. 104 S. Ct. at 782.
65. The majority distinguished Sony from an old copyright contributory infringement
case, Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). In Kalem, the producer of an unau-
thorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book BEN HUE was found liable for the
producer's sale of the film to distributors, who arranged for commercial exhibition of the
film. The producer did not have the right to authorize use of the copyright owner's work;
this exclusive right is the possession of the copyright owner. The Sony majority distin-
guished Kalkm by noting that in Sony the alleged contributory infringer, Sony, is not au-
thorizing use of a copyright owner's work, but merely supplying a mechanism capable of
copying copyrighted broadcast works, some of which may be Universal's. 104 S. Ct. at
785-86.
The majority also distinguished Sony from past contributory infringement cases in
which the contributory infringer was generally in a position to control use of the copy-
righted works, had a financial interest in use of the copyrighted works, and/or authorized
use of the works without permission from copyright owners. See supra note 53. The major-
ity noted that no Sony employees had direct contact with purchasers of Betamaxes after
the sale, when any infringing conduct would have taken place. In addition, the majority
found no evidence that Sony's advertisements encouraged infringing activities. 104 S. Ct.
at 786-87 & n.18 (citing 480 F. Supp. at 460).
66. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
67. 104 S. Ct. at 788 (quoting Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), overmed
on othergrounds by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517
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then set forth a balancing test regarding the sale of articles of commerce
which may be used to infringe copyrights. The test balances the interest
in effective reward to copyright owners on the one hand with the interest
of others to freely engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce
on the other.6 8 These interests are properly balanced, and no contribu-
tory infringement exists, the majority held, if the article of commerce
sold is capable of substantial noninfringing uses.69 Thus, the question
for the majority became: is the Betamax capable of substantial nonin-
fringing use?
70
The majority reasoned Betamax timeshifting satisfied this "substan-
tial noninfringing use" standard, and that therefore Sony Corporation
could not be held liable as a contributory infringer. 7 1 The majority
noted that the district court's findings indicated timeshifting, the pro-
cess of recording a program at an earlier time for later viewing, is the
"primary" use of Betamaxes. 7 2 The majority considered timeshifting a
"substantial non-infringing use" because (a) substantial numbers of
copyright owners apparently do not object to timeshifting of broadcast
programs by VCR viewers, and (b) even unauthorized timeshifting con-
stitutes fair use.
7 3
If a copyright owner authorizes copying of his work, then the copy-
ing of such work is noninfringing, because the copyright owner has in
effect waived his exclusive copyright protection. 74 The majority noted
that the district court found a significant number of copyright owners of
broadcast programs willing to authorize VCR copying for timeshifting.
7 5
(1917). A patentee cannot control distribution of unpatented articles unless they are "un-
suited for any commercial noninfringing use." Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
448 U.S. 176, 198 (1980).
68. 104 S. Ct. at 789. This balancing test appears to be a modification of the "scope
of copyright protection" balancing test to fit the VCR "article of commerce" situation. See
supra note 62 and accompanying text.
69. 104 S. Ct. at 789. The majority expressed concern that if it held Sony to be a
contributory infringer, Universal would have effective control over the sale of VCRs, sim-
ply because VCRs may be used to infringe copyrights. Id. at 788. The majority stated that
even the remedy of a royalty payment on the sale of VCRs would essentially be a payment
to Universal for Universal's relinquishment of its controlling copyright interest in the dis-
tribution of VCRs. Id. n.21.
70. Id. at 789.
71. Id. at 789, 796. As an additional weight against a finding of contributory infringe-
ment, the majority set up a threshhold test for copyright owners bringing an action for
contributory infringement against a seller of copying equipment. In such an action, the
majority stated, "the copyright holder may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects
only his programs, or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an interest in
the outcome." Id. at 791. The majority discounted the amicus briefs filed on Universal's
behalf from groups of entertainment programming copyright owners. Id at 785 & n. 16.
See Brief Amicus Curiae of Motion Picture and Television Producers and Distributors in
Opposition to Writ of Certiorari; Brief of the Motion Picture Ass'n in Opposition to Writ
of Certiorari. Instead, the majority pointed to producers who authorize timeshifting. See
infra note 74 and accompanying text. Because Universal did not speak for these authoriz-
ing copyright owners, Universal did not meet the majority's threshhold test. 104 S. Ct. at
791.
72. 104 S. Ct. at 779.
73. Id at 789.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). See supra note 3.
75. These authorizing copyright owners include owners of sports, religious and edu-
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Because authorized copying is non-infringing, and because a significant
number of copyright owners authorize VCR copying for timeshifting,
the majority felt it would be unfair to stifle the sale of Betamaxes.
76
Having noted that there is a significant authorized and therefore
non-infringing timeshifting use for Betamax, the majority next consid-
ered whether unauthorized timeshifting was "fair use," and therefore
non-infringing use. As had the lower courts, the majority considered
the four factors indicative of fair use set forth in section 107 of the 1976
Copyright Act. 7 7 As to the first factor, the purpose and character of the
use, the majority noted that timeshifting is a noncommercial, nonprofit
activity. 78 As to the second factor, the nature of the work, the majority
pointed out that viewers are invited to see broadcast works free of direct
charges. 79 As to the third factor, the portion of the work copied, the
majority stated, upon consideration of the fact that the viewer is invited
to see broadcast works for free, that copying of the entire work does not
preclude a finding of fair use.80 As to the fourth factor, the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyright, the majority
did not feel that Universal had shown any present harm to its copyrights
or any meaningful likelihood of future harm to its copyrights. 8 1 In addi-
tion to its evaluation of the above four factors, the majority noted that
increased access to broadcast programs through timeshifting yields soci-
cational programs. 104 S. Ct. at 789-90 (quoting 480 F. Supp. at 468). The majority
especially noted the enthusiastic authorization of Fred Rogers, of "Mr. Roger's Neighbor-
hood." 104 S. Ct. at 790 n.27 .
76. 104 S. Ct. at 791.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). Seesupra note 28. The restatement of the doctrine of fair
use in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) was not intended to change, narrow or enlarge the previous
judicial doctrine of fair use. The factors mentioned in the statute to be considered in
determining fair use are illustrative and not exhaustive. Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ.
Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1168 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (dictum). During the develop-
ment of the 1976 Copyright Act, experts had indicated to Congress that personal or pri-
vate use should be fair use. See, e.g., Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646
and H.R. 6927 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
22-23 (testimony of Barbara A. Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights) (Assistant Regis-
ter Ringer indicates that home recordings should be treated as fair use.).
78. 104 S. Ct. at 792. Libertarians will be pleased to note that the majority does not
consider home VCR copying commercial, another step in the retreat from Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-25 (1942) (government can set quota on wheat consumed on the
same farm where it was raised).
79. 104 S. Ct. at 792.
80. Id. at 792-93.
81. Id. at 793-95. In connection with the fourth factor, the majority set forth a burden
of proof for a plaintiff seeking to prove harm from a noncommercial use of copyrighted
material. The plaintiff must demonstrate either that the particular use is harmful to either
the present market for or the value of the copyrighted work, or show by a preponderance
of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm to the potential market or
the value of the copyrighted work exists. Id at 793. Universal failed to carry this burden
of proof because (a) no present harm existed, as Universal admitted, and (b) the district
court findings showed no meaningful likelihood of future harm. In support of (b), the
majority cited district court findings that (1) current audience measuring systems allow the
Betamax audience to be analyzed; (2) although some Betamax viewers may fast-forward
through commercials, advertisers can make judgments about Betamax audiences similar to
those the advertisers currently make about whether people watching TV shows watch ad-
vertisements; and (3) there is no factual basis to believe that Betamax use will decrease live
television or movie audiences, or audiences from telecast reruns. Id. at 794 & n.36.
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etal benefits.
8 2
Balancing all these factors together in an "equitable rule of rea-
son," 83 the majority concluded that Betamax timeshifting by consumers
is fair use.8 4 Because much Betamax timeshifting use is authorized and
therefore non-infringing, and because even unauthorized timeshifting is
non-infringing fair use, the majority held that the Sony Betamax is capa-
ble of substantial non-infringing uses. Therefore, Sony's' sale of
Betamaxes to the public does not constitute contributory infringement
of Universal's copyrights.
8 5
B. The Position of the Dissent
The dissent8 6 argued it was very possible that Sony's sale of
Betamax VCRs constituted contributory infringement of Universal's
copyrights. 8 7 As a basis for its argument, the dissent proposed a test for
determining whether it is appropriate to impose contributory infringe-
ment liability on the manufacturer of an article which can be used to
infringe copyrights. 88 According to the dissent's test, a manufacturer
cannot be held contributorily liable for infringing uses of the article if a
significant portion of the article's use is noninfringing.8 9 But if almost
all of the article's use is infringing, the manufacturer may be held con-
tributorily liable.9 0 Thus, the question for the dissent became: how
much of Sony Betamax use is infringing?9 1
The dissent argued that at least that portion of Betamax use which
consists of unauthorized timeshifting should be considered infringing
use.9 2 The dissent considered inappropriate the majority's holding that
82. 104 S. Ct. at 795 (citing Community Television of S. Cal. v. Gottfried, 459 U.S.
498 n. 12, 508 (1983) (dictum) (there is a public interest in making television broadcasting
more available)). Fair use is a compromise between the public's first amendment right to
access to knowledge of general import and the right of an author to protection of his
intellectual creation. H.C. Wainwright & Co. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp.
620, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afd, 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Keep Thomson Gover-
nor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D.N.H. 1978) (first
amendment interest of freedom of expression in a political campaign weights in favor of
fair use treatment).
83. The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act indicates that the fair use doc-
trine as endorsed in § 107 of the Act is to be applied as an "equitable rule of reason" on a
case-by-case basis. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5679. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d
Cir. 1977) (dictum) (line between fair use and copyright infringement depends on an ex-
amination of the facts in each case), cert. denied, 434 U.S 1013 (1978).
84. 104 S. Ct. at 795.
85. Id. at 796.
86. l t at 796 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joined by Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist,
BJ.).
87. Id at 815, 818.
88. The dissent realized that if liability were imposed on the manufacturer of every
product which could be used to infringe copyright, commerce would be halted. Id at 814.
89. lt
90. Id.
91. Id See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text. As background, the dissent noted
the statutory protections for copyright owners under the 1976 Copyright Act. 104 S. Ct. at
799-800. Under section 106(1), copyright owners have the exclusive right to authorize
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unauthorized timeshifting is fair use.93 In support of its argument that
unauthorized timeshifting is infringing use rather than noninfringing
fair use, the dissent employed the "productive/intrinsic" use distinction
set forth by the court of appeals.94 Fair use exceptions to the exclusive
copyright protection, the dissent argued, should be limited to uses
which result in some productive, socially-laudable benefit to the public
beyond the benefit produced by the first author's work.95 Because VCR
copying by the consumer for private use results in no creative benefit to
society, the dissent argued, VCR copying should not be held to be fair
use.
96
As additional support for its argument that unauthorized timeshift-
ing is not fair use, the dissent considered the factors indicative of fair
use set forth in section 107.9 7 As to the first factor, the purpose and
character of the use, the dissent argued that although VCR copying may
be noncommercial and nonprofit, it is a noncommercial use resulting in
an individual benefit only, not a societal benefit appropriate to fair
use.98 As to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the
dissent felt that original, creative works of entertainment, the most likely
type of work to be copied by VCR consumers, are especially deserving of
copyright protection rather than fair use treatment.99 As to the third
factor, the portion of the work copied, the dissent argued strongly that
VCR copying of copyrighted works in their entirety is the opposite of
fair use because fair use is intended to permit copying of small portions
of origi. ' works for productive purposes.10 0 As to the fourth factor,
reproduction of copyrighted works. See supra note 3. This exclusive right would include
the right to authorize the making of a VCR copy. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 61, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5675 ("[T]he right 'to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . .' means the right to produce a material
object in which the work is duplicated. . . in a fixed form from which it can be 'perceived
. . . either directly or indirectly with the aid of a machine .... ' ") The dissent noted that
there are only a few, narrowly-restricted situations in which a copy of a copyrighted work
can be made without infringement under the 1976 Copyright Act. 104 S. Ct. at 800. See,
e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1982) (libraries have right to make single copy of work under
limited conditions); 17 U.S.C. § 112(a) (1982) (retransmitters have right to make single
copy of work under limited conditions). In addition, the dissent found no private home
use exemption for VCR copying in the 1976 Copyright Act. 104 S. Ct. at 800-806.
93. 104 S. Ct. at 815. For a discussion of the majority's fair use holding, see supra
notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
94. Id at 807-08. For a discussion of the court of appeals "productive" versus "in-
trisic" distinction, see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
95. Id In addition to the requirement that a fair use be "productive," the dissent
proposed a balancing test that "productive" uses should pass to attain fair use status.
Under this test, the risk of depriving authors of their incentive to create would be balanced
against the risk of reducing the creative activity of others. Id. at 808.
96. Id at 808.
97. For the majority's consideration of these factors, see supra notes 76-86 and accom-
panying text.
98. 104 S. Ct. at 816-17. The majority had argued that the noncommercial, nonprofit
nature of VCR copying weighed in favor of fair use.
99. Id at 817. The majority felt the fact that viewers were invited to watch broadcast
programs free of direct charge weighed in favor of fair use. The dissent argued that the
fact that a copyright owner has licensed such broadcast of his work is irrelevant to the
existence of his right to control reproduction. Id at 808.
100. Id at 817. The majority felt that when the fact that viewers are invited to watch
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the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
right, the dissent felt that VCR copying without remuneration to copy-
right owners has an adverse effect on the value of Universal's copyrights,
because the value of Universal's copyrights would be greater if Universal
were compensated for VCR copying.10 ' The dissent argued that such
an adverse effect is not consistent with fair use.10 2 Therefore, both be-
cause unauthorized timeshifting is not productive use and because the
four factors of section 107 indicate fair use treatment is inappropriate,
the dissent concluded that unauthorized timeshifting is not fair use.
10 3
The district court had not made any finding as to the percentage of
noninfringing versus infringing Betamax use. ' 0 4 Before a decision as to
Sony's contributory copyright infringement liability could be made
under the dissent's test, such a finding was required to determine
whether a significant portion of Betamax use is non-infringing.' 0 5 With
this in mind, the dissent suggested remand to the district court for a
determination of the percentage of non-infringing versus infringing
Betamax uses. 1
06
If virtually all VCR use were found to be infringing, the dissent felt
contributory infringement liability could be imposed upon Sony.
10 7
Under copyright case law, the dissent argued, "contributory infringe-
ment liability may be imposed even when the defendant has no formal
control over the infringer."108 The contributory infringer need merely
broadcast programs for free was considered, VCR copying of works in their entirety did
not preclude a fair use finding. The dissent pointed out that an invitation to view a copy-
righted program for free does not necessarily include an invitation to copy it. Id. at 808,
817 n.49.
101. Id. at 817-18. The majority stated that Universal had failed to show any present
harm to their copyrights or any meaningful likelihood of future harm to their copyrights.
See supra note 81. The dissent proposed a different burden of proof: when the proposed
use is not "productive," the copyright owner need only show "a potential for harm to the
market for or value of the copyrighted work." Id. at 809 (emphasis in the original). Show-
ing a reasonable "potential for harm" would be a significantly lighter burden for copyright
owners than showing actual present harm or a meaningful likelihood of future harm under
the majority test. The dissent felt that if there is uncertainty as to the possibility of harm,
the risk should shift away from the copyright owner. Thus a lighter burden of proof on
copyright owners isjustified, at least when the use is not "productive." 104 S. Ct. at 809-
10.
102. 104 S. Ct. at 811. In addition to its evaluation of the above four factors, the dis-
sent argued that increased public access to television programming is an inappropriate
reason for fair use treatment. Free public access to copyrighted works strikes at the very
heart of the copyright system, because the value of a copyright is inversely proportional to
the availability of free public access to the work. Id. at 808-09.
103. Id at 809, 811, 815.
104. 480 F. Supp. at 468.
105. 104 S. Ct. at 814-15. Although the dissent felt unauthorized timeshift copying was
infringing use, possible noninfringing uses include authorized timeshifting copying, re-
cording works not protected by copyright, and uses qualifying as "fair use" under the
dissent's narrow definition of fair use. Id at 814 n.43.
106. Id at 815.
107. Id at 814.
108. Id at 812 (citing Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162-63; Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 160 n.Il (1975)).
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have reason to know that infringement is taking place. 0 9 Sony had rea-
son to know that Betamaxes would be used to infringe copyrights, the
dissent argued, particularly because off-the-air copying is the intended
use of the Betamax. 1"0 Sony induced infringement by Betamax consum-
ers with its advertisements suggesting off-the-air recording.'' Sony's
inducement of infringing activity, while having reason to know infringe-
ment would occur, the dissent concluded, would merit imposition of
contributory infringement liability if virtually all Betamax use were
found infringing on remand."
12
C. Analysis of the Supreme Court Decision
1. Contributory Infringement
Under the majority decision, a copyright plaintiff will have a difficult
time proving a manufacturer of copying equipment liable for contribu-
tory infringement. To avoid liability under the majority test, the manu-
factured article need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses. 1 13 Unless Congress acts to limit the majority decision, a manufac-
turer of copying equipment is unlikely to be found liable for contribu-
tory infringement in the future."
14
Under the dissent's opinion, a copyright plaintiff would be able to
prove a manufacturer of copying equipment liable for contributory in-
fringement in very limited circumstances. Under the dissent's test, lia-
bility may be found if virtually all the article's use is infringing.
15
109. 104 S. Ct. at 812 (citing Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162; Screen Gems-Columbia Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
110. 104 S. Ct. at 813 (citing 480 F. Supp. at 459-60).
111. 104S.Ct.at813.
112. 104 S. Ct. at 813, 815. A contributory infringer is "one who, with knowledge of
the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct
of another."
113. 104 S. Ct. at 789 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra notes 67-69 and accompany-
ing text. Under the majority decision, copyright owners are basically left to obtain what
remuneration they can within the perameters of unfettered copying technology marketing
and use. For example, if advertisers feel that VCR owners are fast-forwarding through
commercials, copyright owners will simply not receive remuneration for the VCR audi-
ence. 104 S. Ct. at 794 n.36.
114. The majority opinion also forecloses use of a vicarious liability theory as a basis
for recovery of damages by copyright owners. 104 S. Ct. at 787. A strict products liability
theory (cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A) seems out of the question given the
reluctance of both the majority and dissent to "block the wheels of commerce." 104 S. Ct.
at 788-89 (quoting Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), overuled on other grounds
by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917)). 104
S. Ct. at 814 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The inability of the courts to resolve the conflict
between copyrighted works and communications technology innovations without congres-
sional legislation is discussed infra at notes 126-54 and accompanying text.
115. Id at 814 (Blackmun, J, dissenting). See supra notes 107-17 and accompanying
text. Under the dissent's opinion, copyright owners would be able to obtain remuneration
for consumption of their works if a continuing royalty or continuing damages remedy
could be devised for copyright infringement liability. Id at 817 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The dissent thus leaves a window for possible remuneration to copyright owners in the
egregious situation where a communciation technology is univerally purchased for pur-
poses of copyright infringement. The historical pattern of congressional provision for
remuneration to copyright owners is discussed infra notes 135-36, 146-50 and accompany-
ing text.
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Contributory infringement is slightly less difficult to prove under the
dissent's test, because liability may be found based on actual infringing
use, regardless of the capabilities of the copying equipment."l 6
2. Fair Use
Under the majority's decision, a copyright plaintiff will also have a
difficult time proving direct infringement by noncommercial users.
Under the majority's interpretation of fair use, noncommercial copying
of any type of copyrighted work in its entirety is not within the copyright
protection unless it is (a) causing present harm to the value of copy-
rights, or (b) likely to cause harm in the future.' 17 If the copyright
owner cannot demonstrate such harm, the economic loss from noncom-
mercial copying will be borne by the copyright owner.1 18
The dissent's opinion argues that extensive copying of copyrighted
works for convenience is not fair use.' 1 9 Because the majority's treat-
ment of fair use permits such a broad range of noncommercial copying,
as the scope of such copying increases, the dissent's more traditional
treatment of fair use may become more persuasive. 1
2 0
3. Criticism
Sony is a case involving conflict between two types of intellectual
creativity: the creation of artistic entertainment, and the invention of
communications technology.' 2 1 In order to encourage such socially
beneficial acts, the marketing of both types of intellectual creativity is
protected. 12 2 The question is: how can each type of creativity be en-
116. 104 S. Ct. at 814 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. The majority declined to limit the fair use exception to copyright protection to
socially "productive" uses. 104 S. Ct. at 795 n.40. For a discussion of the "produc-
tive"/"intrinsic" use dichotomy, see surpa notes 43-45 and accompanying text. The ma-
jority was willing to allow as fair use home-copying of entire entertainment works, unless
the copyright owners made a showing of actual present harm or some meaningful likeli-
hood of future harm. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
118. 104 S. Ct. at 810 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority's calculation of harm to
the value of the copyright does not include the value the copyright would have had if the
copying in question was within the copyright protection. Id. at 794.
119. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
120. The range of noncommercial copying allowed under the majority's fair use hold-
ing is discussed supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. The growth of VCR copying
alone continues to be revolutionary. See supra note 23. Additional technologies facilitating
noncommercial copying will no doubt appear in the near future. See infra note 121.
121. This conflict between creativity protected by copyrights and inventiveness pro-
tected by patents also potentially exists with other communications technologies, such as
photocopiers, cameras, audio recorders, satellite and cable transmitters, the use of com-
puters to receive and transmit copyrighted computer programs, etc. As new communica-
tions technologies are developed, the list of such conflicts can only lengthen. See Senate
Hearings, supra note 58, at 364-66 (statement of Hon. David Ladd, Register of Copyrights
and Assistant Librarian of Congress for Copyright Services).
122. The Supreme Court majority recognized the need to protect the marketing of
both artistic and technological creativity in its balancing test regarding the sale of articles
of commerce which may be used to infringe copyrights. See supra notes 67-69 and accom-
panying text. The test balances the interest in effective reward to copyright owners on the
one hand with the interest of others to freely engage in substantially unrelated areas of
commerce on the other. 104 S. Ct. at 789. The dissent also recognized that the right to
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couraged without unduly restricting the other?125
The constitutional mechanism for the encouragement of "Science
and the useful Arts" is remuneration to authors and inventors.
124
Therefore, to encourage artistic creativity and technological invention
simultaneously, the least-conflicting means should be found to maximize
remuneration to the owners of both types of intellectual property.
12 5
III. TECHNOLOGIES SIMILAR TO BETAMAX
Throughout the history of copyright law, new technologies have pe-
riodically arisen which have thrown the relationship between copyright
owner and consumer out of balance. 126 When this has occurred, copy-
right law has been restructured to ensure that this balanced relationship,
based on the exclusive copyright protection, was reestablished. 127 The
challenge of VCR technology to the relationship between copyright
owner and consumer is unique, but it bears similarities to two technolo-
gies which in the recent past challenged copyright law to adapt and
grow. These technologies were rapid, efficient photocopying systems
and cable television systems.
Betamax technology is similar to photocopying technology in that
both permit the consumer to obtain a copy of a copyrighted work effi-
ciently, at low cost, and without direct remuneration to the copyright
owner. Betamax technology is similar to cable television retransmission
technology in that Betamax enables consumers to receive (through play-
back) programs at times which would otherwise not be possible, while
cable television technology enables viewers to receive signals which
would otherwise be too faint. A brief review of the response of the
courts and Congress to the challenges posed by photocopying and cable
television retransmission technologies is instructive in evaluating the
Supreme Court's decision in Sony.
market communications technologies must not be blocked by an overextension of copy-
right protection. 104 S. Ct. at 814 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent's test is simply
weighted more heavily in favor of the copyright owner at the expense of the communica-
tions technology marketer. For a comparison of the majority and dissent tests, see supra
text accompanying notes 113-116.
123. Amid argued against holding the marketing of a new technology to be a contribu-
tory infringement on the theory that infringement would not occur without the new tech-
nology. Such a "but for" rule of contributory infringement would have a chilling effect on
invention and on the willingness of advertisers to market technological advances. Amicus
Curiae Brief in Support of the Consumer Electronics Group of the Electronic Industries
Ass'n at 16; Amicus Brief of McCann-Erickson, Inc., et al. at 3.
124. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
125. The means to maximize remuneration to patent owners would be to allow unfet-
tered marketing of the patented communications technology. The means to maximize re-
muneration to copyright owners would be a mechanism providing a fair payment for each
use of the copyrighted work. For a proposed least-conflicting means to maximize remu-
neration to the owners of both types of intellectual property, see infra notes 165-74 and
accompanying text.
126. See supra note 17.
127. See supra note 16.
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A. Photocopying
The early copyright acts gave the copyright owner the exclusive
right to make or authorize the making of copies of his work. 12 8 How-
ever, to accommodate scholars who wished to copy small portions of
copyrighted works in producing works of their own, the courts devel-
oped the doctrine of "fair use," permitting such minor copying.' 2 9 As
photocopying machines became capable of producing copies easily and
cheaply, concern grew that increasing photocopying in libraries and
schools threatened the market for copyrighted works.' 3 0
While Congress was considering revision of the Copyright Act, a
case came before the U.S. Court of Claims concerning the issue of li-
brary copying. In William & Wilkins Co. v. United States,13 1 a publisher of
medical journals brought suit against the National Institutes of Health
Library and the National Library of Medicine. The suit claimed that
these libraries had infringed copyrights by supplying large numbers of
photocopies of medical journal articles to medical researchers and prac-
titioners throughout the country. 13 2 In a controversial decision, the Wil-
liams & Wilkins court upheld the large scale copying by the two libraries
as fair use, in part on grounds that the harm to medical science which
would result from a halt to the photocopying of the articles outweighed
any harm to the publishers. ' 3 3 Following Williams & Wilkins, it appeared
that virtually any amount of photocopying was permissible as a fair use,
at least if done for research purposes.
134
The 1976 Copyright Act, however, set outside limits to photocopy-
ing of copyrighted works. Libraries are permitted to make single photo-
copies of journal articles for individual users, but before copying an
entire work or a substantial part of it, the library must determine that the
work could not be obtained from trade sources at a fair price.' 3 5 Photo-
copying in limited amounts for use by scholars, journalists and educa-
tors is permitted as a fair use.13 6
128. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
129. See, e.g., Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (dictum)
(quotation may be made from a copyrighted work for purposes of criticism). For a defini-
tion of the judicial doctrine of fair use as embodied in the 1976 Copyright Act, see supra
note 28.
130. Register of Copyrights, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law 25-26 (Comm. Print 1961).
131. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973), af d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
132. Id. at 1346-49.
133. Id at 1356-59. See also id, at 1371-72 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
award of a reasonable royalty to the publisher would not harm medical science). For a
marketplace oriented criticism of the Williams & Wilkins decision, see Gordon, supra note 4,
at 1647-52.
134. For a viewpoint favoring broad public access to information and technologies, see
Note The Threatened Future of Home Video Recorders-Universal City Studios v. Sony, 31
DEPAUL L. REv. 643 (1982).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 108(d), (e) (1982).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). For a fuller exposition of § 107, see supra note 28. The
legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act sets forth the texts of agreements between
representatives of copyright owners and educators establishing minimum guidelines for
fair use copying for educational purposes. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-
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To summarize, photocopying technology threatened to disrupt the
relationship between copyright owners and consumers because it ena-
bled consumers, in effect, to become publishers and provide themselves
with copies of copyrighted works without paying royalties to copyright
owners. Responding to this challenge, the Williams & Wilkins court per-
mitted large scale photocopying of journal articles for individual users
on grounds that it produced immediate social benefit in the encourage-
ment of scholarship and scientific discovery. 1 37 Congress, however, sig-
nificantly narrowed the Williams & Wilkins decision with the 1976
Copyright Act. 138 The Act permits limited photocopying, 13 9 but not on
a scale that threatens to disrupt the relationship between copyright
owner and consumer based on the exclusive copyright protection.'
40
B. Cable Television Retransmission
Early in the history of broadcasting, a broadcast was held to consti-
tute a public performance for profit, and thus to fall within the copyright
owner's monopoly right to authorize such performances.14 1 Later cases
held that a retransmission of the broadcast was also such a public per-
formance. For example, it was held that a hotel's retransmission of ra-
dio broadcasts through a public address system was a public
performance. 1
4 2
During the 1960s, cable television systems emerged for the purpose
of providing television broadcast signals to subscribing viewers who
lived in places where reception was too faint. The issue of whether such
retransmission constituted copyright infringement was addressed in
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. 143 Taking a different ap-
proach from earlier cases, the Supreme Court held that cable television
systems were in effect acting as agents of the viewers, enhancing the
viewer's capacity to receive the broadcast signal.' 44 Thus, the retrans-
mission of broadcasts by cable systems did not constitute a performance
70, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5659, 5681-83. Concerning photocopy-
ing under the 1976 Copyright Act, see generally Barkstrom, Copyright: The Fine Art of Pro-
tecting the Fine Arts, 13 COLO. LAW. 1383, 1390-92 (1984).
137. 487 F.2d at 1362-63.
138. Congress viewed Williams & Wilkins as a "holding action" by the courts until Con-
gress could act. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1975).
139. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
141. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.)
(radio broadcast is public performance within meaning of 1909 Copyright Act), cert. denied,
269 U.S. 556 (1925).
142. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931). See also Society of Euro-
pean Stage Authors & Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. I
(S.D.N.Y. 1937) (hotel's retransmission of radio broadcast to speakers in hotel rooms is
public performance); Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.
Pa, 1958) (use of wire systems to supply Muzak to subscribing businesses is public per-
formance), affd per curiam, 267 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1959). Retransmission by the manage-
ment of a hotel to private lodgings is now permitted as noninfringing. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (a)
(1982). Amplification of radio broadcasts by small retail establishments has recently been
found noninfringing. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
143. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
144. Id, at 399-401.
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within the meaning of the Copyright Act and did not constitute copy-
right infringement.
14 5
The 1976 Copyright Act returned to the approach of the pre-Fort-
nightly cases. The Act gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to
perform the copyrighted work publicly.' 4 6 The transmission of a per-
formance to the public is also a public performance.' 4 7 Since a trans-
mission of a performance is a performance, a retransmission is also a
performance. Thus, retransmission is within the copyright owner's ex-
clusive protection.' 48 If a cable system wishes to retransmit broadcasts,
the system must deposit semiannually with the Copyright Royalty Tribu-
nal a royalty fee reflecting use of the cable system by subscribers.' 4 9
These royalty fees are then distributed by the Tribunal to copyright
owners in amounts which reflect the consumption of an individual copy-
right owner's works by the public.
150
Thus, cable television technology threatened to disrupt the rela-
tionship between copyright owners and consumers because it enabled
cable systems to conduct public performances of copyrighted works for
viewers without paying royalties to copyright owners.151 Responding to
this challenge, the Fortnightly Court decided that cable television trans-
mission should be considered a noninfringing use. 15 2 Congress, how-
ever, essentially reversed the Fortnightly decision with the 1976
Copyright Act.153 The Act permits retransmission, but also provides a
scheme for remuneration to copyright owners, 15 4 which restores the re-
lationship between copyright owner and consumer based on the copy-
right protection.
145. Id at 400-02. The Fortnightly holding was extended to include retransmission of
signals not intended to be received in the subscribing area in Teleprompter Corp. v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394 (1974). Plaintiffs in Teleprompter argued that
because cable television system operators play a major role in the retransmission of copy-
righted works, the operators should be held liable for contributory infringement. Id. at
403-04. (The Sony Supreme Court dissent engaged in a similar analysis with regard to
contributory infringement by VCR manufacturers. See supra notes 87-91 and accompany-
ing text.) The Teleprompter Court, however, declined to apply such a "but for" test.
Rather, the Court indicated that resolution of the contributory infringement issue de-
pended on a determination of the function cable television retransmitters play in the total
process of television broadcasting and reception. 392 U.S. at 408.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982).
147. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
148. l A cable television system operator may retransmit by making a videotape copy
of a broadcast and retransmitting at a later time. 17 U.S.C. § 11 (e) (1982).
149. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1982). The cable television retransmitter must obtain a li-
cense. The cable television system may only retransmit those stations which the FCC per-
mits it to transmit. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (1982).
150. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is able to calculate proper remuneration to indi-
vidual copyright owners based on viewer information provided by each cable television
system. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1982).
151. For a discussion of the relationship between copyright owner and consumer, see
infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
153. The Fortnightly Court characterized retransmitters as agents of the viewers. Fort-
nightly, 392 U.S. at 399-401. The 1976 Copyright Act required retransmitters' licensees to
pay royalties to copyright owners. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1982).
154. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
1985]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 & 4
C. Comparison
The courts responded in a similar way to the challenges of photo-
copying and cable television technology. In both Williams & Wilkins and
Fortnightly, the courts acted to permit extensive use of the new technol-
ogy, and broad access for consumers to information communicated by
the new technology, without remuneration to copyright owners. Con-
gress, however, later acted to restrict sharply the scope of noninfringing
uses of these technologies and structured royalty schemes ensuring re-
muneration to copyright owners for use of their works.
The Supreme Court responded to the challenge of VCR technology
in a manner similar to the response of the courts to photocopying and
cable television retransmission technology. The majority acted to per-
mit extensive use of VCR technology and broad access for consumers to
information communicated by VCRs without remuneration to copyright
owners. If the pattern continues, Congress will act to restrict sharply
the scope of noninfringing uses of VCRs or structure a royalty scheme
ensuring remuneration to copyright owners for use of their works.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. The Copyright Marketplace
Underlying the constitutional theory that the granting of a limited
copyright monopoly to authors will ultimately result in the public
good,' 55 is the premise that an economic marketplace exists where indi-
vidual consumers can interact with copyright owners and their publish-
ers.' 56 This premised marketplace acts to provide a forum in which the
measure of the value of an author's work to society is determined by the
amount of remuneration which an author receives from purchases of his
work by individual consumers. 157 Having received through remunera-
tion from consumers an indication that his works are socially valuable,
the author will theoretically continue to produce such works and the
public will be further benefited.'
58
155. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. In advocating a congressional copyright
and patent power, James Madison wrote: "The public good fully coincides ... with the
claims of individuals." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, (J. Madison) (E. Bourne ed. 1901).
156. The theories of Adam Smith and like-minded economists hold that the unre-
strained economic marketplace is the best means of satisfying both the needs of participat-
ing individuals and the needs of society as a whole. See generally A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (0. Piest ed. 1961); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962). Mar-
ketplace theories also underlie constitutional freedom of speech. Broad protection is
given particularly to speech of a political nature on the theory that the political debates of
society are best resolved in the "marketplace of ideas." See, e.g., Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
157. See generally R. POZNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 11-72 (2d ed. 1977).
158. The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant pat-
ents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors
in "Science and the useful Arts." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (dictum). See
also Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932) (dictum) (copyright provides
incentive to further creative efforts).
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In some instances, however, this theoretical marketplace fails to
function. 15 9 One such situation occurs when consumers can enjoy an
individual's work without remunerating him for his efforts. 16° VCR
technology threatens such a marketplace malfunction. Through use of
the VCR, programs can be copied off the air, edited to remove commer-
cials, and watched at a later time.1 6 1 When a VCR consumer watches a
copyrighted work without watching the accompanying commercial
messages, the consumer does not provide a basis for remuneration to
the creative artist who originated the copyrighted work; advertisers will
not pay for that part of an audience which does not watch their
messages. 16 2 If the creator of the work does not receive remuneration,
theoretically the creative artist will not produce additional works. 163
Thus, if the marketplace fails to provide remuneration to copyright own-
ers, consumers will be deprived of additional works from the creative
artist. In addition, consumers will be deprived of the ability to allocate
social resources to producing additional works. 16 4
B. Provision of Royalties
In order to rectify the marketplace malfunction created by VCR
technology, Congress should enact legislation providing a reasonable
159. For example, the theoretical marketplace could fail to provide proper indication
to an author of the value of his work if transaction costs involved in purchasing the work
(such as contacting the seller, arranging and paying for delivery, etc.) are too great to
make purchase possible for the individual consumer. In this situation, the author receives
no indication whether his work is socially valuable, because no one purchases his work. An
author so situated is not likely to produce additional works, though they might be socially
valuable. Thus, the public good would be frustrated by market failure resulting from high
transaction costs. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 1628-29.
160. Intellectual property is easily transferred from one person to another. The supply
of the property is unlimited once it is produced. Thus, control of intellectual property is
inherently difficult. See, e.g., Mansfield, Contribution of Research and Development to Economic
Growth in the United States, in PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 186-91 (E. Mansfield ed.
1974).
161. See supra note 5.
162. The portion of the broadcast audience not watching commercials is hard to gauge.
A Sony Corp. survey indicated that only 25% of Betamax owners fast-forward through
commercials. 480 F. Supp. at 468. Another source indicates that from 40 to 85% of VCR
owners "skip commercials or erase them." Survey of Media Statistics, Inc., Brief for Re-
spondent on Reargument at 6. At any rate, it does seem clear that VCR owners are less
valuable to advertisers than are off-the-air viewers. Brief Amicus Curiae of CBS, Inc. in
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2.
163. Claims of copyright infringement in the television broadcast field require an anal-
ysis of compensation paid to the copyright owner. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394, 411-13 (1974). For a discussion of techniques by
which economic harm from the copying of copyrighted works may be determined, see
Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other Than for Profit or Sale
Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases,
28 ST. Louis U.LJ. 647 (1984).
164. The decision of the Sony Supreme Court majority in effect endorsed a continua-
tion of the marketplace malfunction with regard to VCR technology until and unless Con-
gress acts. For a discussion of the efforts of Congress to balance copyright interests in
light of the Sony decision, see Note, VCR Home Recording and Title 17: Does Congress Have the
Answer to Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc?, 35 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 793
(1984).
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royalty to copyright owners of broadcast works.16 5 Such a royalty could
be collected as part of the purchase price of blank videocassettes.1
6 6
The royalties could be distributed to copyright owners through the
Copyright Royalty Tribunal.' 6 7 Each copyright owner would receive
royalties commensurate with the copyright owner's share of the VCR
audience, as determined by Nielson-type ratings.
168
Collection of royalties as part of the purchase price of videocas-
settes is the most equitable means of remunerating copyright owners.1
6 9
If the VCR consumer is making a noninfringing use of his VCR 170 or is
timeshifting, he will require far fewer tapes and therefore pay fewer roy-
alties. 171 If the consumer is "library-building," however, a more egre-
gious direct infringement of copyright, he will require far more tapes,
165. A number of experts have indicated that the economic incentives of copyright
owners will be undermined if VCR use is permitted without remuneration. See, e.g., Senate
Hearings, supra note 58, at 55-64 (statement of Sidney Sheinberg, President and Chief Op-
erating Officer of MCA, Inc.); Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 356-421 (statement of Hon.
David Ladd, Register of Copyrights and Assistant Librarian of Congress for Copyright
Services); Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 457-460 (statement of Jack Valenti, President,
Motion Picture Association of America); House Hearings, supra note 58, at 589-98 (statement
of Hon. Frank Hodsoll, Chairman, National Endowment for the Arts); House Hearings, supra
note 58, at 611-94 (statement of Hon. David Ladd, Register of Copyrights and Assistant
Librarian of Congress for Copyright Services).
166. The royalty would be collected as a reasonable fixed amount added to the price of
each videocassette. Royalty arrangements are currently found in the Copyright Act in a
number of places. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(b) (2), 111 (1982) (compulsory royalties for secondary
transmissions by cable television systems); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1982) (royalties set by law on
the copying and distribution of phonograph records); 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1982) (royalties for
public performances by jukeboxes); 17 U.S.C. § 118 (1982) (royalties for the use of works
in noncommercial broadcasts).
167. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is an independent agency under the legislative
branch. 17 U.S.C. § 801 (1982). It is composed of five commissioners appointed for
seven-year terms by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 17 U.S.C.
§ 802 (1982). The Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine royalty rates. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111,
115, 116, 118 (1982). It is also responsible for receiving and distributing royalty fees. 17
U.S.C. § 111(d), 116(c), 801(b) (1982).
168. Nielson-type ratings systems are capable of measuring the viewing preferences of
the VCR audience. See supra note 80. A royalty distribution system based on viewer pref-
erences is currently administered by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal in the area of cable
television retransmissions. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
169. The VCR and the videocassette tapes it requires have been likened to a "razor and
blades" marketing situation. In other words, the major long-term profits to be made from
VCR technology will come not from the sale of VCRs (the "razor"), but from the sale of
videocassettes (the "blades"). Bus. WK., October 29, 1976, at 29.
170. See supra note 105. Attorneys are making increasing use of VCRs for videotaped
depositions and preparation of witnesses. One court has pioneered a system whereby di-
rect and cross examinations are presented to the jury on a VCR, with objections and other
procedural arguments edited out.
Traditional fair use considerations, see supra notes 44-46, would seem to dictate that
users of VCR copies for "productive" purposes such as teaching should be exempt from
the payment of copyright royalties on videocassettes. Congress could establish such an
exemption in conjunction with a statutory provision for royalty payments. To simplify the
exemption, perhaps blank videocassette sales to educational institutions could be handled
by special distributors exempt from royalty payments. Guidelines for classroom use of off-
the-air taping have been proposed and supported by educators and industry representa-
tives. 127 CONG. REC. E4751 (daily ed. October 14, 1981).
171. Generally, with timeshifting use and noninfringing use, the VCR consumer
records on the tape and then records over the same tape for the next use.
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and thus will pay more royalties.' 72
Congress should act promptly to provide reasonable royalties to
copyright owners of broadcast works.' 73 It is time to acknowledge the
continuing contribution of copyright owners to the VCR revolution by
bringing VCR use within the exclusive copyright protection. 7 4
Kim Ikeler
172. "Library-building" is the practice of recording many broadcast works and saving
each tape for later viewings, thus accumulating a "library."
173. Among the bills introduced in Congress concerning VCR use following the court
of appeals decision in Sony (see supra note 58) was H.R. 5488, introduced by Rep. Edwards.
Rep. Edwards' bill would exempt home VCR use as noninfringing and provide for pay-
ment of royalty fees by manufacturers and importers of videorecorders and blank tapes.
See House Hearings, supra note 58, at 1105-1118 (reproduction of H.R. 5488, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982)). In the Senate, Sen. Mathias introduced amendment 1333 to S. 1758. This
amendment would exempt off-the-air home VCR recording from the copyright protection,
while providing remuneration to copyright owners. Under Sen. Mathias' amendment,
manufacturers and importers who distribute hardware or blank tape would pay royalties
under a compulsory license at rates set by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (see supra note
167). The Copyright Royalty Tribunal would then distribute the royalties to copyright
owners. Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 335-55 (reproduction of Amendment No. 1333 to
S. 1758, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)).
In early 1983, Sen. Mathias introduced S. 3 1, which provided for collection of royalty
fees by the Register of Copyrights and distribution of royalties by the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal to copyright owners. Senate Bill 31 featured a compulsory licensing scheme
under which manufacturers and importers of VCRs and blank videotapes would pay royal-
ties at rates set by negotiation or arbitration. Home VCR consumers would be exempt
from infringement liability. Video and Audio Home Taping: Hearings on S. 31 and S. 175 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-47 (reproduction of S. 31, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)).
174. With an estimated five million VCR households being added each year, for a total
of 35 million households by 1988, there is no question that VCR use is in a revolutionary
expansion period. The Video Revolution, NEWSWEEK, supra note.23, at 52.

OLIVER V. UNITED STATES: POWELL CHASES KATZ
OUT OF THE FIELDS
INTRODUCTION
Two Kentucky state policemen, without a warrant and admittedly
without probable cause, entered the farm of Ray Edward Oliver after
receiving an anonymous tip claiming that marijuana was growing on his
property.' After driving a short distance past Oliver's house on a road
posted as private, they encountered a locked gate.2 Undaunted, the
detectives parked their car and continued past the gate on foot.3 By this
time, they had already passed four "no trespassing" signs.4 After the
agents had walked several hundred yards beyond the locked gate, past a
barn and a parked camper, they were warned by a man on the property
not to proceed farther. The police, however, continued their investiga-
tion and eventually found a field of marijuana over a mile from the Oli-
ver home.5 The district court suppressed the evidence obtained by the
officers under the exclusionary rule,6 but its decision was eventually re-
versed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc.7
A similar factual scenario had taken place in Maine.8 Again, acting
on an anonymous tip, without probable cause or warrant, two police of-
ficers proceeded onto private property, between a mobile home belong-
ing to Richard Thornton and a neighboring residence, until they
reached an overgrown footpath in a heavily wooded area. 9 An old stone
wall, a barbed wire fence, and "no trespassing" signs were placed
around the perimeter of Thornton's property, including a sign where
the footpath entered the property. The officers ignored all this, how-
ever, and followed the path until they encountered two marijuana
patches 10 which were fenced with chicken wire. Thornton was arrested
1. The Government admitted that it did not have probable cause to conduct the war-
rantless search. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 362 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(Keith, J., dissenting), afd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
2. Id. at 358.
3. The reported Oliver opinions differ somewhat on the facts of the case. For in-
stance, the Sixth Circuit panel opinion stated that "the two men slipped through a hole in
the gate," United States v. Oliver, 657 F.2d 85, 86 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'den banc, 686 F.2d
356 (6th Cir. 1982). However, the en banc opinion reported that they walked around the
gate and proceeded on a path adjacent to it, 686 F.2d at 358. See Note, Katz in Open Fields,
20 A.,. CPmui. L. Rav. 485, 487 n.13 (1983).
4. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 4, Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
5. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1738 (1984).
6. See United States v. Oliver, 657 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1981) for a synopsis of the
unpublished district court order. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence seized in
violation of the Constitution is inadmissible at the trial of the accused.
7. 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982).
8. Maine v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
9. Id. at 490-91.
10. The entire area was so heavily wooded that it was impossible to see the two mari-
juana patches from Thornton's home, from his driveway, from the public road, or from
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and indicted on the basis of this evidence.II The trial court granted
Thornton's motion to suppress; its decision was affirmed by the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court. 12
In each of these two cases, then, police officers had entered private
property in search of evidence of a crime.1 3 The property owners had
excluded the public with no trespassing signs and fences. The contra-
band subsequently found by the police was located in areas which could
not have been seen from any vantage point accessible to the public; this
evidence was then used to incriminate the owner of the property. There
was no warrant authorizing the activities of the police in either case.14
In their efforts to incriminate others, the police in both instances
had committed criminal acts themselves, since statutes prohibiting crim-
inal trespass in Kentucky' 5 and in Maine' 6 had been violated. Certiorari
was granted in both cases,1 7 which were then consolidated.
The United States Supreme Court, in Oliver v. United States,' 8 held
that the fourth amendment, 19 which was created to protect individual
privacy rights against unreasonable governmental intrusion,20 did not
apply in these two situations. It is argued here that the Oliver decision
conflicts with the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard enunci-
ated in Katz v. United States,2 1 that it perpetuates the unworkable curti-
lage concept, 2 2 and that it inconsistently applies fourth amendment
protections.23
I. CREATION AND EROSION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Since the adoption of the fourth amendment, judicial definition of
the amendment's scope has propagated confusion and debate.2 4 To fa-
cilitate an understanding of Oliver's impact on fourth amendment analy-
ses, it is necessary to trace the evolution ofjudicial interpretation of the
neighboring land. "In fact, a person would have had to search just to find his way to the
patches." Id. at 491.
11. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1739.
12. 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982).
13. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1744 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
14. Id.
15. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 511.070, 511.080, 511.090 (1985).
16. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 402(l)(c) (1983).
17. Certiorari was granted in Oliver v. United States, 459 U.S. 1168 (1983) and in
Maine v. Thornton, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983).
18. 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
19. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. See infta notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Coker, Confusion Regarding Exclusion: The Evolution of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 801 (1981).
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scope of fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures, as well as the "open fields" exception to the fourth
amendment.
A. Early History
Prior to the formation of the United States, colonists were fre-
quently subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures under "writs of
assistance." 2 5 These writs were issued by the British, without any re-
quirement of a showing of probable cause, in order for their officers to
search any place suspected of concealing smuggled goods. 26 The wide-
spread abuse of this process by officers has been credited as one of the
major catalysts behind the American movement towards indepen-
dence. 27 In response to these governmental intrusions on privacy, the
framers of the United States Constitution drafted the fourth amendment
to safeguard fundamental values which would far outlast the specific
abuses which gave it birth.
2 8
The language of the fourth amendment does not provide a remedy
for its violation. 29 None of the events leading to its adoption involved
pleas that illegally obtained evidence be excluded from trial. In fact, any
pertinent evidence was admissible, regardless of the manner in which it
was obtained; the only remedy available to the victim of illegally ob-
tained evidence was to sue in tort.3
0
In an effort to put teeth into the fourth amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court, in
1886, excluded evidence from a criminal trial due to violation of the
petitioner's constitutional rights in Boyd v. United States. 3 1 However, the
25. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). See also H. COMMAGER, Docu-
MENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 104 (8th ed. 1968).
26. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625.
27. James Otis pronounced the writ to be "the worst instrument of arbitrary power,
the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever
was found in an English law book," since it placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty officer." Id. (quoting Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 301-303).
Referring to the famous debate in which the above statement was made, John Adams
reflected that "then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbi-
trary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born." Id.
28. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977). In Chadwick, ChiefJustice Burger
reasoned:
[a]ithough the searches and seizures which deeply concerned the colonists, and
which were foremost in the minds of the Framers, were those involving invasions
of the home, it would be a mistake to conclude. . . that the Warrant Clause was
therefore intended to guard only against intrusions into the home. . . . inhere
is no evidence at all that they intended to exclude from protection of the Clause
all searches occurring outside the home.
Id. His discussion indicates that the vagueness in the fourth amendment was intended to
be flexibly construed. See generally N. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FouRTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONsTrrUTON (1937).
29. See, e.g., supra note 19.
30. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1928). For a discussion of mod-
em trends in this direction, see Berner, Fourth Amendment Enforcement Models: Analysis and
Proposal, 17 VAL. U.L. REv. 215 (1982).
31. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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official creation 3 2 of the exclusionary rule did not take place until 1914,
in Weeks v. United States.
33
In Weeks, the Supreme Court ruled that evidence illegally obtained
must be excluded from criminal proceedings in the federal courts.
34
Thirty-five years later, in Wolf v. Colorado,35 the Court stated that the
exclusionary rule did not apply to state proceedings. However, in 1961,
the Court changed course with its Mapp v. Ohio decision 36 and held that
the exclusionary rule was binding on the states, under the due process
clause of the fourth amendment, as an implicit part of fourth amend-
ment guarantees. 3 7 Mapp was also one of the first cases to espouse de-
terrence as the principal purpose of the exclusionary rule. 38
B. The Katz Decision
In 1967, the next major expansion of the fourth amendment's scope
occurred in the landmark decision of Katz v. United States.3 9 Federal
agents in Los Angeles had attached electronic listening and recording
32. The Boyd case is not considered the original source of the exclusionary rule be-
cause the decision was not based solely on a violation of the fourth amendment. The
Court reasoned that, as the petitioner was in essence forced to incriminate himself by the
compulsory production of private papers, both the fourth and fifth amendments were vio-
lated; the combined violation necessitated exclusion of the evidence. Note, The Erosion of
the Exclusionary Rule Under the Burger Court, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 363, 363-64 (1981).
33. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks, the defendant was convicted, in the trial court, of
usi- the mails to transmit coupons or tickets in a lottery enterprise, based on evidence
obtained by a U.S. Marshall who had searched his room and seized various papers and
articles without a search warrant. The Supreme Court held that such taking of papers by
an official of the United States, acting under color of office, violated the constitutional
rights of the defendant, and that the lower court had erred by permitting introduction of
the papers at trial.
34. Justice Day stated:
[t]he tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures. . . should find no sanction in the judg-
ments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Consti-
tution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights.
Id. at 398.
In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Court reiterated:
[Iln the Weeks Case, and those which followed, this court decided with great
emphasis and established as the law for the federal courts that the protection of the
Fourth Amendment would be much impaired, unless it was held that not only was
the official violator of the rights under the amendment subject to action at the suit
of the injured defendant, but also that the evidence thereby obtained could not be
received.
Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
35. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Court stated that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment did not incorporate the Bill of Rights. Id. at 26.
36. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37. Id. at 655. See also Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. Rv.
1365 (1983).
38. Coker, supra note 24. "The rationale is that potential exclusion of any evidence
produced by an unreasonable search will eliminate the incentive to conduct such
searches." Id. at 805. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Peltier v. United
States, 422 U.S. 351 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See generally Note, Scope of the Exclusionary Rule--"Inevi-
table Discovery" Exception Adopted, 4 U. ARK. LrrrLE RocK LJ. 551 (1981).
39. 389 U.S. 397 (1967).
OLIVER v. UNITED STATES
devices to the outside of a public telephone booth 40 to gather evidence
that Charles Katz was transmitting wagering information to Miami and
Boston in violation of a federal statute.4 1 The District Court for the
Southern District of California admitted the evidence, and Katz was con-
victed under an eight-count indictment.4 2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the conviction, holding that no fourth amendment violation had oc-
curred, as there was no physical invasion of the area occupied by Katz. 43
The Supreme Court granted Katz's petition for certiorari in order
to provide the lower courts with a much needed clarification of the
fourth amendment's application. The majority opinion shifted emphasis
away from the "constitutionally protected areas" standard44 toward a
review of reasonable privacy expectations. Most important, the Court
held that the fourth amendment's protections against unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusions applied to "people, not places."
4 5
Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, interpreted the majority opinion
as holding that the rule to be applied was whether the individual had a
"reasonable expectation of privacy."' 46 He then defined this rule as in-
volving a two-part test. First, the individual must have exhibited an ex-
pectation of privacy (subjective part).4 7 Second, this expectation must
40. Id. at 348.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1982). The statute provides:
(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering know-
ingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or for-
eign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire commu-
nication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets
or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sport-
ing events or contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the plac-
ing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State where betting on
that sporting event or contest is legal into a State in which such betting is legal.
18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1982).
42. 389 U.S. at 349.
43. Katz, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966).
44. The Court stated that "the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not
necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase 'constitutionally protected area.' " 389
U.S. at 350. Originally, under a literal interpretation of the fourth amendment, constitu-
tionally protected areas consisted only of "persons, houses, papers and effects." U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV. A "physical trespass theory" was initially used to determine whether
an invasion of a protected area had taken place. Over the years, these protected areas
were expanded to include automobiles, business offices and hotel rooms. Note, Fourth
Amendment Implications of Warrantless Aerial Surveillance, 17 VAL. U.L. REv. 309, 311 n.17, 312
(1983). The physical trespass theory was also expanded, beginning with Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), to protect individuals against modem surveillance
devices. After Katz, fourth amendment protection was extended to cover public restrooms
with open stalls, People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 844 (1973), and garbage, People v. Krivada, 5
Cal. 3d 357 (1971).
45. 389 U.S. at 353. Justice Harlan's concurrence noted: "As the Court's opinion
states, 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.' The question, however, is
what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question




DENVER UNIVERSITY IA W REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 & 4
be one that society deems reasonable (objective part).48
The expansive reading of the fourth amendment's protections given
in Katz seemed to impliedly overrule the limitations imposed by the
"open fields" doctrine 49 first espoused almost half a century earlier, in
Hester v. United States.
5 0
C. The Open Fields Exception
In Hester, decided in 1924, revenue agents had observed two men
committing the crime of "concealing distilled spirits." 5' The agents had
witnessed the incriminating activity while hiding on private property
without a warrant. However, the case did not mention the presence of
"no trespassing" signs, fences, or anything else which would have indi-
cated that the land was not open to the public; in fact, the Court did not
seem clear as to whether there had even been a trespass.5 2 The two
men bolted when they saw the officers. While in pursuit, the agents re-
covered two containers of moonshine whiskey 53 which the men had
abandoned in their flight. The Court held simply that there was no
fourth amendment violation, since the amendment's protections did not
apply to "open fields."
54
Olmstead v. United States,5 5 decided three years after Hester, involved
evidence obtained through telephone wire taps. The Court again held
that the fourth amendment protections did not apply, since their scope
was limited to "persons, houses, papers, or effects."' 56 However, the
Court did concede in dicta that an actual physical invasion of the "curti-
lage" surrounding a house would fall within the amendment's
purview.
5 7
Therefore, prior to Katz, the open fields doctrine was a recognized
exception to the scope of the fourth amendment. Open fields were not
within the plain meaning of the fourth amendment, and so were not en-
titled to any constitutional protection. However, the Katz mandate to
48. Id.
49. See Comment, Katz in Open Fields, 20 AM. CrIM. L. REv. 485 (1983).
50. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 58. The language used by the Court states ambiguously, "even if there had
been a trespass." Id.
53. The Court defined "moonshine whisky" as "whisky illicitly distilled." Id.
54. The Court matter-of-factly stated that "it is enough to say that.., the special
protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses,
papers and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter
and the house is as old as the common law." Id. at 59.
55. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
56. Id. at 465.
57. Specifically, the Court stated:
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to
our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a de-
fendant, unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person or such
a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical inva-
sion of his house "or curti/age" for the purpose of making a seizure.
Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
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protect "people, not places" 5 8 made rigid fourth amendment interpre-
tations, such as those enunciated in Hester and Olmstead, appear
obsolete.5 9
The open fields doctrine has been the subject of numerous deci-
sions in the lower courts, although there has been a great deal of confu-
sion among the circuits regarding its application, 60 especially after the
Katz decision. 6 1 With its decision in Oliver, unfortunately, the Court has
apparently decided to restrict the expansive reading Katz had previously
given the fourth amendment. Ironically, the Court purportedly uses a
Katz analysis to accomplish this end.
6 2
II. OLIVER'S RESTRICTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S SCOPE
The Oliver decision erodes the scope of the fourth amendment
under the guise of defining protected subject matter.
A. Analysis of the Majority's Reasoning
The crux of the majority opinion is that fourth amendment protec-
tions do not extend to open fields.63 The majority effectively emascu-
lates the Katz decision, while purporting to apply Harlan's two-part Katz
test in its analysis. As the basis for its revitalization of the "open fields
doctrine," the majority stated that society will never recognize an expec-
tation of privacy in open fields as reasonable. 64 Open fields, then, auto-
matically fail the second, objective, part of Harlan's Katz test. The fact
that a person asserts a subjective privacy interest in the property is
irrelevant.
65
58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. "Katz made it clear that the Court would no longer rely
solely on property right technicalities or physical intrusion to determine the scope of pro-
tection afforded by the fourth amendment." See Note, How Open Are Open Fields? United
States v. Oliver, 14 TOLEDO L. REV. 133, 142 (1982).
59. See generally Note, Florida v. Brady: Can Katz Survive in Open Fields? 32 Am. U.L.
REv. 921 (1983).
60. See infra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
61. One recent Supreme Court case did, however, uphold the open fields doctrine, at
least in an administrative context. Pollution Variance Board of Colorado v. Western Al-
falfa Corporation, 417 U.S. 861 (1974), was decided seven years after Katz. It involved
open fields surrounding a business, though, and not a home, as in Oliver. Here, a state
health inspector entered the Western Alfalfa Corporation's outdoor premises, without a
warrant, in order to determine if the plant's emissions violated air quality standards. Id. at
862-63. In holding that there was no violation of the fourth amendment, the Court,
although specifically citing Hester, id. at 865, noted that "we are not advised that [the in-
spector] was on premises from which the public was excluded." Id. The Court was appar-
ently applying the Katz test, finding that there was no subjective manifestation of the
Corporation's privacy interest in the property. The Court implied that if the public had
actually been exduded from the property, it may have ruled differently. Id. Since there
was not even a subjective manifestation of an expectation of privacy in the premises, how-
ever, this case failed the Katz test from the outset, unlike the Thornton and Oliver situations.
See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 64-85 and accompanying text.
63. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1744.
64. Id. at 1741.
65. Since both parts of Harlan's two-part test must be satisfied in order for a "reason-
able expectation of privacy" to be found, the fact that the second part of the test fails
1985] 905
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 & 4
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, advanced three main rea-
sons that open fields fail the "objective" evaluation under Katz:
(1) Open fields are not within the plain meaning of the fourth
amendment;
6 6
(2) Open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activ-
ities that the fourth amendment is intended to shelter from government
interference or surveillance;6 7 and
(3) A blanket open fields exception to fourth amendment protec-
tions would avoid a case-by-case determination of whether a legitimate
expectation of privacy does indeed exist, and would at the same time
take the guesswork out of police operations.
68
1. Plain Meaning Interpretation
The majority stated that open fields cannot be categorized as "per-
sons, houses, papers [or] effects," 69 and therefore are not "within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."' 70 Powell tried to reconcile this
strict interpretation with Katz by implying that "persons, houses, papers,
and effects" are examples of "those expectations that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable."
7 1
In explaining its holding, the majority admitted that "no single fac-
tor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the
fourth amendment that a place should be free of government intrusion
not authorized by warrant." 72 The Court then listed factors it had con-
sidered in past determinations of whether society deemed a privacy ex-
pectation to be "legitimate."
73
2. No Activities Deserving of Protection
The Court stated that an individual can never have a "legitimate"
expectation of privacy in an open field, as such fields "do not provide
the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended
to shelter from government interference or surveillance. . . . There is
no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities . . . that
precludes the expectation from being found to be a "reasonable" one. See supra notes 46-
48 and accompanying text.
66. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1740.
67. Id. at 1741. Cf id. at n.10.
68. Id. at 1742-43.
69. This is the precise language used in the fourth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend.
IV., supra note 19.
70. 104 S. Ct. at 1740.
71. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
72. 104 S. Ct. at 1741 (emphasis added).
73. These factors include:
1. The intention of the framers of the fourth amendment, e.g., United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977);
2. The uses to which the individual has put a location, e.g., Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960); and
3. Our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protec-
tion from government invasion, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Oliver, 104 S.
Ct. at 1741.
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occur in open fields." 74
As support for this proposition, the majority observed that open
fields are usually accessible to the public and the police in ways that a
home, an office, or a commercial building would not be. This is due to
the fact that fences and signs do not generally bar the public from "view-
ing" open fields in rural areas.
75
3. Ease of Application
Finally, to bolster its holding that open fields automatically fail the
objective part of the Katz test, the majority stated that such a clear cut
rule would facilitate police enforcement. The Court felt that a blanket
"open fields" exception to fourth amendment protections would make it
easier for a policeman to discern the scope of his authority. 76 It stated
that, conversely, a case-by-case determination would create a danger
that constitutional rights could be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced.
7 7
B. White's Concurrence
Justice White briefly stated 78 that the majority's determination that
open fields do not fall within the plain meaning of the fourth amend-
ment provided enough support for its holding. No matter how reason-
able an individual's expectations of privacy are, "those expectations
cannot convert a field into a 'house' or an 'effect.' ,,79
C. The Dissent
Justice Marshall's dissent was joined by Justices Brennan and Ste-
vens. 80 The dissent particularly took issue with the plain meaning inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment taken in both the majority and
concurring opinions, 8 1 and with the majority's finding that society does
not recognize a legitimate privacy expectation in open fields.
82
1. Non-Literal Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
Marshall noted the majority's inconsistency with Katz, stating that
"neither a public telephone booth nor a conversation conducted therein
can fairly be described as a person, house, paper, or effect; yet we have
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1742-43.
77. Id. at 1743.
78. White's concurrence, in its entirety, was as follows:
I concur in the judgment and join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. These
parts dispose of the issue before us; there is no need to go further and deal with
the expectation of privacy matter. However reasonable a landowner's expecta-
tions of privacy may be, those expectations cannot convert a field into a "house"
or an "effect."
Id. at 1744 (White, J., concurring).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1744-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
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held that the Fourth Amendment forbids the police without a warrant to
eavesdrop on such a conversation." 8 3 Further, Marshall pointed out the
inconsistency in the majority's own holding:
The Court rules that the curtilage, a zone of real property sur-
rounding a dwelling, is entitled to constitutional protec-
tion. . . . We are not told, however, whether the curtilage is a
"house" or an "effect"-or why, if the curtilage can be incorpo-
rated into the list of things and spaces shielded by the Amend-
ment, a field cannot.
84
The dissent reiterated that constitutional provisions should be in-
terpreted to effectuate their purposes.8 5 Marshall stated that the fourth
amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable governmental
intrusions into legitimate expectations of privacy would be incompletely
protected if the amendment were strictly construed.
8 6
2. Privacy Expectation Can Be Legitimate
Contrary to the majority's holding, Marshall found that privacy ex-
pectations in open fields are sometimes viewed by society as reason-
able.8 7  One way in which society manifests its definition of
reasonableness is in the laws it promulgates. 88 In both Kentucky and
Maine, society protects property interests by invoking criminal sanctions
against those who trespass.89 A punishable trespass occurs, however,
only when the property owner has manifested his privacy expectation in
the area by posting conspicuous "no trespassing" signs, or by fencing or
otherwise enclosing the area. 90
To further emphasize his point, Marshall listed ways in which pri-
vately-owned fields not exposed to public view might be used such that
society would acknowledge a legitimate privacy expectation. 9 1 These
83. 104 S. Ct. at 1745 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring generally to Katz, 389 U.S.
347 (1967)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1746.
86. Id.
87. Justice Marshall's reasoning was as follows:
[W]e have traditionally looked to a variety of factors in determining whether an
expectation of privacy asserted in a physical space is "reasonable.... Though
those factors do not lend themselves to precise taxonomy, they may be roughly
grouped into three categories. First, we consider whether the expectation at is-
sue is rooted in entitlements defined by positive law. Second, we consider the
nature of the uses to which spaces of the sort in question can be put. Third, we
consider whether the person claiming a privacy interest manifested that interest
to the public in a way that most people would understand and respect. When the
expectations of privacy asserted by petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton
are examined through these lenses, it becomes clear that those expectations are
entitled to constitutional protection.
Id. at 1747.
88. Justice Marshall stated that "property rights reflect society's explicit recognition
of a person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, [and] should be considered in
determining whether an individual's expectations of privacy are reasonable." Id. at 1747
(quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978)).
89. See supra notes 15-16.
90. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1748 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1748-49.
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include solitary walks, agricultural business, wildlife refuges, lovers'
meetings, worshippers' gatherings, or other creative endeavors.
9 2
3. The Dissent's Solution
The dissent concluded by proposing its own rule: "Private land
marked in a fashion sufficient to render entry thereon a criminal trespass
under the law of the states in which the land lies is protected by the
Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures." 93 Marshall was obviously applying a version of the Katz test:
a subjective privacy expectation, manifested in accordance with the tres-
pass laws of the state, is objectively reasonable. 94
III. PROBLEMS PERPETUATED BY THE MAJoRrrY's HOLDING
The Oliver majority, while declining to extend fourth amendment
protections to open fields, acknowledged two places obstensibly absent
from the "persons, houses, places, and effects" list as within the fourth
amendment's coverage: curtilage
9 5 and offices. 9 6
A. Difficulty of Distinguishing Between Curtilage and Open Fields
Courts have struggled with the concept of curtilage ever since Olin-
stead.97 The distinction between curtilage and open fields is extremely
important, as the former is protected under the fourth amendment,
while the latter is not.98
Curtilage has been generally defined as "an area of domestic use
immediately surrounding a dwelling and usually but not always fenced
in with the dwelling." 99 Oliver defines curtilage as "the area to which
extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life.' "100 What has been termed a "fairly
well-accepted set of guidelines for ascertaining curtilage" 1 0' is enunci-
ated in Care v. United States :102 "Whether the place searched is within
the curtilage is to be determined from the facts, including its proximity
or annexation to the dwelling, its inclusion within the general enclosure
surrounding the dwelling, and its use and enjoyment as an adjunct to
92. The majority acknowledged these "private uses" suggested by the dissent, but
justified its failure to extend fourth amendment protections in these situations by stating
that "in most instances police will disturb no one when they enter upon open fields." Id. at
1741-42, n.10 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 1750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. See generally supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
95. 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
96. Id. at 1741, n.8.
97. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
98. See gmerally supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
99. United States v. LaBerge, 267 F. Supp. 686, 692 (D.Md. 1967).
100. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1742 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 630).
101. United States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, 546 F.2d 1292, 1296 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
102. 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956).
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the domestic economy of the family."' 0 3
Such a nebulous concept has led to inconsistent results in the appel-
late courts. 10 4 Outbuildings or areas as far as 240 feet away from a
house have been held to be within the "curtilage,"' 1 5 while others ap-
proximately one-third that distance away from a house have been held
to be outside the "curtilage.' 10 6 The Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel.
Saiken v. Bensinger,10 7 frustrated by these inconsistencies, stated its own
per se rule: any outbuilding or area within 75 feet of the house is within
the curtilage and any outbuilding or area further than 75 feet is outside
the curtilage."' 0 8 However, other circuits have declined to follow this
rule. '
0 9
Oliver provided the Supreme Court with a perfect opportunity to
resolve the curtilage mystery; instead, the Court perpetuated it. There-
fore, as the law in this area stands after Oliver, curtilage is protected
under the fourth amendment, while open fields definitely are not. How-
ever, a Katz-type analysis" l0 may be needed to determine whether an
area is actually curtilage or an open field, thus necessitating additional
judgment calls by police officers.
B. Protection of Offices
Just as the fourth amendment has been held to include "curtilage,"
so it also has been held to cover "commercial premises.""' The
103. Id. at 25.
104. See United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1981) (150 feet is within the
curtilage); United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1978) (150 feet is within the
curtilage), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979); United States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, supra
note 101 (400 feet is outside the curtilage); United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37 (4th Cir.
1973) (80-90 feet is outside the curtilage), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v.
Capps, 435 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1970) (40-45 feet is within the curtilage); Atwell v. United
States, 414 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1969) (750 feet is outside the curtilage); Wattenburg v.
United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th dr. 1968) (20-35 feet is within the curtilage); Fullbright v.
United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.) (150-300 feet is outside the curtilage), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 830 (1968); United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1964) (75 feet is
within the curtilage); United States v. Hassel, 336 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1964) (750 feet is
outside the curtilage), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 965 (1965); Brock v. United States, 256 F.2d 55
(5th Cir. 1958) (150-180 feet is outside the curtilage); Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d
281 (5th Cir. 1957) (150 feet is outside the curtilage); Care v. United States, supra note 102
("one long city block" is outside the curtilage); Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447 (5th
Cir. 1955) (210-240 feet is within the curtilage);Janney v. United States, 206 F.2d 601 (4th
Cir. 1953) (100 feet is outside the curtilage). Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924),
the landmark Supreme Court decision in this area, held that an article found 150-300 feet
from the house was outside the curtilage.
105. Walker, 225 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955).
106. United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 416 U.S. 936
(1974).
107. 546 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
108. Id. at 1297.
109. United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1981).
110. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
111. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). "This Court has held that the word
'houses,' as it appears in the Amendment, is not to be taken literally, and that the protec-
tion of the Amendment may extend to commercial premises." Id. at 367. See also See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344
(1931); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that offices can be constitution-
ally protected areas.
1 12
Katz stated that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of fourth amendment pro-
tection" 11 3 but "what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."' "1 4 The Katz
majority, then, specifically extended its "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" standard to offices and, in fact, appears to be applying Harlan's
two-part test.
Straying from its own analytical framework, Oliver also evidenced its
support for fourth amendment protection of offices," 5 even though
"offices" are not within the plain meaning of the fourth amendment.
The majority, in dicta, specifically stated that there may be legitimate
expectations of privacy in commercial buildings, citing Marshall v. Bar-
low's Inc. 16 and G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States. 17 Both of these post-
Katz cases employed Harlan's subjective/objective analysis in determin-
ing that commercial buildings were protected under the ambit of the
fourth amendment. 18
C. Cumbersome Test
As the law stands after Oliver, certain areas, such as "curtilage" and
"offices," which do not fall within the plain meaning of the fourth
amendment may still be protected by it, depending upon the outcome of
a Katz analysis." 19 Other areas, however, such as "open fields," are held
not to be deserving of a Katz analysis and will never be protected by the
fourth amendment, no matter what the surrounding circumstances. 120
112. The majority opinion in Oliver specifically mentions two recent rulings in which
the Court held that offices fell within the ambit of the fourth amendment: Marshall v.
Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307 (1978) and G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338
(1977). 104 S. Ct. at 1741, n.8. See also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966).
113. 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). In United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311
(1972), the Court held that a business, by its special nature and voluntary existence, may
open itself to intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context. Thus, a
warrandess search of a locked storeroom during business hours, pursuant to the inspec-
tion procedure authorized by the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 923(g), was up-
held since "[w]hen a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to
accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms,
and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection." Id. at 316. In Colonnade Ca-
tering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), the Court stated that Coneress has
broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures to regu-
late the liquor industry, although in that case a warrantless search was not authorized. See
also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
114. 389 U.S. at 351. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); ExparteJackson,
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
115. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741, n.8.
116. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
117. 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
118. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741, n.8. Justice Powell refers to Marshall v. Barlow's and G.
M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, supra note 112.
119. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, after Oliver, policemen actually have a more cumbersome test
to apply.
First, officers must determine whether the area in question is an
"open field," thus falling under a blanket exclusion from fourth amend-
ment protections. In order to do this, however, the police must deter-
mine if the area can be classified as curtilage. Such a determination has
not proven easy in the past.' 2 1 Second, if the area does not fall under a
blanket exclusion from fourth amendment protections, the officers must
proceed to a Katz analysis to determine whether the individual had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area. 122 If not, there are no
fourth amendment protections. If so, fourth amendment protections
apply. 123
Oliver, in its attempt to streamline the analytical process for police-
men, actually adds the extra, "first," step to that process.
124
IV. PROPOSAL
The majority opinion in Oliver results in a selective and inconsistent
application of the Katz analysis. Open fields, when involving private
land where citizens have made their homes, should at least be accorded
the same protections as businesses.' 2 5 Furthermore, confusion as to
what constitutes curtilage necessitates the case-by-case determination
process which the Oliver majority wished to avoid.'
26
Hester does not need to be overruled, but it should only be used as
modified by the Katz decision. 127 As in the office exception,128 Harlan's
subjective/objective clarification of the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy standard should still be used. Specifically, the test to be applied to
open fields should be that which was basically proposed by the Oliver
dissent: 1
29
121. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
122. For example, such a determination would be necessary in the case of a telephone
booth, see Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), or an office, see supra notes 109-118 and accompany-
ing text.
123. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
124. This "first" step, as previously stated, is that officers must now determine whether
an area falls under a blanket exclusion from fourth amendment protections. This must be
done before the officers apply the Katz analysis, since if the area is excluded under the first
test, no additional analysis is necessary. However, a Katz analysis may be needed to deter-
mine whether the first test is satisfied, see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
127. "It now appears that Hester no longer has any independent meaning but merely
indicates that open fields are not areas in which one traditionally might reasonably expect
privacy." United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 1976). See also United
States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1170 (9th Cir. 1974); Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472,
478 (4th Cir. 1974).
128. See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
129. The test proposed by the dissent, see supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text,
basically qualified the Katz test in both parts ofJustice Harlan's subjective/objective analy-
sis:
(1) An individual must manifest his individual expectation of privacy in an open field
by complying with the "markings" required under his state's criminal trespass statute.
(2) Society will objectively view a governmental intrusion as a violation of the indi-
OLIVER v. UNITED STATES
(1) The manifestation of a subjective expectation of privacy,
(2) Evaluated objectively by societal standards of reasonableness.
Considerations for the first part of the above test might include
whether the area in question could be viewed from a place open to the
public, and whether the individual asserting the privacy expectation had
posted signs, erected fences, or otherwise indicated that the place was
private.
Considerations for the second part of the above test might include
whether the individual manifesting the privacy expectation had com-
plied with the notice requirements under local trespass laws, whether in
fact there were any trespass laws, and whether the open field was next to
a residence. 
30
Application of the two-part Katz test to open fields questions would
abolish the nebulous curtilage concept. In addition, it would provide a
consistent standard for law enforcement officers to apply, instead of a
rule fraught with exceptions.
CONCLUSION
The Oliver decision, under the guise of streamlining fourth amend-
ment application, only serves to perpetuate old problems, as well as cre-
ate new ones. Determination of whether an intrusion into an open field
constitutes an unreasonable search should depend, per Katz,' 3 ' on a
reasonable expectation of privacy standard. This can be evaluated by
viewing an individual's subjective expectation of privacy, as manifested,
in light of objective societal standards. ' 3 2
Leslie Ranniger
vidual's fourth amendment rights only if said intrusion constituted a trespass under the
laws of that state.
This author agrees with the dissent's proposal as far as it goes, but feels it is too
limited; Katz would have allowed the consideration of other factors in addition to those
listed above.
130. Even though a subjective privacy expectation is expressed, society would probably
not deem the expectation to be objectively reasonable where there is no dwelling at all on
the land. See United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pruitt,
464 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Capps, 435 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1970).
131. In particular, as previously discussed, the analysis should focus on whether there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy, as determined by the use of Justice Harlan's two-
prong subjective/objective analysis. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
132. See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
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